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Conspiracy theories point accusing fingers at authorities, and offer alternatives to 
official explanations.  Scholars have argued that in doing so, they may therefore subvert 
social systems and undermine confidence in established political, health and environmental 
positions.  In this thesis we empirically put these arguments to the test.  In four experiments, 
we found that exposure to conspiracy theories reduced SHRSOH¶V intention to engage in (a) the 
political system, (b) environmentally-friendly initiatives and (c) childhood vaccination 
(Chapters 2 and 3).  Ironically however, instead of undermining the social status quo, we 
found in four experiments that conspiracy theories appear to bolster satisfaction with social 
systems.  They appear to do so because they explain tragedies, disasters and social problems 
on the actions of destructive individuals and groups, rather than inherent flaws in society.  By 
drawing attention away from the deeper limitations of social systems, conspiracy theories 
may therefore reduce, rather than increase, the likelihood of social and political change 
(Chapter 4).   Finally, we found that once people have been exposed to conspiracy theories, 
the negative effects are difficult to attenuate.  In two experiments we tested interventions 
based on counter-arguments (e.g., that vaccines are safe instead of harmful) and a pre-
warning that detailed SHRSOH¶V tendency to rely on retracted information.  However, both 
were found to be ineffective in improving intentions to vaccinate a fictional child (Chapter 5).  
Overall, the research outlined in this thesis highlights some of the potentially damaging 
consequences of conspiracy theories.  This research opens up new avenues for enquiry and 
calls for ongoing investigations to address the growth of conspiracism in society.  
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Chapter 1 - 
The social psychological consequences of conspiracy theories:  
Introduction 




funding.  Paul McCartney died in 1966 and was secretly replaced in the Beatles by a 
lookalike.  Pharmaceutical companies and governments cover up evidence of harmful side 
effects of vaccines for financial gain.  Shape-shifting reptilian people control our world by 
taking on human form and gaining power.  Each of these is an example of what is known as a 
conspiracy theory.  Conspiracy theories accompany many significant political and social 
events, such as the death of Diana, Princess of Wales (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Wood, 
Douglas, & Sutton, 2012), the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & 
Furnham, 2010; Wood & Douglas, 2013), the assassination of U.S. President John F. 
Kennedy (McHoskey, 1995), and issues such as climate change (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & 
Gignac, 2013a).  Conspiracy theorising adopts a counterhegemonic stance where the 
conspiracy theories seek to challenge the orthodox explanation for an event (Gray, 2010; 
Sapountzis & Condor, 2013).  In other words, conspiracy theories attempt to undermine or 
subvert social systems by highlighting inconsistencies or ambiguities in official accounts 
(e.g., Clarke, 2002; Fenster, 1999; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007).  In doing so however, they 
may subvert social systems and undermine confidence in established positions on important 
topics such as climate science and vaccination.  An aim of this thesis therefore, is to examine 
and attempt to address the social psychological consequences of conspiracy theories. 
Belief in conspiracy theories is widespread in society, with polls consistently showing 
millions of people subscribing to these alternative viewpoints (Swami & Coles, 2010).  For 
example, one survey revealed that a quarter of the U.K. population believe Princess Diana 
was assassinated rather than being killed in an unfortunate car accident (YouGov, 2012).  
Similarly, polls indicate that more than 60 per cent of Americans doubt the official account 
                                                                                                        Introduction 3 
that President Kennedy was assassinated by a lone gunman (e.g., Carlson, 2001; Goertzel, 
1994; McHoskey, 1995; Swift, 2013), and more than 20% endorse the idea that there is a link 
between childhood vaccines and autism (Public Policy Polling, 2013).  In another study, 48% 
of an African American sample agreed that HIV was a laboratory made virus, and 53% of the 
same sample agreed that a cure for AIDS is being withheld from the poor (Bogart & 
Thorburn, 2006).   
Belief in conspiracy theories is not just limited to the U.K. and the U.S.A.  Polls have 
reliably shown that belief in conspiracy theories occurs across the world (Sunstein & 
Vermeule, 2009).  For example, a poll conducted in seven Muslim countries found that more 
than three quarters of respondents did not believe the 9/11 attacks were carried out by Arabs 
(Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2004).  Similarly, in a survey conducted in 2008 of 16,063 people in 
17 nations, such as China, Russia, France, Kenya, Mexico and South Korea, only 46% on 
average believed the official account that Al Qaeda was behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks, with 
the rest either believing it was the responsibility of the U.S. government, Israel, or indicating 
that they did not know (Allen, 2008).    
It is therefore clear that large sections of the population across the world endorse 
conspiracy theories.  With this in mind, it is paramount to understand why they resonate so 
much with the public.  It is also vital to understand what their consequences could be.  Until 
recently, however, there has been limited empirical research on conspiracy theories compared 
to other areas of social psychology (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; 
Swami & Coles, 2010).  It is only within the last five years that conspiracy theories have 
received serious scholarly attention, with an increasing number of empirical studies now 
being published in scientific journals.  Swami and Coles (2010) have even gone as far as to 
suggest that some academics may have been worried about being engaged with conspiracy 
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theories in case they were branded as conspiracy theorists themselves.  Alternatively, 
researchers may have overlooked this area because conspiracy theories were thought to be 
ridiculous beliefs, held only by a small portion of the population (Sunstein & Vermeule, 
2009), or simply harmless fun and therefore of little concern (Bratich, 2008; Clarke, 2002).  
The growing body of psychological literature has focused mainly on the 
psychological characteristics and processes associated with belief in conspiracy theories.  
Conspiracy theories can however be viewed as attempts to undermine or subvert social 
systems as they offer alternatives to establishment narratives (e.g., Clarke, 2002; Sapountzis 
& Condor, 2013).  In doing so, conspiracy theories may undermine confidence in 
establishment positions on important topics such as climate science and childhood 
vaccination (cf. Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013b).  It is therefore important for 
researchers to consider the consequences of conspiracy theories.  For example, it is plausible 
to suggest that if conspiracy theories do subvert social systems by offering alternatives to 
official explanations this may reduce the likelihood of people engaging in the political 
system, taking action against climate change or vaccinating children against diseases.  
Conspiracy theories may therefore have the power to damage important social systems that 
people rely on in their everyday lives.  This thesis aims to put this assertion to the test and 
examine the impact of exposure to conspiracy theories on important behavioural intentions. 
Conspiracy theories seeking to challenge the orthodox explanation for a significant 
event and instead offer alternative explanations may therefore stop people from engaging in 
behaviours that are needed for society to function.  However, conspiracy theories appearing 
to be so critical of the government and subverting confidence in social institutions seem to be 
in conflict with the important motivation to maintain a positive view of society.  System 
justification theory argues that people are motivated to perceive the system they live in as fair 
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and legitimate (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & Thompson, 2000).  Threats 
to the fairness or legitimacy of social systems cause people to defend, bolster or rationalise 
the status quo (e.g., Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003).  This thesis therefore aimed to 
investigate the novel proposal that whilst conspiracy theories may subvert or undermine 
important social systems, exposure to conspiracy theories may not decrease general 
satisfaction with social systems.  In other words, we explored the idea that conspiracy 
theories might perform a system-justifying function that allows people to preserve the belief 
that the design of society is fair and legitimate.  We propose that by blaming social problems 
on the actions of a destructive few, conspiracy theories allow people to maintain a positive 
view of society.  In doing so however, conspiracy theories may enable people to justify 
inherent limitations of society such as inequality.  This thesis therefore aimed to uncover the 
potential dangers of conspiracy theories.  We tested the idea that conspiracy theories may 
stop people from engaging with important aspects of the social system, but that they also may 
allow people to justify rather than address inherent limitations within society as a whole.  
After examining whether conspiracy theories may damage the social systems that 
people rely on in their everyday lives and can be a way to uphold unfair social systems rather 
than undermine them, the final aim of the thesis was to consider ways to address the potential 
detrimental consequences of conspiracy theories.  To date, there has been limited discussion 
on how to address the impact of conspiracy theories.  It is therefore important to investigate 
tools that may attenuate the potential detrimental consequences of conspiracy theories.  To 
meet these aims, this opening chapter will present a broad introduction to the phenomenon of 
conspiracy theories.  It first will discuss ways to define a conspiracy theory and reasons 
behind their continued popularity in the 21st century, leading to a review of the psychological 
literature examining beliefs in conspiracy theories.  The chapter will end by introducing the 
current research programme.   
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An introduction to conspiracy theories 
Definition of a conspiracy theory 
Several definitions of the term conspiracy theory have been proposed (e.g., see 
Brotherton, 2013).  ab) defined conspiracy theories broadly as attempts to explain the 
ultimate causes of events as secret plots by powerful forces rather than as overt activities or 
accidents.  A second definition, which has been used in a variety of publications, defined a 
conspiracy theory as a proposed plot by powerful people or organisations working together in 
secret to accomplish some (usually sinister) goal (e.g., Coady, 2006; Douglas & Sutton, 2008; 
Goertzel, 1994; Wood et al., 2012).   Finally, some scholars have defined conspiracy theories 
as false beliefs in which the ultimate cause of an event is believed to be due to a malevolent 
plot by multiple actors working together, usually unlawfully and in secret (Swami & 
Furnham, 2012; Swami, et al., 2013).   
These three example definitions are similar in that they all focus on the actions of 
powerful others.  This allows a clear difference to be highlighted between a conspiracy theory 
and what might be called a ³mainstream´ account.  A conspiracy theory interprets an event as 
being orchestrated by a small group of powerful people in order to meet a secret goal, 
whereas a mainstream account may explain the cause of an event as being by a more 
mundane activity such as a simple accident with no malevolent intent.  For example, 
conspiracy theories relating to the death of Princess Diana often suppose that she was 
murdered by the British government as opposed to being killed in an unfortunate car accident 
by a drunk driver.  Therefore, taking into account the similarities of the varying definitions of 
a conspiracy theory, within this thesis we broadly define a conspiracy theory as explaining 
the causes of events as the actions of secret, powerful forces.   
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Popularity of conspiracy theories 
Polls have indicated that beliefs in conspiracy theories are thriving in the 21st century 
(e.g., Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013).  Interestingly, however, whilst 
beliefs in some conspiracy theories can be seen to maintain hold in the public consciousness, 
others never receive such popularity.  For example, a Gallup Poll has found that in the last 50 
years, on average, over 60% of respondents believed µothers¶ were involved in the 
assassination of President Kennedy, peaking at 81% in 2001 (Swift, 2013).  The continued 
popularity of the J.F.K. conspiracy theory occurs despite significant evidence supporting the 
lone-assassin explanation.  On the other hand, however, Public Policy Polling (2013) found 
that certain conspiracy theories were endorsed by only a small percentage of people.  For 
example, only 4% of American respondents indicated belief that ³OL]DUGSHRSOH´control our 
society; furthermore, only 5% in the same sample indicated they believed that Paul 
McCartney actually died in 1966.   
In order to investigate why some conspiracy theories appear to be more popular than 
others, Grzesiak-Feldman and Suszek (2008) IRFXVHGRQSHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVRI the 
conspirators behind the theories.  It was found that conspiracy theories were considered to be 
more plausible if the proposed conspirators were a tightly formed group, such as Jews.  In 
other words, the conspiracy theory was considered more plausible if the proposed 
conspirators were seen to have a high degree of cohesion, homogeneity and shared goals.  
Further, conspiracy theories can provide explanations for big events ± for example, a 
conspiracy theory may be seen as more plausible when the event is disproportionately large 
(Leman & Cinnirella, 2007).  Moreover, some conspiracy theories, such as anti-Semitic 
conspiracy theories, appear to be sensitive to situational factors such as war or elections 
(Byford & Billig, 2001; Kofta & Sedek, 2005).  For example, Kofta and Sedek (2005) found 
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that the Jewish conspiracy theory which argues individuals of the Jewish faith are involved in 
international events, such as in banking institution, is activated in politically threatening 
situations, such as before parliamentary elections.  Therefore, the size of the event, whether 
the proposed conspirators are a tightly formed group, and situational factors at the time such 
as war may promote belief in certain conspiracy theories. 
Popular culture has also embraced conspiracy theories, which may help explain why 
some conspiracy theories continue to be popular in the 21st century.  For example, conspiracy 
theories surrounding J.F.K. and 9/11 have been featured in a range of documentaries, films 
and books (see Byford, 2011).  $VHDUFKRQ$PD]RQFRXNRIWKHNH\ZRUGV³FRQVSLUDF\
WKHRULHV´VKRZVRYHUUHVXOWVVXFKDVWKHILOPConspiracy Theory, the 1991 film 
J.F.K, the popular drama The X-FilesDQG-RQ/HZLV¶The Mammoth Book of Cover-Ups.  
Further, conspiracy theories are regularly referred to in popular TV programmes, such as in 
Friends references to the Moon landings (Bright, 2002) and an episode in the animated show 
South Park dedicated to the 9/11 conspiracy theories (Parker, 2006).  
Conspiracy theories are also easily accessible on the Internet, which may be another 
contributing factor in helping to explain why conspiracy theories continue to be popular 
today.  The Internet is used to assist with a variety of daily tasks, from work to hobbies.  It is 
also FUXFLDOO\DQGLQFUHDVLQJO\XVHGWRIRUPSHRSOH¶VYLHZVDERXWWKHZRUOG0LOOHU	5\DQ
2011), such as being able to access political news and information that can subsequently 
LQIOXHQFHSHRSOH¶VSROLWLFDOYLHZV)RUH[ample, instead of people having to rely on 
LQIRUPDWLRQIURPQHZVSDSHUVWKH\FDQDFFHVVSROLWLFDOFDQGLGDWHV¶ZHEVLWHVRQOLQHDQG
ZDWFKYLGHRVRIFDQGLGDWHV¶VSHHFKHV'LVFRYHU\,WKDVHYHQEHHQVXJJHVWHGE\VRPH
that Barack Obama won his American presidency by utilising the Internet to connect with 
millions of voters (Discovery, 2014).  Moreover, when a significant event such as the death 
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of Princess Diana occurs it is also quick and easy to find an array of information about the 
event on the Internet.  Under conditions of social anxiety and uncertainty, people are eager 
for explanations (Reid, 2010), which the Internet can quickly provide for them.  For example, 
Leman (2007) reports that people were able to access conspiracy theories on websites built 
around the death of Princess Diana in 1997 in a matter of hours.  
With the technological advances made in the last 10 years, conspiracy theories are 
now instantly available via sources such as blogs, Youtube videos and social media (e.g., 
Wood, 2013).   For example, a survey of 153 YouTube videos matching the term 
³YDFFLQDWLRQ´DQG³LPPXQL]DWLRQ´UHYHDOHGWKDWKDOIRIWKHYLGHRVZHUHQRWVXSSRUWLYHRI
vaccination, and provided contradictory information to official sources (Keelan, Pavri-Garcia, 
Tomlinson, & Wilson, 2007).  Researchers have also found that 43% of websites based 
around vaccination contained explicit anti-vaccination content, with many of these sites 
appearing in the top ten results for internet searches on vaccination (Davies, Chapman, & 
Leask, 2002; Nasir, 2000).  It is possible to suggest therefore, that conspiracy theories today 
are more easily disseminated across digital channels than ever before (Coady, 2006).   
In summary, conspiracy theories continue to be popular today with millions of people 
believing these alternative explanations for events (Swami & Coles, 2010).  In order to 
explain such widespread belief in conspiracy theories today, scholars have suggested that the 
digital revolution may have helped (Clarke, 2007; Wood, 2013).  This may be due, in part, to 
the Internet eliminating WKHFRQYHQWLRQDO³JDWH-NHHSHUV´VXFKDVSURIHVVLRQDOHGLWRUV
(Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012, p. 110).  Along the same lines, 
Bartlett and Miller (2011) found that young people are increasingly unable to recognise bias 
in Internet articles because they do not apply fact checks to the information they find.  
Moreover, young people, when searching for information, will not go to a varied number of 
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sources, but rather trust the first thing they find.  Therefore, as noted by Bartlett and Miller 
SHRSOH³DUHRIWHQLQIOXHQFHGE\LQIRUPDWLRQWKH\VKRXOGSUREDEO\GLVFDUG´S
Coupled with the ease of spread of conspiracy information on the Internet (Coady, 2006), 
such limited knRZOHGJHDERXWKRZWKHRQOLQHZRUOGZRUNVLHKRZWKHWRS³KLWV´LQD
search engine are formed) may help explain why some conspiracy theories continue to persist 
in the 21st century.  In other words, being exposed to such alternative views readily on the 
Internet, without the source of information being critically evaluated, may stimulate the 
continued popularity of the conspiracy theory.  With belief in conspiracy theories being 
widespread, it is therefore important for psychologists to learn more about the personality 
characteristics associated with belief in conspiracy theories and the potential consequences 
that are associated with conspiracy theorising. 
What do we know about the psychology of conspiracy theories to date? 
In recent years, psychologists have learned a good deal about the individuals who 
endorse conspiracy theories.  In this section, the existing research to date on the psychology 
of conspiracy theories will be outlined, including measures of conspiracy beliefs, 
investigations of psychological characteristics associated with conspiracy beliefs, and 
psychological processes associated with belief in conspiracy theories.   
Measuring conspiracy beliefs 
At present, several psychometric scales aim to measure the extent to which people 
endorse conspiracy theories.  These usually consist of participants completing a short self-
report questionnaire assessing belief in a number of conspiracy theories concerning real-
world events.  Common items in these scales include conspiratorial statements concerning the 
assassination of President Kennedy, the death of Princess Diana, and the NASA moon 
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landing (e.g., Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Douglas & 
Sutton, 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; Swami et al., 2013).  Participants 
typically rate their agreement with each item on a Likert-type rating scale ranging from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree.  Douglas and Sutton (2011), however, refined this 
measure by asking participants to not only rate their agreement with each statement, but also 
to rate how convincing, worth considering, interesting and coherent they thought each 
statement was.  A total measure of conspiracy theory endorsement was then calculated for 
each conspiracy statement across the five items. 
New measures now exist that offer an alternative to the approach of using real-world 
events.  Brotherton, French, and Pickering (2013) have argued that using specific historical 
events may limit the diverse sample of populations that the scale can be administered to, and 
may become outdated in changing trends of popular conspiracy theorising.  Following this, 
several new scales have been developed, such as the Generic Conspiracist Belief scale (GCB) 
(Brotherton et al., 2013) and the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ, Bruder et al., 
2013).  These scales assess belief about the typicality of conspiratorial activity, removed from 
the context of specific historical events.  Items refer WR³WKHJRYHUQPHQW´DQG³VLJQLILFDQW
HYHQWV´LQWKHSODFHRIVSHFLILFHQWLWLHVRUHYHQWVLHWKHVHLWHPVZHre non-event-based; 
Brotherton et al., 2013).  In doing so, the authors suggest that their GCB measure will endure 
over time, and can be suitable for diverse populations (i.e., not culture specific; Brotherton, et 
al., 2013).   
It is worth noting however, that the GCB scale has been found to correlate strongly 
with the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI, Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic & 
Furnham, 2010) which refers to real-world conspiracy theories.  Thus, when looking at 
British and American samples at least, the scales may be equally useful.  In summary, there 
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are a variety of different approaches to measure beliefs in conspiracy theories, with each 
approach holding their own advantages. 
Demographics  
There appear to be few socio-demographic factors that consistently predict conspiracy 
theory beliefs across studies.  For example some researchers have found conspiracy theories 
to be associated with age (Swami, 2012), education level (Bird & Bogart, 2003; Oliver & 
Wood, 2014), annual income (Bird & Bogart, 2003), perceived importance of religion (Oliver 
& Wood, 2014), religiousness (Furnham, 2013), and political orientation (Furnham, 2013; 
Inglehart, 1987; Oliver & Wood, 2014).  Others, however, have found conspiracy beliefs not 
to be limited to certain parts of society, with several studies reporting no gender, race, 
religious belief, intelligence or educational level differences in conspiracy belief (Abalakina-
Paap et al., 1999; Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999; Darwin et al., 2011; 
Goertzel, 1994; Herek & Capitanio, 1994; Parsons, Simmons, Shinhoster, & Kilburn, 1999; 
Simmons & Parsons, 2005; Swami et al., 2011, 2013), or weak and/or inconsistent 
relationships (Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010; Swami, et al., 2011; Swami & Furnham, 
2012). 
Nonetheless, ethnicity does appear to be a robust predictor of conspiracy beliefs (e.g., 
Goertzel, 1994; Hoyt, et al., 2012).  For example, Crocker et al. (1999) found belief in AIDS 
conspiracy theories to be more common amongst minority groups and especially Black 
populations.  A potential reason could be due to the fact that minority groups already suffer 
from discrimination, and may therefore be more likely to distrust authorities.  In support of 
this idea, Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) found that African-Americans who believed they had 
been the victims of police harassment were more likely to endorse conspiracy theories.  
Along a similar vein, starting in 1932 and continuing for 40 years, the Public Health Service 
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working with the Tuskegee Institute (now known as Tuskegee University) studied the effects 
of syphilis on 600 black men ± 399 with syphilis and 201 who did not have the disease.  
Those who had syphilis, unbeknown to them, had the treatment withheld in order for doctors 
to learn about untreated syphilis in rural African American men.  As argued by Reid (2010), 
³LWLVFOHDUO\ZRUWKQRWLQJWKat governments do at least occasionally conspire against their 
RZQFLWL]HQV´S,WPD\WKHUHIRUHEHUHDVRQDEOHWRVXJJHVWWKDWPLQRULW\JURXSVPD\
have developed beliefs in conspiracy theories because of real discrimination.    
Structure of belief 
Researchers have shown consistently that belief in one conspiracy theory is strongly 
predicted by belief in unrelated theories (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et 
al., 2010, 2011; Wood et al., 2012).  For example, people who endorse conspiracy theories 
regarding the 9/11 terrorist attacks are likely to believe in other unrelated conspiracy theories 
such as President Kennedy not being killed by a lone gunman or that the Apollo moon 
landings were staged (Swami et al., 2010).  Further, scholars have found that individuals who 
endorse real-world conspiracy theories are also more likely to endorse a fictional conspiracy 
theory made up for the purpose of a study (Swami et al., 2011; Leman & Cinnirella, 2013).   
A variety of reasons for this phenomenon have been proposed, centred on broader 
belief systems and world views.  For example, one possible suggestion is that somehow the 
beliefs in conspiracy theories support one another (Goertzel, 1994).  In other words, each of 
the beliefs serve as evidence for other forms of conspiracy, and thus conspiracy can become 
the default explanation for any given event (Goertzel, 1994; Wood et al., 2012).   Goertzel 
(1994) was the first to suggest that conspiracy beliefs may form part of a monological belief 
system, a suggestion that has since been empirically supported by others (e.g., Swami et al., 
2010, 2011).  Indeed, as noted by Wood et al. (2012), the fact that ³one near-perfect 
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[conspiracy could be] successfully executed in secrecy suggests that many other plots are 
possible´ (p. 767).  
Interestingly, however, Wood et al. (2012) also found that people endorse mutually 
incompatible conspiracy theories of the same event.   For example, participants who endorsed 
the belief that Osama bin Laden was already dead when the Americans reached his 
compound in Pakistan were also likely to believe he was still alive.  Holding such a 
contradictory belief can therefore be seen to be at odds with the general idea of a monological 
belief system.  Goertzel (1994) argued for example, that conspiracy theories are linked 
because they are in direct agreement and thus, the conspiracy beliefs support each other.  The 
monological belief perspective therefore does not account for instances where people hold 
conspiracy beliefs that are mutually exclusive.  
Sutton and Douglas (2014) have also suggested that the monological belief system 
perspective is not sufficient in explaining why people endorse several conspiracy theories at 
the same time.  The authors note that there are other plausible mechanisms that hold 
conspiracy beliefs together, such as conspiracy theories addressing feelings of control 
(Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) and WKHWHQGHQF\WRSURMHFWRQH¶VRZQPRUDOOHDQLQJVRQWRWKH
alleged conspirators (Douglas & Sutton, 2011).  Another explanation argues that beliefs in 
conspiracy theories are positively associated because both are associated with the view that 
authorities are engaged in a cover-up and are hiding something (Wood et al., 2012).  Thus, 
conspiracist belief systems are driven not by direct relationships among individual theories as 
presented in the monological belief system perspective, but by agreement between individual 
theories and higher-order beliefs about the world.  Wood et al. (2012) have provided evidence 
of this assertion by demonstrating beliefs in contradictory theories regarding Osama Bin 
Laden were explained by people endorsing the idea that the U.S government is hiding 
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important information about the raid that led to his death.  Sutton and Douglas (2014) suggest 
tKDWWKHDVVRFLDWLRQVEHWZHHQEHOLHIVLQFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVPD\HYHQEHH[SODLQHGE\³DQ
underlying individual difference variable, such as conspiracism´S2YHUDOOWKLV
research provides evidence that the message is not as important as the idea that authorities 
and officials are responsible for a cover-up.    
Cognitive biases 
Beliefs in conspiracy theories have also been found to be associated with biases in 
information processing that are automatic and thus unconscious.  This section aims to provide 
an overview of each of the biases associated with conspiracy theorising.  
Biased assimilation and attitude polarisation.  Conspiracy theories may persist 
because people seek and interpret information in such a way as to confirm an existing 
preconceptioQ,QRWKHUZRUGVQHZLQIRUPDWLRQLVRQO\VRXJKWLQRUGHUWRFRQILUPRQH¶V
initial beliefs, which subsequently protects the beliefs from critical evaluation.  This process 
of biased assimilation is correlated with attitude polarisation (McHoskey, 1995).  Put 
GLIIHUHQWO\RQH¶VLQLWLDOSRVLWLRQFDQEHVWUHQJWKHQHGE\XQFULWLFDOO\DFFHSWLQJHYLGHQFHWKDW
supports prior held beliefs.  For example, when presented with mixed evidence, people have a 
tendency to uncritically accept evidence that is supportive of their prior viewpoint whilst 
discrediting evidence that argues against this existing preconception.  By uncritically 
accepting evidence that is supportive of their viewpoint, this information further strengthens 
their beliefs.  McHoskey (1995) suggested that a similar process of biased assimilation and 
attitude polarisation might happen with belief in conspiracy theories. 
McHoskey (1995) empirically explored this assertion by first asking participants to 
indicate their belief in several conspiracy theories concerning the assassination of J.F.K.  
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Participants were then presented with evidence containing conspiracy theory arguments or 
anti-conspiracy arguments, before re-rating their belief in the J.F.K. conspiracy theory.  
Results revealed that those who initially indicated a higher belief in J.F.K conspiracy found 
arguments supporting this position to be more persuasive than evidence in favour of the long-
gunman theory.  McHoskey (1995) also exposed participants to mixed evidence containing 
both conspiracy theory arguments and anti-conspiracy arguments.  Results demonstrated that 
people uncritically accepted evidence that was supportive of their prior belief, whilst 
scrutinising and discrediting any evidence that went against their initial position.  In other 
words, those who held a conspiracy theory belief discredited evidence that argued in favour 
of the mainstream account.  On the other hand, those who held mainstream beliefs discredited 
evidence that argued for the conspiracy account. 
 Similarly, Leman and Cinnirella (2013) found participants who indicated a higher 
belief in real world conspiracy theories were more likely to attribute a conspiracy theory to a 
fictitious account of an assassination, whereas nonbelievers believed it fitted better with a 
mainstream account.  The research taken together suggests that the same piece of information 
can be taken to support contradictory beliefs held by different people.  Put differently, when 
evidence contains both pro- and anti-conspiracy information for example, people accepted the 
body of evidence that supports their own pre-existing belief.  These findings appear to 
confirm the relevance of biased assimilation and attitude polarisation in the maintenance of 
conspiracy theory beliefs. 
Projection. The process of projection leads people to believe that others will 
generally think, feel and behave in the same way as they themselves do (Ames, 2004).  This 
therefore allows people to make sense of the social environment when more reliable 
information is lacking (Ames, 2004).  Douglas and Sutton (2011) have suggested belief in 
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conspiracy theories may be a product of this social cognitive tool where they use themselves 
as a reference point when trying to understand what others may have done.  For example, 
people may be less likely to dismiss the hypothesis that government scientists created AIDS 
if they believe that they personally would be willing to create it.  In other words, people 
KROGLQJWKHSHUFHSWLRQWKDW³,ZRXOGGRLW´OHDGVWKHPWRSHUFHLYHWKDW³WKH\GLGLW´'Ruglas 
& Sutton, 2011, p. 545).  
To test this hypothesis, Douglas and Sutton (2011) conducted two studies.  In the first 
study they measured the individual difference variable of Machiavellianism, which reflects a 
willingness to exploit others for personal gain and is therefore a reasonable indicator of a 
SHUVRQ¶VPRUDOWHQGHQFLHVChristie & Geis, 1970; Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Hodson, Hogg, 
& MacInnis, 2009).  Participants were then asked to indicate their belief in a number of 
conspiracy theories and whether they would have participated in the alleged conspiracies if 
they were in the same position.  Results revealed that Machiavellianism and greater personal 
willingness to conspire predicted stronger belief in conspiracy theories.  Moreover, the 
relationship between Machiavellianism and belief in conspiracy theories was explained by 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUVRQDOZLOOLQJQHVVWRFRQVSLUH,QRWKHUZRUGVKLJK0DFKLDYHOOLDQ
participants were more likely to endorse the conspiracy theory account because they were 
more likely to perceive they would conspire themselves.   
In the second study, Douglas and Sutton (2011) primed participants with their 
personal morality by asking them to recall a time when they behaved in a moral and decent 
manner (vs. a control).  It was reasoned that in recalling a time when they behaved in a moral 
and decent manner, participants would perceive themselves as being unlikely to participate in 
conspiracy theories.  Participants were then asked to indicate both their belief in conspiracy 
theories and their willingness to participate in each of the alleged conspiracies.  They found 
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that the participants who were asked to write about a time they helped someone endorsed 
conspiracy theories to a lesser extent than those in the control condition.  This relationship 
was fully explained by participants being less willing to have participated in the alleged 
conspiracies.  This provides evidence that people believe in conspiracy theories to the extent 
that they think they, personally, would have been willing to conspire.  As Douglas and Sutton 
(2011) note, projection may arise in conspiracy theories when there is little information 
available concerning the causes of a significant event.  People therefore may use themselves 
as a reference point when faced with a conspiracy theory account. 
Proportionality. 7KHSURSRUWLRQDOLW\ELDVUHIHUVWR³DQLUUDWLRQDOQHHGWRH[SODLQELJ
DQGLPSRUWDQWHYHQWVZLWKSURSRUWLRQDWHO\ELJDQGLPSRUWDQWFDXVHV´0F&DXOH\	-DFTXHV
1979, p. 637).  It is argued that this occurs because people often prefer to make assumptions 
that significant events are likely to have been caused by something as equally significant 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972).  To take the example of the death of Princess Diana, 
explaining her death as a simple car accident violates the principle of proportionality.  
However, explaining her death as a conspiracy, where members of the Royal Family 
murdered her, maintains proportionality between a big cause and a big consequence.  Across 
a series of studies, the role of the proportionality bias in conspiracy belief has been tested.  
The first by McCauley and Jacques (1979) tested the hypothesis that people would prefer to 
believe a major cause is responsible for a major event.  To test this, the authors presented 
participants with one of two newspaper headlines ± RQHKHDGOLQHEHLQJ³0DQVKRRWVDWWKH
3UHVLGHQWDQGPLVVHV´PLQRUFRQVHTXHQFHDQGWKHVHFRQGEHLQJ³0DQVKRRWVDWWKH
3UHVLGHQWDQGNLOOVKLP´PDMRUFDXVH7KHVHVFHQDULRVWKHUHIRUHGLUHFWO\PDQLSXODWHGWKH 
size of the event where people were either told the president survived an assassination (i.e., a 
minor event) or the bullets killed him (i.e., major event), before indicting their belief that a 
FRQVSLUDF\ZDVLQYROYHGLQWKH3UHVLGHQW¶VGHDWK5HVXOWVGHmonstrated that the fatal 
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assassination was judged to be relatively more likely to be the result of a conspiracy (as 
opposed to a lone assassin) in comparison to the non-fatal attempt.   
In explaining this finding, McCauley and Jacques (1979) suggested however, that 
rather than being influenced by a proportionality heuristic, the participants may have instead 
made a judgment about the expected competence of the assassin.  In a follow up study, 
Leman and Cinnirella (2007) aimed to explore this alternative interpretation further by 
breaking the casual link between the competence of the assassin and the outcome.  People 
therefore read one of four scenarios: the president is shot and dies (1; major event), the 
president is shot at but the bullets miss and he survives (2; minor event), the president is hit 
but he survives (3; minor event) or the president is shot at but the bullets miss; however, he 
dies of an unrelated cause (4; major event).  The last scenario was the key condition, as this 
took into account the competence of the assassin, but the outcome was still the death of the 
President.  Results demonstrated that participants were more likely to believe that a 
conspiracy was the cause of an event where the president had died (scenarios 1 and 4) than 
when he survived (scenarios 2 and 3).  Leman and Cinnirella (2007) named this relationship 
WKHµPDMRUHYHQW-PDMRUFDXVH¶ELDVLQFRQVSLUDF\WKLQNLQJ 
Recently, van Prooijen and van Dijk (2014) have found that this effect is moderated 
by perspective-taking.  Across a series of studies, participants were asked to read about 
events with big consequences and causes which involved the death of an African country 
leader (versus an event with a minor consequence and/or cause).  They found that conspiracy 
theories were more strongly endorsed when the participants took the perspective of the 
citizens of the African country.  The researchers also tested an individual difference measure 
of perspective-taking abilities where no explicit instructions were given to take the 
perVSHFWLYHRIWKHRWKHUJURXS,QWKLVVWXG\SDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGWRWDNHWKH³5HDGLQJWKH
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0LQGLQWKH(\HV´WHVWZKLFKLVGHVLJQHGWRDVVHVVSHRSOH¶VFDSDFLW\WRLQIHURWKHUSHRSOH¶V
mental states (van Prooijen & van Dijk, 2014).  Results were in line with the previous studies 
and demonstrated that for people who had high perspective-taking ability, they indicated a 
stronger belief in conspiracy theories if the opposition leader died (major consequence) as 
opposed to lived (minor consequence).  In the final study, the authors kept the big 
FRQVHTXHQFHVFRQVWDQWEXWPHDVXUHGSDUWLFLSDQW¶VRZQGHVLUHWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHFDXVHVRI
significant events.  Results demonstrated that the effect of perspective-taking was explained 
by participants¶ own motivation to make sense of the event.  Taken together, perspective 
taking was shown to increase conspiracy beliefs following a consequential event.  This 
research therefore provides an explanation for why people endorse conspiracy theories 
following significant events, even when the event took place elsewhere in the world. 
In summary, researchers have demonstrated that participants were more likely to 
believe that a fictional President was shot and killed by a gunman involved in a conspiracy, 
than an insane lone gunman (McCauley & Jacques, 1979; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007).  
Moreover, this preference to believe that a major event was caused by a major cause has been 
shown to be more prominent in people taking the perspective of another group (van Prooijen 
& van Dijk, 2014).  If a major event has a minor cause, such as when a president is 
assassinated by a mentally unstable gunman or a drunk driver kills a princess, this can leave 
the relationship between cause and effect unpredictable, and this makes people feel 
uncomfortable (e.g., Leman, 2007).  Some scholars argue that conspiracy theories are 
therefore mental shortcuts, which draw clear arrows between big causes and big effects (e.g., 
Leman & Cinnirella, 2007).   
Conjunction fallacy.  Finally, the conjunction fallacy is an error of probabilistic 
reasoning where people overestimate the likelihood of co-occurring events.  Brotherton and 
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French (2014) developed several conspiratorial vignettes in order to test whether people who 
endorse conspiracy theories are particularly susceptible to this fallacy.  They found that 
people who indicated stronger agreement with popular conspiracy theories, as well as generic 
conspiriacist ideas, made more conjunction errors.  They suggest that this occurs because 
FRQVSLUDF\EHOLHYHUVKDYHD³biased conception of randomness, where coincidences are rarely 
PHUHFKDQFHRFFXUUHQFHV´%URWKHUton & French, 2014, p. 246).  Those who endorse 
conspiracy theories are more likely to see unrelated facts as being causally related by a 
conspiratorial plot.  This can make them particularly susceptible to perceiving unrelated 
events as being related.  The causal pathway, however, is not clear.  As noted by Brotherton 
and French (2014), the conjunction fallacy could be caused by or cause endorsement of 
conspiracy theories, or potentially a reciprocal relationship may occur.  Nonetheless, it is 
clear that such a fallacy could help a person make sense of uncertain events where there is no 
coherent explanation.  
Personality 
Another line of work has investigated the psychological makeup of people who 
endorse conspiracy theories.  If we are all susceptible to the same cognitive biases, 
investigating common characteristics of conspiracy believers using an individual difference 
approach will help determine what type of person is more likely to endorse conspiracy 
theories.  Initially a large amount of the early work investigating individual characteristics of 
those who endorse conspiracy theories classified conspiracy believers as paranoid individuals 
whose judgements are VRPHKRZ³GLVWRUWHG´DVDUHVXOWRIDQ³XQFRPPRQO\DQJU\PLQG´
(Hofstadter, 1971, pp. 2-3) or as a product of psychopathology, paranoia or delusional 
ideation (e.g., Groh, 1987; Plomin & Post, 1997).  A recent shift however, has directed focus 
away from the pathological perspective, as this account could be argued to be lacking when 
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considering how widespread conspiracy beliefs are in society (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009; 
Swami & Coles, 2010; Waters, 1997).  Indeed, it is unlikely that millions of conspiracy 
believers all suffer from serious pathological problems.    
Darwin et al. (2011) found that subclinical paranoid and schizotypal personality traits 
were associated with stronger beliefs in conspiracy theories.  It was argued that extreme 
forms of these personality traits may lead to maladaptive behaviours, but milder forms may 
be adaptive and make people suspicious in risky situations.  Conspiracy theories may, 
therefore, be a consequence of this adaptive approach where mild paranoia makes people 
suspicious of those around them.  Similarly, distrust in authority, low levels of interpersonal 
trust (e.g., institutions, neighbours, friends), anomie and cynicism have been associated with 
beliefs in conspiracy theories (e.g., Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Leman & 
Cinnirella, 2013; Swami et al., 2010).  As noted by Darwin et al. (2011), these correlates are 
similar to paranoia, but are in a mild form.  For example, it is plausible that mistrust may be a 
product of mild paranoia, where people high in both these traits may find conspiracy theories 
appealing since they are both distrusting and suspicious of those who are in a position of 
power.  
Further, lower self-esteem, anxiety and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) have been 
found to be associated with higher conspiracy beliefs (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 
1994; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013; Swami et al., 2011).  However, it should be noted that 
researchers have found contradictory findings when exploring self-esteem and RWA.  For 
example, Swami (2012) found no relationship between self-esteem and conspiracy beliefs, 
and Leman and Cinnirella (2007) found no relationship between authoritarianism and 
conspiracy theorising.  Moreover, the causal pathway between self-esteem, authoritarianism 
and belief in conspiracy theories is not clear.  Without the casual evidence to show otherwise, 
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self-esteem for example may be a product of a combination of factors.  Specifically, when a 
person feels anxious, this may lower self-esteem.   
Scholars have also investigated the idea that those who endorse conspiracy theories 
are more open to experience, rather than being rigid and closed (e.g., Swami et al., 2010, 
2011).  However, whilst some researchers have found that beliefs in conspiracy theories are 
associated with openness to experience (Swami et al., 2011), others have found inconsistent 
relationships when using the Big-5 personality inventory, where statistically significant, but 
weak, relationships have been found with openness (Swami et al., 2010, 2013), or a failure to 
find a significant relationship at all (Bruder et al., 2013; Furnham, 2013; Imhoff & Bruder, 
2014).   
It is therefore unclear whether conspiracy theories reflect openness to experience.  
However, openness can be associated with such traits as superstition, beliefs in the 
paranormal and new age ideas, which each have been linked to belief in conspiracy theories 
(Darwin et al., 2011).  Thus, whilst there is no direct reliable relationship between openness 
and conspiracy theories, other predictors such as belief in the paranormal can provide a 
tentative link between openness and conspiracy beliefs.  Moreover, openness could be 
associated with the search for information.  For example, Swami et al. (2010) found that 
individuals who endorse conspiracy theories relating to the 9/11 terrorist attacks report 
consuming more information about the theories.  It is not clear, however, whether the trait of 
openness may mean that people are more likely to choose to seek out conspiracy information, 
or whether prior beliefs alone could explain this.  Nonetheless, whilst the research is not 
conclusive, there is some evidence to suggest that openness may be a factor associated with 
belief in conspiracy theories.  
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Moreover, researchers have suggested that conspiracy theories may help people 
address feelings of powerlessness and a lack of control (Leman, 2007; Miller, 2002; Swami 
& Coles, 2010; Swami & Furnham, 2012).  For example, Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) found 
that measures of general powerlessness predicted stronger belief in conspiracy theories.  
Consistent with this correlational data, Whitson and Galinsky (2008) provided experimental 
evidence that lacking in control increases belief in conspiracy theories.  To do this, they 
asked participants to remember a time when they were either in complete control of a 
situation or lacked it entirely.  Results demonstrated that those who reminisced about a lack 
of control were more likely to interpret conspiracy theories in ambiguous stories they read, 
such as an office worker being denied promotion after a flurry of e-mails between the boss 
and another co-worker.  In a follow up study, Whitson and Galinsky (2008) found if 
participants were able to gain a sense of control from a substitute route, such as a self-
affirmation exercise, this made people less likely to attribute a conspiracy theory to 
ambiguous stories.  To test this idea, the authors asked participants to first complete the recall 
task to induce a lack of control.  They were then asked to complete a scale that focused on a 
value that they perceived to be most important (self-affirmation) or least important (no self-
affirmation).  Results demonstrated that those who completed the self-affirmation task 
perceived conspiracy theories to be less likely in the ambiguous stories in comparison to 
those who were not give an opportunity to self-affirm.  These studies therefore provide 
evidence that conspiracy theorising may be a route to satisfy feelings of powerlessness and 
lack of control. 
Conspiracy theories can also help people avoid feelings of uncertainty (van Prooijen 
& Jostmann, 2013; Whitson, Galinsky, & Kay, in press).  For example, van Prooijen and 
Jostmann (2013) and Whitson, et al. (in press) found across their studies that people endorsed 
conspiracy theories when uncertainty was made salient.  Previous research has indicated that 
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ZKHQXQFHUWDLQW\LQFUHDVHVSHRSOHSD\FORVHUDWWHQWLRQWRWKHPRUDOLW\RIDQDXWKRULW\¶VDFWLRQ 
(cf. van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013).  Thus, van Prooijen and Jostmann (2013) specifically 
wanted to test whether uncertainty increased the extent to which people interpreted signs of 
whether an authority is moral, and how this impacted their conspiracy theory beliefs.  Across 
their studies therefore, the participants were given moral or immoral information whilst under 
conditions of uncertainty (vs. a control).  Results revealed that morality influenced beliefs in 
conspiracy theories, but only when uncertainty was made salient.  Along a similar vein, 
Whitson, et al. (in press) had participants recall uncertain (e.g., worried, surprised; vs. certain, 
e.g., angry, certain) emotions before reading an ambiguous scenario and rating their belief in 
a conspiratorial explanation.  Results demonstrated that participants who recalled an 
uncertain emotion showed greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs than participants who 
recalled a certain emotion.  Together, these studies provide empirical evidence that 
conspiracy theories may be a response to people satisfying the need to avoid uncertainty.   
Several lines of research therefore provide support for the view that conspiracy 
theories typically present subversive alternatives to establishment narratives.  For example, 
endorsement of conspiracy theories is associated with traits such as anomie and political 
distrust (e.g., Abalakina-Paap, et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994).  Conspiracy theories questioning 
authorities and institutions may however contradict a well-documented motivation ± system 
justification.  System justification theory proposes that people are motivated to maintain 
positive views about social systems (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & 
Thompson, 2000).  People consequently see the system that affects them as fair and 
legitimate and possess a motivation to defend and justify it.  Scholars argue that system 
justification theory therefore accounts for a number of belief systems, such as:  belief in a just 
world, power distance, right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Jost & 
Hunyady, 2002).  They suggest that each of these beliefs systems supply rationalisations for 
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different aspects concerning the status quo that individuals may feel compelled to defend and 
justify.  People therefore may defend and justify their society if it is threatened, or they feel 
that they are dependent on it (e.g., Kay et al., 2009).  
One possible answer to explain why people subscribe to conspiracy theories is that 
like system justification, conspiracy theories provide a route to satisfy important 
psychological needs such as allowing people to address feelings of powerlessness and control 
(Abalakina-Paap, et al., 1999; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) and avoid feelings of uncertainty 
(van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; Whitson, et al., in press).   In a similar vein, Whitson, et al. 
(in press) have argued that support for the current status quo, belief in conspiracy theories and 
embracing the paranormal may all be rooted in part, in the same underlying process.  When 
addressing feelings of uncertainty therefore, people may turn to conspiracy theorising as a 
substitute route when system justification is untenable.   
Alternatively, conspiracy beliefs may not be in conflict with system justification.  It is 
plausible to propose that conspiracy theories instead may serve to uphold the perceived 
legitimacy of the status quo rather than undermine it.  Conspiracy theories give believers 
someone tangible to blame instead of blaming it on impersonal forces (Goertzel, 2010).  
Thus, by deflecting blame for the causes of significant events on to a small number of people, 
conspiracy theories may enable people to maintain the belief that society is fair.  Conspiracy 
theories may therefore function as a means to defend the current social system.  In doing so, 
conspiracy theories may therefore be a route to satisfy psychological needs such as low self-
esteem and feelings of powerlessness, lack of control, anxiety and uncertainty (Abalakina-
Paap, et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013; van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; 
Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; Whitson, et al., in press) alongside system justification.  In sum, 
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there are grounds to predict that conspiracy theories may either undermine or bolster support 
for the status quo.  To date however, no research has directly examined these predictions.     
Psychological and social consequences of conspiracy theories 
Conspiracy theories PD\XQGHUPLQHSHRSOH¶VFRQILGHQFHLQSROLWLFDOV\VWHPVWKHLU
trust in the workings of science, and their confidence and trust in medical establishments.   
Ironically however, it is plausible that conspiracy theories may actually bolster support for 
the status quo.  Inadvertently this may enable people to justify rather than address limitations 
of society.  Therefore, whilst conspiracy theories may be a route for people to address 
important psychological needs, the consequences of conspiracy theories could have a 
potentially detrimental impact to society.  Some scholars have however suggested that 
conspiracy theories may be harmless fun and of little concern (Bratich, 2008; Clarke, 2002), 
with beliefs held only by a small number of the population (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009).  It 
was therefore thought that conspiracy theories would have little or no detrimental influence 
over society, as belief in conspiracy theories were seen to be foolish and illogical (e.g., 
Melley, 2002; Willman, 2002).  As Douglas and Sutton (2008) also QRWH³WKHWHUPLWVHOILV
VRPHZKDWGLVPLVVLYHDQGSHMRUDWLYH´S  Indeed, whilst there has been no empirical 
evidence at present, a number of scholars have discussed the potential positive consequences 
of endorsing conspiracy theories.  For example, Miller (2002) suggests that conspiracy 
theories can provide individuals with the opportunity to question the credibility of 
governments, which in normal circumstances would likely be denied to them.  Moreover, as 
discussed earlier, conspiracy theories may serve to help people deal with a sense of 
powerlessness, uncertainty and lack of control when faced with significant events 
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).   
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Scholars have also suggested that conspiracy theories can reveal actual anomalies in 
mainstream explanations (e.g., Clarke, 2002; Swami & Coles, 2010).  Indeed, some 
conspiracy theories have been proven to be true such as the U.S. Department of Defence 
plans to orchestrate terrorism and blame it on Cuba, the Watergate scandal that involved a 
break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters where President Nixon¶V 
administration attempted to cover-up their involvement and the Tuskegee syphilis scandal 
where treatment was withheld from 399 Black men without their informed consent.  
Conspiracy theories may therefore allow people to question social hierarchies, which may 
encourage governments to be more transparent (see Swami & Coles, 2010).  However, 
Brotherton (2013) argues that this may be a dubious assertion.  In the case of the Watergate 
scandal, this conspiracy was uncovered due to the efforts of conventional journalists and 
academics or whistle blowers, UDWKHUWKDQ³REVFXUH´FRQVSLUDF\WKHRULVWVS7KXVZhilst 
conspiracy theories may allow people to challenge social hierarchies, the investigative 
activity of conspiracy theorists may not serve to successfully uncover real conspiracies.    
This potentially ineffective investigative activity has the ability to elicit mistrust and 
divert attention from important scientific, political and societal issues (e.g., Fenster, 1999; 
van der Linden, 2013; Miller, 2002; Swami & Coles, 2010).  Beliefs in conspiracy theories 
may therefore have potentially detrimental consequences for both the individual and wider 
society.  For example, researchers have shown that endorsement of birth control and 
HIV/AIDS conspiracy theories, which propose that HIV/AIDS are a form of genocide against 
African Americans, are associated with increased negative attitudes towards contraceptive 
behaviours (e.g., the use of condoms; Bogart & Thorburn, 2006; Bird & Bogart, 2003).  
Indeed, negative attitudes towards condoms have been shown to partially explain the 
relationship between conspiracy beliefs and condom use (Bogart & Thorburn, 2006).  Similar 
results have been found in research conducted by Hoyt et al. (2012), where HIV conspiracy 
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beliefs were associated with increased risk relating to HIV such as being more likely to avoid 
appropriate treatment behaviour.  However, we are unable to establish the causal pathway 
from this research ± belief in HIV conspiracy theories may lead to increased risky behaviour, 
or it may just be that those prone to such beliefs are also more likely to be risk takers.  
Nonetheless, this work suggests that conspiracy theories may have potentially negative 
consequences for the prevention of pregnancy and sexually transmitted illnesses. 
Moreover, the former South African President Mbeki publicly stated that HIV is not 
the cause of AIDS and that antiretroviral (ARV) drugs are not useful in controlling the HIV 
infection (Chigwedere, Seage, Gruskin, Lee, & Essex, 2008).  The South African government 
therefore declined to accept donations of ARV medication.  It is plausible that such a public 
expression of conspiracy belief may have influenced WKH6RXWK$IULFDQSXEOLF¶VWUXVWLQ
biomedical claims (Rubincam, 2014).  It has since been estimated that over 330,000 South 
Africans died between the years 2000-2005, which could have been due, in part, to the 
actions of the South African government (Chigwedere et al., 2008).  This clearly highlights 
the implications and potentially widespread consequences of high-level officials endorsing a 
conspiracy account. 
Conspiracist ideation in general also tends to be associated with a mistrust of science 
such as the rejection of climate science and the link between smoking and lung cancer 
(Lewandowsky, et al., 2013b).  Similarly, Oliver and Wood (2014) have shown using four 
nationally representative surveys sampled between 2006 and 2011 that over half of the U.S. 
population endorses at least one medical conspiracy theory, such as the link between vaccines 
and autism.  They also found that people who endorse such conspiracy theories are less likely 
to use traditional vaccines such as flu shots, and were more likely to indicate that they would 
trust medical advice from non-professionals such as friends and family.  This demonstrates 
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that people who endorse medical conspiracy theories may be reluctant to follow trusted 
medical advice, which could have wider detrimental consequences for society as a whole, 
such as with the continued spread of curable illnesses.  
Further, Swami (2012) has demonstrated that among a Malaysian Malay sample, 
belief in Jewish conspiracy theories were associated with greater racist attitudes concerning 
Chinese citizens.  Golec de Zavala and Cichocka (2012) also found that belief in conspiracy 
theories about Jewish domination of the world was associated with anti-Semitic attitudes.  
Moreover, research by Imhoff and Bruder (2014) has shown that conspiracy mentality, which 
is a general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories, is a significant predictor of prejudices 
against a variety of high-power groups (e.g., Jews, Americans, capitalists).  Barlow et al., 
(2012) also found that in a sample of White Americans, people who reported negative contact 
with Black Americans were found to express a higher level of doubt about BaUDFN2EDPD¶V
American citizenship and his eligibility to be President of the United States.  This can suggest 
that conspiracy theories may be used as a way to justify and maintain conflict with a 
particular group (Crocker et al., 1999).  In other words, conspiracy theories can be a way to 
express prejudice against a particular group (Barlow, et al., 2012).   
Conspiracy theories can also change the way people think about events.  Research 
more broadly exploring the influence of information has shown that external sources can play 
a critical role in shaping beliefs (cf. Swami et al., 2013).  Based on this idea, Swami et al. 
(2013) argued that as attitude formation is rarely based on a critical review of all the relevant 
issues, the nature of information that an individual receives about a given phenomenon 
should have an impact on their attitudes.  In testing this assertion empirically, Butler, 
Koopman and Zimbardo (1995) found that people who had viewed the film J.F.K ± which 
highlights several prominent conspiracy theories surrounding the assassination of President 
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John F. Kennedy ± were more inclined to disbelieve official accounts than those who had not 
yet viewed the film.  Similarly, Swami et al. (2013) exposed people to either information that 
argued NASA faked the moon landing, text critical of the moon landing conspiracy account 
or a control condition where no information were provided.  Results demonstrated that those 
who were exposed to the moon landing conspiracy theory indicated a higher level of belief 
that the landing was faked, relative to the other conditions.   
Further, Douglas and Sutton (2008) found participants who read conspiracy 
information concerning the death of Princess Diana were more inclined to endorse 
conspiratorial explanations, even though they perceived that their beliefs had not changed, 
WKXVUHYHDOLQJWKH³KLGGHQLPSDFW´SRIexposure to conspiracy information on 
SHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHV&RQVSLUDWRULDOH[SODQDWLRQVWKHUHIRUHEHLQJDEOHWRFKDQJHSHRSOH¶V
attitudes has wide reaching implications when considering the ease of access to conspiracy 
theories within popular culture, such as in popular TV programs and on the Internet.  In 
summary, conspiracy theories have often been argued to be trivial, harmless, or having 
potentially positive consequences.  However, other research suggests that there may be 
serious negative consequences worthy of further investigation.  
Ways to address the potential consequences of conspiracy theories 
Conspiracy theories point accusing fingers at authority, and offer alternatives to 
official explanations (Gray, 2010; Sapountzis & Condor, 2013).  In doing so however, they 
may subvert social systems and undermine confidence in established positions on important 
topics.  In support of this view, the current research to date suggests that conspiracy theories 
undermining confidence in the working of science may have potentially detrimental 
consequences for HIV prevention and safe-sex practices (e.g., Bogart & Thorburn, 2006; Bird 
& Bogart, 2003; Hoyt et al., 2012).  There is very little empirical evidence to date that has 
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directly investigated ways to address the impact of conspiracy information on attitudes and 
behavioral outcomes.  However, Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) have provided some initial 
recommendations for intervention.  They first recommend putting in place a possible ban on 
conspiracy theorising and imposing a tax for people who disseminate conspiracy theories.  As 
these recommendations are somewhat unlikely to be put in to practice, their final 
recommendation that involves engaging in counter-speech against conspiracy theories to 
discredit and undermine them seems the most practical.  They suggest that governmental 
officials might engage in the counter-speech themselves, or they could engage with private 
parties to engage in counter-speech on their behalf.   
 Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) also recommend that officials respond to more rather 
than fewer conspiracy theories.  They suggest that silence to some conspiracy theories and 
not others may be interpreted as the government not being able to offer evidence to the 
contrary.  Further, Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) suggest that officials should first aim to 
address belief in conspiracy theories with hard core extremists who supply conspiracy 
narratives.  The authors hope that by planting doubts about theories in those who are hard 
core extremists, this will provide new ideas to these groups of people and introduce cognitive 
diversity.   In this particular scenario, it may be more successful to elicit trusted private 
parties to introduce doubts about the conspiracy theories, rather than the governmental 
officials themselves.   People may be suspicious of the counter-material being placed to cover 
the tracks of the conspirators (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009).  If the government is introducing 
this information themselves to hard core extremists it may be readily discredited.  It is 
therefore recommended that the government takes care when doing this, as they cannot be 
seen to control the private party, but instead just provide them with information.  It is not 
clear, however, how best to refute conspiracy theories with both the hard core suppliers and 
the mass public, and whether the government should respond with a single response or 
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multiple responses.  Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) conclude that the choice of issuing a 
single or multiple responses may be a decision that the governmental officials need to make 
taking in to account resource constraints.  
Government officials, however, have been seen in the past to dismiss providing a 
direct response (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009).  For example, when a fact sheet was issued 
concerning 9/11 and the conspiracy theories surrounding a controlled demolition, a 
JRYHUQPHQWVSRNHVPDQVDLG³>Z@HUHDOL]HWKLVIDFWVKHHWZRQ¶Wconvince those who hold to 
the alternative theories that our findings are sound.  In fact, the fact sheet was never intended 
for them.  It is for the masses who have seen or heard the alternative theory claims and want 
EDODQFH´'Z\HU, para. 12).  As highlighted by Sunstein and Vermeule (2009), there 
FRXOGEHFRVWVE\JLYLQJXSRQWKRVHZKRDUHKDUGFRUHFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULVWVDQGWKLV³PD\
actually VSUHDGWKHFRQVSLUDF\WKHRU\IXUWKHU´S 
In summary, examining avenues to address the potential consequences of conspiracy 
theories is timely.  This is because the research to date is suggesting that the consequences of 
conspiracy theories could be costly.  For example, conspiracy theories may undermine 
confidence in the workings of science that may lead people to engage in more risky 
behaviours (e.g., Bird & Bogart, 2003; Bogart & Thorburn, 2006; Hoyt et al., 2012).  It is 
plausible to propose therefore, that conspiracy theories may have other potential detrimental 
consequences such as reducing the likelihood of people engaging in carbon friendly 
behaviours and vaccinating their children against diseases.  Conspiracy theories may have the 
power to damage the social systems that people rely on in their everyday lives.  Ironically 
however, it is also plausible that conspiracy theories may bolster support for the current status 
quo instead of undermining it.  Inadvertently this may then allow people to justify rather than 
address limitations in the social system.  Taken together, this suggests that conspiracy 
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theories may reduce, rather than increase, the likelihood of social and political change.  
Future research is therefore needed to further investigate avenues to address the potentially 
detrimental consequences by testing the success of the recommendations presented by 
Sunstein and Vermeule (2009).  By testing the effectiveness of these recommendations, a 
richer understanding of how to address conspiracy theories will be gained. 
The current thesis 
Scholars are learning more about the personality characteristics associated with 
conspiracy beliefs and the cognitive biases that are associated with conspiratorial thinking.  
Researchers are also beginning to consider the consequences of conspiracy theories.   
However, as the majority of studies have employed correlational designs, this has restricted 
researchers from further investigating the social psychological consequences of conspiracy 
theories.  Examining the consequences of conspiracy theories is important as conspiracy 
theories can be viewed as attempts to undermine or subvert social systems.  In doing so, 
conspiracy theories may XQGHUPLQHSHRSOH¶VFRQILGHQFHLQ important topics such as 
childhood vaccination (cf. Lewandowsky et al., 2013b), which may then directly lead to 
people disengaging from important social systems, such as then not vaccinating their children 
against harmful diseases.   In support of this view, researchers have found that conspiracy 
theories undermining confidence and trust in medical establishments may be associated with 
lack of condom use (Bird & Bogart, 2003; Bogart & Thorburn, 2006) and being more likely 
to avoid appropriate treatment behaviour of HIV (Hoyt et al., 2012).  However, as this 
empirical work has been correlational, examinations of cause and effect are not possible. 
In order to address this causation limitation, scholars are now starting to employ 
experimental approaches to study conspiracy theories (e.g., Butler et al., 1995; Douglas & 
Sutton, 2008; Swami et al., 2013).  For example, using experimental methods has allowed 
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researchers to show that conspiracy theories can change the way people think about events, 
even when they are not aware of this happening (Douglas & Sutton, 2008).  An aim of this 
thesis therefore was to utilise experimental methods in order to examine and attempt to 
address the social psychological consequences of conspiracy theories. 
Conspiracy theories pointing accusing fingers at powerful authority figures may 
XQGHUPLQHSHRSOH¶VFRQILGHQFHLQSROLWLFDOV\VWHPVWKHLUWUXVWLQWKHZRUNLQJVRIVFLHQFe, and 
their confidence and trust in medical establishments.  In this thesis, we aimed to empirically 
put this assertion to the test by exposing people to conspiracy theories and measuring their 
intention to engage in important aspects of society.   In utilising experimental methods 
however, this opens up the possibility that such a design may have important ethical 
implications that should be considered.  By exposing people to conspiracy theories, and 
potentially impacting their behavioural intentions, conspiracy theories may have a potentially 
significant impact on the person.  This could be particularly worrisome when considering 
childhood vaccination.  Conducting such experimental research is an important advancement 
in the field however, as due to the design of the study, using experimental methods enables us 
to test cause and effect.  Yet as a consequence of utilising such a design, exposing people to 
conspiracy theories that may have detrimental consequences could put people at risk.  It is 
therefore important that after each experimental period, the participants are fully debriefed.  
For example, after being exposed to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, participants should be 
provided information that presents facts in favour of vaccines, and subsequently be pointed 
towards official sources for further information.  By having such a strong debrief in place, the 
potential detrimental effects of being exposed to conspiracy theories should be reduced and 
thus not persist after the experimental period has ended. 
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If however exposure to conspiracy theories is found to undermine and subvert social 
systems, this may go against the well-documented social psychological motivation of system 
justification.  System justification theory argues that people are motivated to hold positive 
views about existing social, economic and political arrangements, especially when they are 
dependent on those arrangements (e.g., Jost & Andrews, 2011; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, 
Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005; Kay, et al., 2009).  Threats to the fairness 
of social systems cause people to defend, bolster or rationalise the status quo, even if at the 
expense of their objective social interests (Jost et al., 2004).   
People may therefore endorse conspiracy theories as an alternative means to satisfy 
psychological needs such as powerlessness and lack of control (Abalakina-Paap, et al., 1999; 
Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) when system justification is untenable.  On the other hand 
however, it is plausible that conspiracy theories may not actually be at odds with system 
justification.  Alternatively, conspiracy theories may instead serve to uphold the perceived 
legitimacy of the status quo.  Explaining tragedies as being caused by a malign few instead of 
wider society, may allow people to preserve the belief that society is fair and legitimate.  In 
this thesis, we therefore tested this novel proposal that conspiracy theories instead of 
undermining the social system may allow people to justify it.   
Conspiracy theories may therefore subvert and undermine important social systems.  
+RZHYHUZKLOVWWKLVPD\EHWKHFDVHFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVPD\QRWXQGHUPLQHSHRSOH¶V
overall sense that social V\VWHPVDUHIDLUDQGDSSURSULDWHDQGLQVWHDGEROVWHUSHRSOH¶V
satisfaction with the social status quo.  Conspiracy theories may therefore stop people 
engaging with important aspects of society and lead them to justify rather than address 
limitations of the social system.   It is therefore also important to consider how to address the 
impact of conspiracy theories on societal issues.  To date however, there has been no 
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empirical research investigating tools that aim to attenuate the potential detrimental 
consequences of conspiracy theories on behavioural intentions.   Exploring avenues to 
address the impact of conspiracy theories in this thesis is therefore timely.  
In sum, employing experimental methods in this thesis will allow us to investigate the 
DVVHUWLRQWKDWFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVPD\XQGHUPLQHSHRSOH¶VFRQILGHQFHLQLPSRUWDQWVRFLDO
systems.  People need to vote, take action against climate change and have their children 
vaccinated, so disengagement is likely to be detrimental to society.  Ironically however, it is 
plausible that conspiracy theories may not undermine SHRSOH¶VRYHUDOOVHQVHWKDWVRFLDO 
systems are fair and appropriate.  Utilising experimental methods will therefore allow us to 
uncover the dangers of conspiracy theories.  Conspiracy theories may stop people from 
engaging with important aspects of society, but they could also be a way to justify inherent 
limitations of the social system.  It is therefore important in this thesis to also explore avenues 
to address the potential detrimental consequences of conspiracy theories.  Using an 
experimental approach will allow us to examine techniques that may attenuate the impact of 
exposure to conspiracy theories.  
Research programme 
To begin, Chapter 2 first examines the social consequences of exposure to conspiracy 
theories on engagement with the political system and taking action against climate change.  
In two studies, we exposed participants to conspiracy theories and measured their impact on 
behavioural intentions.  Specifically, Study 1 aimed to investigate the consequences of being 
exposed to governmental conspiracy theories, such as the U.S. government being involved in 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks (vs. anti-conspiracy information), on intentions to engage in politics 
(e.g., intention to vote in the next general election).  Study 2 then exposed people to climate 
change conspiracy theories, which argued that climate change is a hoax (vs. anti-conspiracy 
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information and a control), and measured their intention to engage in pro-environmental 
behaviours (e.g., using energy efficiently).  :HDOVRPHDVXUHGSHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQVWRHQJDJH
in the political system.  The chapter ends with a general discussion outlining the limitations, 
as well as the implications for this research where we highlight the potential impact that 
conspiracy theories can have on important social and environmental outcomes. 
Chapter 3 aimed to further our understanding of the consequences of belief in, and 
exposure to, conspiracy theories by exploring the impact of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories 
on intended vaccination uptake.  Study 3 investigated the relationship between belief in anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories and vaccination intentions.  Study 4 experimentally manipulated 
exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories (vs. anti-conspiracy information and a control) 
DQGWKHQPHDVXUHGSHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQWRYDFFLQDWH a fictional child.  A general discussion then 
outlines the limitations, as well as the implications of this research where we argue that 
conspiracy theories may be an obstacle to vaccine uptake. 
The studies in Chapters 2 and 3 tested the idea that conspiracy theories may subvert 
social systems and undermine confidence in established political, health and environmental 
positions.  Specifically, we tested the idea that conspiracy theories may damage important 
social systems that are needed for society to function.  Importantly therefore, if conspiracy 
theories do undermine social systems, this would appear to be in conflict with the 
psychological need to maintain the belief that society is fair and legitimate (e.g., Jost & 
Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & Thompson, 2000).   In other words, people are 
motivated to hold positive views about the social, economic and political arrangements of 
society rather than to subvert it.  In Chapter 4 therefore, we test the novel idea that conspiracy 
theories may not actually be completely subversive and instead perform a system-justifying 
function for people.  By explaining events as the actions of a malign few, instead of broader 
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society, conspiracy theories may allow people to challenge institutions, whilst still upholding 
the belief that the social status quo is fair and legitimate.  In four studies, this prediction was 
tested.  Study 5 first explored the relationship between satisfaction with the status quo and 
conspiracy theory beliefs.   In Study 6, we aimed to test the idea that if conspiracy theories 
perform a system-justifying function for people, conspiracy theories should be a direct 
response to system threat, and increase when the status quo is threatened.  To do this, 
participants were exposed to a system threatening passage (vs. system affirming) before 
indicating their belief in conspiracy theories.  
Next, in Study 7 we aimed to provide a direct test of the system-justifying function of 
conspiracy theories, where we manipulated system justification and conspiracy theories, then 
PHDVXUHGSHRSOH¶VVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWKWKHVWDWXVTXR6WXG\then aimed to test our proposed 
mechanism.  We argue that by explaining the causes of tragedies, disasters and social 
problems as the actions of a malign few, conspiracy theories may allow people to maintain a 
positive view of society as a whole.  In order to test this hypothetical process in Study 8, 
participants were first exposed to system threat and conspiracy theories (vs. control).  We 
then asked participants to indicate whether they perceived small groups and individuals were 
responsible for social problems (e.g., pollution, inequality), before completing a measure of 
their satisfaction with the status quo.  A general discussion then outlines the limitations, as 
well as the implications of this research where we argue conspiracy theories may function as 
a means to defend the current social system.  However they do so in a way that appears to 
divert people from questioning inherent limitations of their society.   
Conspiracy theorieVPD\LQIOXHQFHSHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQVWRHQJDJHLQSUR-social 
behaviours such as voting, vaccination, and reducing their carbon footprint.  Conspiracy 
theories may therefore subvert or undermine important social systems.  However, whilst this 
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may be the case, exposure to conspiracy theories may not decrease general satisfaction with 
social systems.  Instead, conspiracy theories may bolster satisfaction with the status quo 
rather than undermine it because they explain troubling events as the actions of a small group 
of conspirators rather than problems inherent in society as a whole.  In doing so however, 
conspiracy theories may not only stop people engaging with important aspects of society, but 
also be a way for people to justify inherent limitations of society.   It is therefore important in 
Chapter 5 to examine ways to address the potentially detrimental impact of conspiracy 
theories on social systems.  In Study 9, we investigated the use of counter-arguments (e.g., 
vaccines are safe) as a tool for intervention in alleviating the impact of anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories on vaccination uptake.  In this study, we varied the order of pro-
conspiracy and anti-conspiracy DUJXPHQWVDQGPHDVXUHGSHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQWRYDFFLQDWH 
In Study 10, we aimed to test a second intervention tool where we tested the 
prediction that providing people with a pre-warning before being exposed to conspiracy 
information would make people more vigilant to the information presented before them, and 
thus lessen the impact on vaccination intentions when exposed to conspiracy theories.  To do 
this, people were first presented with a specific pre-warning (vs. general and control), which 
GHWDLOHGSHRSOH¶Vcontinued reliance on information that has been retracted in order to make 
them more vigilant of the information they are being presented, before being asked to read 
pro-conspiracy followed by anti-conspiracy arguments.  The participants then indicated their 
intention to vaccinate a fictional child.  A general discussion then outlines the limitations, as 
well as the implications of this research where we argue conspiracy theories may be resistant 
to correction.  
Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the aims and the main findings of the thesis.  The 
implications and applications of the research are then discussed.  The chapter concludes by 
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highlighting potential limitations of the research and how these have informed potential 







Chapter 2 - 
The effects of exposure to conspiracy theories on intentions to engage in the 











The studies presented in this chapter have been published in the following journal article: 
Jolley, D., & Douglas, K.M. (2014a). The social consequences of conspiracism: Exposure to 
conspiUDF\WKHRULHVGHFUHDVHVLQWHQWLRQVWRHQJDJHLQSROLWLFVDQGWRUHGXFHRQH¶V
carbon footprint. British Journal of Psychology, 105, 35-36. doi: 10.1111/bjop.12018 
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Chapter summary 
The current studies explored the social consequences of exposure to conspiracy 
theories.  In Study 1, participants were exposed to a range of conspiracy theories concerning 
government involvement in significant events such as the death of Diana, Princess of Wales.  
Results revealed that exposure to information supporting conspiracy theories reduced 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQWHQWLRQVWRHQJDJHLQSROLWLFVUHODWLYHWRSDUWLFLSDQWVZKRZHUHJLYHQ
information refuting conspiracy theories.  This effect was mediated by feelings of political 
powerlessness.  In Study 2, participants were exposed to conspiracy theories concerning the 
issue of climate change.  Results revealed that exposure to information supporting the 
FRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVUHGXFHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQWHQWLRQVWRUHGXFHWKHLUFDUERQIRRWSULQWUHODWLYH
to participants who were given refuting information, or those in a control condition.  This 
effect was mediated by powerlessness with respect to climate change, uncertainty, and 
disillusionment.  Exposure to climate change conspiracy theories also influenced political 
intentions, an effect mediated by political powerlessness.  The current findings suggest that 
conspiracy theories may have potentially significant social consequences, and highlight the 
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Introduction 
Conspiracy theories can be described as attempts to explain the ultimate causes of 
events as secret plots by powerful forces rather than as overt activities or accidents 
(McCauley & Jacques, 1979).  For example, conspiracy theories relating to the death of 
Diana, Princess of Wales often suppose that she was murdered by the British government as 
opposed to being killed in an unfortunate car accident.  These types of conspiracy theories are 
widespread, and accompany many significant political and social events, such as the death of 
Princess Diana (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Douglas & Sutton, 2011), the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
(Swami et al., 2010) and the assassination of US President John F. Kennedy (McCauley & 
Jacques, 1979; McHoskey, 1995).  Research has shown that conspiracy theories are 
becoming more popular, with interest in some conspiracy theories even increasing as the 
events become more distant (Goertzel, 1994).  For example, a survey in 1963 found that 29% 
of respondents believed the official account that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in 
assassinating President Kennedy, but in 2001 only 13% of respondents believed the official 
account (Carlson, 2001).  This finding points to the increasing popularity of conspiracy 
theories, and their persistence over time (Moore, 1990). 
Although public interest in conspiracy theories may be increasing, there has been 
surprisingly limited empirical research examining the psychological underpinnings of beliefs 
in conspiracy theories (Abalakina-Paap, et al., 1999; Swami et al., 2010).  Further, much of 
the work that does exist has categorised believers as paranoid individuals whose judgements 
DUHVRPHKRZ³GLVWRUWHG´DVDUHVXOWRIDQ³XQFRPPRQO\DQJU\PLQG´+RIVWDGWHUSS
2-3) or as a product of psychopathology, paranoia or delusional ideation (e.g., Groh, 1987; 
Plomin & Post, 1997).  However, this account may be too simplistic and incomplete 
considering how widespread conspiracy beliefs are in society (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009; 
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Swami & Coles, 2010; Waters, 1997).  It is difficult to imagine that millions of conspiracy 
believers all suffer significant psychological symptoms.  More recent research has taken a 
less pathologizing perspective on conspiracy beliefs, demonstrating that there are several key 
sub-clinical correlates of conspiracy beliefs such as anomie, distrust in authority, political 
cynicism, powerlessness (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010) 
and Machiavellianism (Douglas & Sutton, 2011). 
Further, research suggests that conspiracy theories may change the way people think 
about social events.  For example, after exposure to conspiracy theories about the death of 
Princess Diana, Douglas and Sutton (2008) found that participants were more inclined to 
endorse conspiratorial explanations, even though they perceived that their beliefs had not 
changed.  Also, Butler, et al. (1995) found that people who had viewed the film JFK ± which 
highlights several prominent conspiracy theories surrounding the assassination of President 
John F. Kennedy ± were more inclined to disbelieve official accounts than those who had not 
\HWYLHZHGWKHILOP7KHVHILQGLQJVGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVFDQKDYHD³KLGGHQ
LPSDFW´'RXJODV	6XWWRQSRQSHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVDQGUDLVHDQLQWULJXLQJ
question ± What social consequences might there be for people who are exposed to 
conspiracy theories?  
Scholars have begun to consider what some of these consequences might be.  It is 
argued that there may be both positive and negative consequences of being exposed to non-
mainstream explanations.  For example, conspiracy theories may allow individuals to 
question social hierarchies and as such encourage governments to be more transparent (e.g., 
Clarke, 2002; Fenster, 1999; Swami & Coles, 2010).  Conspiracy theories can also reveal 
anomalies, inconsistencies or ambiguities in official accounts of events (e.g., Clarke, 2002) 
and may open up possibilities for political debate (Miller, 2002).  Indeed, some conspiracy 
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theories reveal actual anomalies in mainstream explanations, such as in the US Department of 
'HIHQFH¶VSODQVWRorchestrate acts of terrorism and blame them on Cuba (Swami & Coles, 
2010).  On the negative side, conspiracy beliefs are associated with negative attitudes toward 
human rights and civil liberties (Swami et al., 2012), and also racist attitudes (Swami, 2012).  
One prominent conspiracy theory proposes that birth control and HIV/AIDS are a form of 
genocide against African Americans (Bird & Bogart, 2003).  Research has found that 
amongst African Americans, endorsement of this theory is associated with negative attitudes 
towards contraceptive behaviours, which can have potentially negative consequences for the 
prevention of pregnancy and sexually transmitted illnesses (Bogart & Thorburn, 2006).  In 
the current research, we further explored the potential influence of conspiracy theories on 
behavioural intentions.  To do so, we first focused on the influence of conspiracy theories on 
political engagement. 
Political behaviours consist of actions such as voting, talking to others to persuade 
them to vote for a certain candidate, donating money to candidates or political groups, and 
wearing campaign stickers (Jenkins, Andolina, Keeter, & Zukin, 2003).  Research has shown 
that such behaviours have decreased across the world over the last decade (Fiorina, 2002; 
Niemi & Weisberg, 2001; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Putnam, 1995, 2000).  For example, 
people are voting less than they did ten years ago, attending fewer political meetings, and 
forgoing wearing campaign stickers (Fiorina, 2002; Putnam, 1995, 2000).  There can be 
many reasons for these changes, such as decreasing interest in politics or the election process, 
time constraints, or even people feeling that their vote would not make a difference (File & 
Crissey, 2010; Fiorina, 2002; Putnam, 1995, 2000).  We argue that another key contributor to 
decreasing levels of political engagement may be the influence of exposure to conspiracy 
theories.   
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In the age of the Internet, people are constantly bombarded with information relating 
to conspiracy theories, and there is an increasing ease with which information about such 
theories can be distributed (Coady, 2006).  We already know that exposure to conspiracy 
WKHRULHVFKDQJHVSHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVZLWKRXWWKHLUDZDUHQHVV'ouglas & Sutton, 2008).  It is 
therefore plausible to propose that the ever-increasing presence of conspiracy theories ± 
particularly about secret and sinister government operations ± PD\LQIOXHQFHSHRSOH¶V
intentions to engage in politics.  For example, governmental conspiracy theories may 
discourage citizens from voting because they persuade people that the government is 
involved in shady deals and plots and that outcomes are therefore beyond their control.  We 
explored this possibility with a wide range of prominent governmental conspiracy theories, 
examining the extent to which exposure to conspiracy theories influences political intentions.   
For the first time, we also examined the potential factors that may mediate such 
effects.  First, research has linked beliefs in conspiracy theories with low levels of trust 
(Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  In addition, research has suggested that a 
possible reason for the observed drop in political engagement could be the decline in trust 
people have for each other and different institutions (e.g., Fiorina, 2002; Putnam, 1995, 2000; 
Shaffer, 1981).  It is therefore possible that exposure to conspiracy theories influences 
SROLWLFDOHQJDJHPHQWEHFDXVHFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVQHJDWLYHO\LQIOXHQFHSHRSOHV¶OHvels of 
trust.  Second, feelings of powerlessness ± specifically towards the government ± were also 
H[SORUHGDVDSRWHQWLDOPHGLDWRU$VGHILQHGLQ6WHUQ¶V9DOXHV-Beliefs-Norms theory 
of behaviour, powerlessness is referred to as the perception of being incapable of affecting an 
outcome by taking action.  Research has demonstrated that powerlessness is associated with 
conspiracy beliefs (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  It is therefore possible that exposure to 
conspiracy theories increases feelings of powerlessness, which subsequently decreases 
intentions to engage in politics.     
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Third, we tested the potential mediating role of uncertainty towards the government, 
which is viewed as a product of the immediate situation or wider social context (De Cremer 
& Sedikides, 2005; Sorrentino & Roney, 2000).  It has been argued that a situation may 
influence the degree of uncertainty a person experiences, and the way that it is expressed, so 
that uncertainty can change with the environment (Smith, Hogg, Martin, & Terry, 2007).  It is 
therefore plausible to suppose that exposure to conspiracy theories increases uncertainty, and 
indeed uncertainty may be one reason why people endorse a wide range of conspiracy 
theories, even if they are contradictory (Wood, et al., 2012).  This uncertainty may then lead 
to decreased intentions to become engaged in politics.  Finally, we also explored the potential 
influence of disillusionment, which is the feeling of disappointment that something is not 
what it was believed or hoped to be.  Research has shown that disillusionment after becoming 
aware of shortcomings may lead to a breakdown in engagement in a particular context (e.g., 
Niehuis & Bartell, 2006; Waller, 1938).  It is therefore reasonable to suppose that exposure to 
conspiracy theories may increase feelings of disillusionment at being tricked and deceived by 
the government.  This disillusionment may then lead to decreased intentions to become 
engaged in political processes.   
There were therefore two aims of the first study.  First, we explored the potential 
consequences of exposure to governmental conspiracy theories on intentions to engage in 
politics.  To do so, we exposed participants to an article that (a) argued in favour of a series 
of governmental conspiracy theories, or (b) argued against the same conspiracy theories.  
Participants exposed to the pro-conspiracy arguments were expected to endorse governmental 
conspiracy theories more than those who had been exposed to the anti-conspiracy arguments.  
Further, we hypothesised that exposure to information supporting conspiracy theories should 
decrease intentions to engage in politics.  Finally, the study directly tested four potential 
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mediators of this predicted effect ± specifically, feelings of mistrust, powerlessness, 
uncertainty and disillusionment towards the government. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred and sixty eight undergraduate and postgraduate research students (108 
women and 60 men, Mage = 22.87, SD = 5.00) at a British university participated in the study. 
Participants were recruited via poster advertisements, emails and the use of the social 
networking site Facebook where they were invited to complete an online questionnaire.  They 
did so voluntarily and without monetary or course credit incentives.  The single independent 
variable was the nature of the article presented to participants (pro-conspiracy versus anti-
conspiracy), and was manipulated between-subjects.  A manipulation check measured 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶MXGJHPHQWVWKDWDVHULHVRIJRYHUnmental conspiracy theories are true.  
Participants also reported feelings of mistrust, powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment 
towards the government, which were measured as potential mediators for the predicted effect.  
Finally, a scale of intended political behaviour formed the dependent variable.   
Materials and procedure 
  The online questionnaire was designed using the Qualtrics questionnaire design tool 
and first presented participants with an information page where they were asked to give their 
consent before beginning the questionnaire.  On the following page, participants were 
presented with the manipulation.  Two articles were used to either expose participants to 
information that supports conspiracy theories (pro-conspiracy condition) or that refutes 
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conspiracy theories (anti-conspiracy condition, see Appendix A for full wording).  The pro-
conspiracy article began by arguing that governments are involved in secret plots and 
schemes.  It then continued to provide specific examples of conspiracy theories such as the 
death of Princess Diana and the London 7/7 terrorist bombing attacks.  An extract from the 




claim that her death ZDVVLPSO\DWUDJLFDFFLGHQW«´ 
The anti-conspiracy article was similar in content to the pro-conspiracy article but differed by 
using the same broad and specific examples to argue that governments are not involved in 
conspiracy theories.  An extract from the anti-conspiracy theory article is as follows: 
³«7RWDNHWKHH[DPSOHRI3ULQFHVV'LDQD¶VGHDth, it is no secret that Princess 
'LDQD¶VSRSXODULW\PDGHVRPHPHPEHUVRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWXQHDV\+RZHYHUWKHUHLV
no evidence at all to suggest that the British government were involved in her death... 
her death waVVLPSO\DWUDJLFDFFLGHQW´ 
The term µFRQVSLUDF\WKHRU\¶ZDVQRWPHQWLRQHGLQHLWKHURIWKHDUWLFOHV  To check 
that the manipulation was successful, participants next rated the likelihood that a series of 
governmental conspiracy theories are true.  These were adapted from previous research 
(Douglas & Sutton, 2008, 2011, Į 7Kere were 12 statements with a mix of general 
HJ³*RYHUQPHQWVDUHRIWHQLQYROYHGLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSORWVDQGVFKHPHV´Į DQG
VSHFLILFHJ³7KH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWZDVLQYROYHGLQWKHGHDWKRI3ULQFHVV'LDQD´Į 
government conspiracy theories (see Appendix A).  In each case, participants were asked to 
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rate the likelihood that each is true on a seven-point scale (1 =  extremely unlikely, 7 = 
extremely likely).  
A scale measuring mistrust towards fouULQVWLWXWLRQVĮ ZDVXVHGIURP9DQGHU
Meer (2010).  3DUWLFLSDQWVLQGLFDWHGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKH\WUXVWHGHDFKLQVWLWXWLRQHJ³,
KDYHWUXVWLQ3DUOLDPHQW´, see Appendix A) on a six-point scale (1 =  strongly disagree, 6 =  
strongly agree).  A three-item scale measuring powerlessness towards the government Į 
.82) was developed from Neal and Groat (1974) and Aarts and Thomassen (2008).  
3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGWRUHDGWKHVWDWHPHQWVHJ³7KHZRUOGLVUXQE\WKHIHZSHRSOHLQ
power, and therHLVQRWPXFKWKHOLWWOHSHUVRQFDQGRDERXWLW´, see Appendix A) and rate their 
agreement by answering on a six-point scale (1 =  strongly disagree, 6 =  strongly agree).  A 
VFDOHPHDVXULQJDSHUVRQ¶VIHHOLQJVRIXQFHUWDLQW\VSHFLILFDOO\FRQFHUQLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQWĮ
= .83) was adapted from the Attributional Confidence Scale (Clatterbuck, 1979) and 
FRQVLVWHGRIIRXULWHPVHJ³7KHJRYHUQPHQWLVRQO\UXQIRUWKHEHQHILWRIWKRVHLQSRZHU´, 
see Appendix A).  Participants rated the extent that they agreed they could predict each 
behaviour on a six-point scale (1 =  strongly disagree, 6 =  strongly agree).  High agreement 
demonstrates a greater prediction that the government would perform those behaviours, 
which therefore demonstrates a greater sense of uncertainty about the government as a whole.  
A scale was included to measure participantV¶IHHOLQJVRIGLVLOOXVLRQPHQWVSHFLILFDOO\DERXW
WKHJRYHUQPHQWĮ 7KLVVFDOHZDVDGDSWHGIURP1LHKXLVDQG%DUWHOODQG
FRQVLVWHGRIIRXUVWDWHPHQWVHJ³,DPYHU\GLVDSSRLQWHGZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQW´, see 
Appendix A) where participants responded with the extent to which they agreed with each 
statement on a six-point scale (1 =  strongly disagree, 6 =  strongly agree). 
)LQDOO\WKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHPHDVXUHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQWHQGHGSROLWLFDOHQJDJHPHQW
Questions were reworded so that particLSDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVUHIOHFWHGLQWHQGHGUDWKHUWKDQ
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previous political engagement (Jenkins, et al., 2003; Pattie, Seyd, & Whiteley, 2003).  There 
were seven statements in total asking participants about their intended behaviours over the 
next 12 months (e.g., ³:LOO\RXYRWHLQWKHQH[WHOHFWLRQ?´³'R\RXLQWHQGWRFRQWULEXWH
PRQH\WRDFDQGLGDWHDSROLWLFDOSDUW\RUDQ\RUJDQL]DWLRQWKDWVXSSRUWVFDQGLGDWHV"´, Į= 
.80, see Appendix A).  Participants responded by indicating the extent that they intended to 
engage in each of the behaviours on a seven-point scale (1 =  definitely no, 7 =  definitely yes).  
At the conclusion of the study, the participants were debriefed in writing and were thanked 
for their participation.  
Results 
 There were no significant effects involving participant gender, so this factor is not 
mentioned further.  Further, participant age was not associated with any of the potential 
mediating variables or DVs and it is also not mentioned further.   
Manipulation check  
  There was a significant difference between the two conspiracy conditions (pro-
conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy) for endorsement of both general, F(1, 166) = 16.70, p < 
.001, Ș2 = .09, and specific, F(1, 166) = 16.65, p < .001, Ș2 = .09 government conspiracy 
theories.  Participants who were exposed to information supporting conspiracy theories 
endorsed general (M = 4.81, SD = 1.16) and specific (M = 2.85, SD = 1.50) conspiracy 
theories more than those in the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 4.04, SD = 1.16; M = 2.07, SD 
= 1.10, respectively).  The manipulation was therefore successful.   
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Government conspiracy theories and political engagement 
  A one-way ANOVA was conducted with article condition (pro- versus anti-
conspiracy) as the independent variable, and political engagement as the dependent variable.  
As predicted, exposure to conspiracy theories influenced political intentions, F(1, 166) = 
9.51, p = .002, Ș2 = .05.  Specifically, participants in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 2.67, 
SD = 1.09) showed less intention to engage in political behaviours than those in the anti-
conspiracy condition (M = 3.20, SD = 1.22).  
Testing mediation 
To test potential mediators of this effect, four separate ANOVAs were first conducted 
with conspiracy condition (pro- versus anti-conspiracy) as the independent variable in each 
case, and summed scores on all four potential mediators ± mistrust, political powerlessness, 
uncertainty and disillusionment ± as dependent variables.  Results revealed that out of the 
four potential mediators, exposure to conspiracy theories only influenced powerlessness, F(1, 
166) = 13.07, p < .001, Ș2 = .07, and uncertainty, F(1, 166) = 10.37, p = .002, Ș2 = .06.  
Participants in the pro-conspiracy condition felt more powerless (M = 2.94, SD = 1.39) and 
uncertain (M = 4.31, SD = 1.04) towards the government than those in the anti-conspiracy 
condition (M = 2.29, SD = 1.09; M = 3.82, SD = 0.99, respectively).  There were no 
differences between the two conditions for mistrust, F(1, 166) = 1.67, p = .198, Ș2 = .01 or, 
disillusionment, F(1,166) = 2.48, p = .117, Ș2 = .01. 
Each of the candidate mediators ± political powerlessness and uncertainty ± was then 
examined in a test of multiple mediation in order to explain the effect of the pro- versus anti-
conspiracy information on intended political behaviours.  This multiple mediation was carried 
RXWXVLQJ3UHDFKHUDQG+D\HV¶ERRWVWUDSSLQJPHWKRGIRULQGLUHFWHIIHFWV7KLVPHWKRG
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is based on between 5000-10000 bootstrap re-samples used to describe the confidence 
intervals of indirect effects in a manner that makes no assumptions about the distribution of 
the indirect effects.  As argued by Hayes (2009; Hayes & Preacher, 2013), an indirect effect 
is estimated as being significant from the confidence intervals not containing a zero, as 
opposed to significance in the individual paths.  This is due to the mediation model not being 
pertinent to whether the individual paths are either significant or non-significant.  Results 
from the current study are presented in Table 1 and Figure 1.  
First, there was a significant total indirect effect.  Importantly, the specific indirect 
effect in this test indicated that political powerlessness was a significant mediator of the 
effect of pro- versus anti-conspiracy information on intended political behaviours, when 
controlling for uncertainty.  However the specific indirect effect of uncertainty was not found 
to be a significant mediator, when controlling for political powerlessness.  This provides 
evidence that political powerlessness was the driving mediator of the effect of exposure to 
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Table 1 
Simple Mediation of the Indirect Effects of Conspiracy Condition (pro-conspiracy versus 
anti-conspiracy) on Political Behaviours through Feelings of Political Powerlessness and 
Uncertainty (N= 168; 5,000 bootstrap samples).  
 
  BCaa 95% confidence 
interval (CI) 
 
Point Estimate  
(s.e.) Lower Higher 
Multiple indirect effects    
     Political Powerlessness   .21 (.08) 0.0831 0.4032 
     Uncertainty -.03 (.05) -0.1512 0.0899 
     Total mediated effect .18 (.06) 0.0480 0.3531 
 
Note. Boldface type highlights a significant effect as determined by the BCaa 95% confidence 
interval (CI) which does not contain a zero. 
a Refers to bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrapping confidence intervals (CI) that 























Adj R2 = .14, F(3, 164) = 9.70, p < .001 
 
Figure 1.  Multiple mediation test of the relationship between conspiracy condition (pro- 
conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy) and intended political behaviors. 
Notes. **p < .05.  ***p < .01. 
Discussion 
,Q6WXG\ZHIRXQGWKDWH[SRVXUHWRFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVLQIOXHQFHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
intentions to engage in political processes such as voting.  Demonstrating that exposure to 
conspiracy theories influences intended political engagement gives a hint to the extent to 
which conspiracy theories may be influential.  Voting and other forms of political 
engagement are decreasing around the world (e.g., Fiorina, 2002), and revealing that intended 
political behaviours can be influenced by exposure to conspiracy theories suggests that 
decreased engagement could be due, in part, to how widespread conspiracy theories are in 
society (Swami & Coles, 2010).  This study has also extended previous research investigating 
the impact of conspiracy theories (Butler et al., 1995; Douglas & Sutton, 2008).  Here, it has 
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been demonstrated that while exposure to conspiracy theories can influence the extent to 
ZKLFKWKHWKHRU\LVHQGRUVHGLWFDQDOVRLQIOXHQFHDSHUVRQ¶VEHKDYLRXUDOLQWHQWLRQV 
Further, Study 1 demonstrated that feelings of powerlessness towards the government 
fully mediated the effect of pro- versus anti-conspiracy information on intended political 
behaviours.  This suggests that being exposed to government conspiracy theories may 
LQFUHDVHIHHOLQJVWKDWRQH¶VDFWLRQVZLOOKDYHOLWWOHLPSDFWZKLFKPD\VXEVHTXHQWO\ORZHU
RQH¶VLQWHQWLRQVWRHQJDJHLQSROLWLFDOEHKDYiours.  This line of reasoning is consistent with 
results from a recent American census (File & Crissey, 2010) ± when asked why people did 
not vote, many responded with the reason that their vote would not make a difference.   
This study also extends previous research that has revealed an association between 
powerlessness and endorsement of conspiracy theories.  In the current study however, we 
GHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWH[SRVXUHWRFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVGLUHFWO\LQIOXHQFHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶IHHOLQJRI
powerlessness towards the government.  Previous research has only been able to demonstrate 
correlations between endorsement of conspiracy theories and powerlessness without 
indicating the direction of the relationship (e.g., Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  Whilst some 
individuals may endorse conspiracies to reduce their feelings of powerlessness (Swami & 
Coles, 2010), it can be suggested from the current findings that exposure to conspiracy 
theories may also bring about feelings of powerlessness.  
Although uncertainty was shown not to be a significant mediator of the relationship 
between exposure to conspiracy theories and political behaviour, participants who were 
exposed to conspiracy theories felt more uncertain towards the government than those 
exposed to an anti-conspiracy account.  This also extends previous literature by providing 
evidence of a directional relationship between conspiracy beliefs and uncertainty.  There 
were however no reported effects of exposure to conspiracy theories on mistrust and 
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disillusionment.  This was an unexpected finding as previous research suggests that mistrust 
is associated with conspiracy beliefs (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  However, it may be 
difficult to manipulate mistrust and disillusionment by exposure to a wide variety of 
governmental conspiracy theories.  Using this method, it is difficult to manipulate trust in one 
particular group because different groups are implicated in different conspiracy theories (e.g., 
US government, British government, specific politicians).  Trust and disillusionment could 
perhaps be better influenced by exposure to specific conspiracy theories such as those related 
to climate change, that are associated with a single group of apparently dishonest individuals 
(i.e., climate scientists) rather than a wider group.  We test this possibility in Study 2, which 
also serves to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1.   
Study 2 
 In Study 2, we focused on the influence of climate change conspiracy theories on 
LQWHQWLRQVWRUHGXFHRQH¶VFDUERQIRRWSULQW6SHFifically, we investigated whether conspiracy 
theories concerning the validity of scientific claims concerning climate change influence 
SHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQVWRSXUFKDVHHQHUJ\HIILFLHQWOLJKWEXOEVRUXVHRWKHUPHDQVRIWUDQVSRUW
than driving a motor vehicle.  Research has demonstrated that engagement with such 
behaviours ± in a similar way to political engagement ± is not sufficiently high in Western 
societies (e.g., Leiserowitz, 2003).  For example, a recent Gallup Poll found that American 
respondents ranked the environment 15th (out of 15) of the most important problems today 
(Jones, 2011), and another Gallup Poll found that American respondents ranked climate 
change as the 12th most important (out of 13) environmental issues facing people today 
(Dunlap & Saad, 2001).  This is intriguing, especially given that climate change is arguably 
the primary environmental risk confronting the world in the 21st century (Leiserowitz, 2003).  
Recent research has found an association between conspiracy beliefs in general and rejection 
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of climate science claims (Lewandowsky, et al., 2013a).  We argue here that exposure to 
LQIRUPDWLRQWKDWUHMHFWVFOLPDWHVFLHQFHFODLPVZLOODGYHUVHO\LQIOXHQFHSHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQVWR
engage in climate friendly behaviours.    
To test this prediction, we utilised a similar method to Study 1, exposing participants 
to climate change conspiracy theories (versus anti-conspiracy material), and measuring the 
extent to which participants intended to engage with efforts to reduce their carbon footprint.  
We also examined the influence of exposure to conspiracy theories on political intentions, 
using the same scale as used in Study 1.  In doing so, it was possible to examine whether a 
type of conspiracy theory that does not explicitly accuse the government of any actions can 
also lead to political disengagement.  This is an intriguing possibility because it points to the 
potential for conspiracy theorizing to form part of a political mindset ± a set of beliefs that are 
associated with political suspicion and disbelief of official explanations.  We also included 
the range of mediators tested in Study 1.  Indeed, previous research has linked climate change 
behaviour to feelings of powerlessness (Aitken, Chapman, & McClure, 2011), uncertainty 
(e.g., de Kwaadsteniet, 2007; Hine & Gifford, 1996), and mistrust (MacGregor, Slovic, 
Mason, & Detweiler, 1994) and we examined here if climate change conspiracy theories 
influence intentions via these potential mediators.   
Further, Study 2 provided a methodological refinement to Study 1 by including a 
control condition where participants were exposed to no information regarding conspiracy 
theories.  Study 1 demonstrated a difference in political intentions between the pro- and anti-
conspiracy conditions but it cannot be known for certain whether the pro-conspiracy 
condition decreased political intentions or whether the anti-conspiracy condition increased 
such intentions.  A control condition allows us to be certain of the direction of the effect. 
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Method 
Participants and design 
Two hundred and fourteen undergraduate students (182 women and 32 men, Mage = 
19.66, SD = 3.06) at a British university participated in an online experimental questionnaire.  
Participants received course credit in exchange for their participation.  A timer was used to 
identify participants who had spent less than 30 seconds reading the manipulation and who 
had thus exceeded reading speed capabilities for upper college students (Speed Reading, 
2014).  Such participants were excluded from the analyses, and in total this was 11 
participants from the pro-conspiracy condition and 12 from the anti-conspiracy condition.  
The final sample size used for data analysis was therefore 191 (164 women and 27 men, Mage 
= 19.75, SD = 3.21).  There were 63 participants in the pro-conspiracy condition, 59 in the 
anti-conspiracy condition, and 69 in the control condition. 
A single-factor independent variable (pro-conspiracy vs. anti-conspiracy vs. control) 
between-subject design was employed.  A manipulation check measureGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
judgements that a series of climate change conspiracy theories are true.  Participants reported 
feelings of climate powerlessness, uncertainty, disillusionment and trust towards different 
sources to tell the truth about climate change, which were measured as potential mediators for 
the predicted effect on climate change intentions.  Participants also reported feelings of 
political powerlessness, which were measured as a possible mediator for the predicted effect 
of exposure to climate change conspiracy theories on political intentions.  Finally, scales of 
intended climate change behaviours and intended political behaviours formed the two 
dependent variables.   
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Materials and procedure 
  As in Study 1, the online questionnaire was designed using the Qualtrics 
questionnaire design tool and first presented participants with an information page where they 
were asked to give their consent before beginning the questionnaire.  On the following page, 
two articles were used to either expose participants to information that supports conspiracy 
theories (pro-conspiracy condition) or information that refutes conspiracy theories (anti-
conspiracy condition) (see Appendix B for full wording).  A control condition was also 
included, where no further information was given.  The pro-conspiracy article began by 
arguing that climate change is a hoax.  It then continued to provide specific examples of 
conspiracy theories such as that climate change scientists are just chasing funding and not all 
scientists agree with the climate change findings.  An extract from the conspiracy article was 
as follows: 
³«IXUWKHUWKHLGHDRIJOREDOZDUPLQJKROGVOLWWOHZHLJKW,QGHSHQGHQWHYLGHQFH
shows that since 1940, global average temperatures fell for four decades.  This 
presents DVLJQLILFDQWIODZLQWKHRIILFLDODFFRXQW«´ 
The anti-conspiracy article was similar in content to the pro-conspiracy article but 
differed by arguing that climate change is not a hoax.  An extract from the anti-conspiracy 
theory article was as follows: 
³«further, evidence of global warming is robust.  Independent evidence shows that 
the last two decades of the 20th century were the hottest in 400 years «. Numerous 
ILQGLQJVVXFKDVWKLVSUHVHQWVLJQLILFDQWVXSSRUWIRUWKHRIILFLDODFFRXQW«´ 
7KHWHUPµFRQVSLUDF\WKHRU\¶ZDVQRWPHQWLRQHGLQHLWKHURIWKHDUWLFOHV  To check 
that the manipulation was successful, participants next rated the likelihood that a series of 
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climate change conspiracy theories are true.  Those in the control condition also completed 
this manipulation check.  These statements were adapted from previous research (Douglas & 
6XWWRQ7KHUHZHUHVHYHQVWDWHPHQWVLQWRWDOHJ³&OLPDWHFKDQJHLVDKRD[´³7KH
LGHDWKDWWKHZRUOGLVKHDGHGIRUFDWDVWURSKLFFOLPDWHFKDQJHLVDIUDXG´Į , see 
Appendix B).  In each case, participants were asked to rate the likelihood that each is true on 
a seven-point scale (1 =  extremely unlikely, 7 =  extremely likely). 
A scale was used to DVVHVVDSHUVRQ¶VIHHOLQJVRISRZHUOHVVQHVVVSHFLILFDOO\
cRQFHUQLQJFOLPDWHFKDQJH$LWNHQHWDO7KLVVFDOHFRQVLVWHGRIWKUHHLWHPVHJ³,
IHHOWKDWP\DFWLRQVZLOOQRWDIIHFWWKHRXWFRPHRIFOLPDWHFKDQJH´Į , see Appendix B) 
where participants indicted the extent to which they agreed to each statement on a six-point 
scale (1 =  strongly disagree, 6 =  strongly agree).  A further scale measuring uncertainty 
about climate change was used from Aitken et al. (2011).  The scale consisted of two items 
HJ³I feel uncertain as to whether climate chDQJHLVDVLJQLILFDQWSUREOHP´Į , see 
Appendix B) where participants indicted the extent to which they agreed to each statement on 
a six-point scale (1 =  strongly disagree, 6 =  strongly agree). 
$VFDOHZDVDOVRLQFOXGHGWRPHDVXUHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶IHHOLQJVRIGLVLOOXVLRQPHQW
specifically towards climate change scientists.  This scale was adapted from Niehuis and 
%DUWHOODQGFRQVLVWHGRIIRXUVWDWHPHQWVHJ³,DPYHU\GLVDSSRLQWHGZLWKWKH
FOLPDWHFKDQJHVFLHQWLVWV´Į , see Appendix B) where participants responded with the 
extent to which they agreed with each statement on a six-point scale (1 =  strongly disagree, 6 
=  strongly agree).  Further, a scale measuring trust towards a variety of sources to tell the 
truth about climate change was developed from Leiserowitz (2003).  This scale consisted of 
VHYHQWUXVWVRXUFHVHJ³Scientists and doctors´Į , see Appendix B) where 
participants indicated the extent they trusted the source to tell the truth about climate change 
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on a six-point scale (1 =  strongly distrust, 6 =  strongly trust).  Further, the three-item scale 
measuring powerlessness, speFLILFDOO\FRQFHUQLQJSROLWLFVZDVXVHGDVLQ6WXG\Į ; 
see Appendix A).  
7KHILUVWGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHPHDVXUHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQWHQGHGFOLPDWHFKDQJH
EHKDYLRXUV4XHVWLRQVZHUHDGDSWHGIURPSUHYLRXVUHVHDUFKVRWKDWSDUWLFLSDQW¶VUHVSRQVHV
reflected their intended behaviour (Leiserowitz, 2003).  There were seven statements in total 
DVNLQJSDUWLFLSDQWVDERXWWKHLULQWHQGHGEHKDYLRXUVRYHUWKHQH[WPRQWKVHJ³'R\RX
intend to use energy-efficiency as a selection criterion when buying a light bulb or household 
DSSOLDQFH´³'R\RXLQWHQGWRZDONRUF\FOHPRUHWKDQGULYLQJRUXVLQJSXEOLFWUDQVSRUW"´Į
= .80, see Appendix B).  Participants responded by indicating the extent that they intended to 
engage in each of the behaviours on a seven-point scale (1 =  definitely no, 7 =  definitely yes).  
7KHVHFRQGGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHPHDVXUHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQWHQGHGSROLWLFDOEHKDYLRXUVXVLQJWKH
same questions as in Study 1 (Į = .77, see Appendix A).  At the conclusion of the study, the 
participants were debriefed in writing and were thanked for their participation. 
Results 
There were no significant effects involving participant gender, so this factor is not 
mentioned further.  Further, participant age was not associated with any of the potential 
mediating variables or DVs and it is also not mentioned further.   
Manipulation check  
There was a significant difference in endorsement of climate change conspiracy 
theories between conditions, F(2, 188) = 11.35, p <  .001, Ș2 = .11.  Endorsement of climate 
change conspiracies was significantly higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 3.23, SD = 
1.69) than the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 2.31, SD = 1.01, p < .001) and the control 
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condition (M = 2.57, SD = 1.13, p = .001).  Endorsement of climate change conspiracy 
theories was not significantly higher in the anti-conspiracy condition relative to the control 
condition (p = .180).  The manipulation was therefore successful.  
Climate conspiracy theories and intended climate behaviours 
Results revealed a significant difference in climate change intentions between 
conditions, F(2, 188) = 3.67, p = .027, Ș2 = .04.  Specifically, climate change intentions were 
significantly lower in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 3.36, SD = 1.14) than the anti-
conspiracy condition (M = 3.83, SD = 1.02, p = .019) and the control condition (M = 3.81, SD 
= 1.13 p = .021).  Intentions to engage in climate-friendly behaviours were not significantly 
different in the anti-conspiracy condition relative to the control (p = .910).  
Climate conspiracy theories and intended political behaviours 
Results also revealed a significant difference in political intentions between 
conditions, F(2, 188) = 5.93, p = .003, Ș2 = .06.  Specifically, political intentions were 
significantly lower in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 2.62, SD = 0.78) than the anti-
conspiracy condition (M = 3.17, SD = 0.91, p = .003) and the control condition (M = 3.14, SD 
= 1.22, p = .003).  Political intentions were not significantly different in the anti-conspiracy 
condition relative to the control (p = .884).  
Testing mediation 
Exposure to climate change conspiracy theories therefore influenced intentions to 
engage in both climate change and political behaviours.  To test potential mediators of these 
two effects, separate ANOVAs were firstly conducted with conspiracy condition (pro-
conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy versus control) as the independent variable, and summed 
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scores on all potential mediators for climate change behaviours (climate powerlessness, 
uncertainty, disillusionment and trust), and summed scores on the one potential mediator for 
political behaviours (political powerlessness) as dependent variables.   
Results revealed a marginally significant difference in climate powerlessness between 
conditions, F(2, 188) = 2.71, p = .069, Ș2 = .03.  Specifically, climate powerlessness was 
significantly higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 3.39, SD = 1.20) than the anti-
conspiracy condition (M = 2.91, SD = 1.08, p = .025) and marginally significantly higher than 
the control (M = 3.06, SD = 1.16, p = .100).  Powerlessness towards climate change was not 
significantly higher in the anti-conspiracy condition relative to the control condition (p = 
.491).  
Results also revealed a marginally significant difference in uncertainty between 
conditions, F(2, 188) = 2.61, p = .076, Ș2 = .03.  Specifically, uncertainty was significantly 
higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 3.42, SD = 1.09) than the anti-conspiracy 
condition (M = 3.00, SD = 1.05, p = .031) and marginally significantly higher than the control 
(M = 3.10, SD = 1.06, p = .089).  Uncertainty was not significantly higher in the anti-
condition relative to the control condition (p = .590).  
Further, results revealed a significant difference in disillusionment between 
conditions, F(2, 188) = 4.41, p = .013, Ș2 = .05.  Specifically, disillusionment was 
significantly higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 2.72, SD = 1.00) than the anti-
conspiracy condition (M = 2.28, SD = 0.87, p = .008) and the control (M = 2.33, SD = 0.92, p 
= .015).  Disillusionment was not significantly lower in the anti-conspiracy condition relative 
to the control condition (p = .751).  There were no reported differences in trust across all 
combined sources between conditions, F(2, 188) = 0.81, p = .448, Ș2 = .00.   
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Finally in relation to the mediator for the effect of conspiracy condition on intended 
political behaviours, results revealed a significant difference in political powerlessness 
between conditions, F(2, 188) = 27.60, p <  .001, Ș2 = .23.  Specifically, powerlessness was 
significantly higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 3.59, SD = 0.69) than the anti-
conspiracy condition (M = 2.78, SD = 0.75, p = .003) and the control (M = 2.70, SD = 0.81, p 
< .001).  Powerlessness was not significantly higher in the anti-conspiracy condition relative 
to the control condition (p = .560). 
Each of the candidate mediators was then examined in a test of mediation in order to 
explain the effect of the conspiracy conditions (pro-conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy, versus 
control) on climate and political intentions separately.  The mediators of climate 
powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment were examined in a test of multiple mediation 
in explaining climate change behavioural intentions.  The mediator of political powerlessness 
was examined in a test of simple mediation in explaining political intentions.  These multiple 
DQGVLPSOHPHGLDWLRQVZHUHFDUULHGRXWXVLQJ+D\HVDQG3UHDFKHU¶V3) bootstrapping 
method for indirect effects.  This differed slightly from the method used in Study 1 as it 
allowed the mediations between the three conspiracy conditions to be tested by the use of 
indicator coding (see Table 2).  The pro-conspiracy condition was coded as the representative 
condition, whereby controlling for pro-conspiracy condition to control (D2) enabled the effect 
for pro-conspiracy condition to anti-conspiracy condition (D1) to be explored, and vice versa.  
This indictor coding was automatically completed usinJWKH+D\HVDQG3UHDFKHU¶V) 
SPSS macro.  Results from the current study are presented in Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 2 
and 3, for climate change and political behaviours intentions, respectively. 
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Table 2 
A Table of ,QGLFDWRU&RGLQJ5HIHUUHGWRDVµ'¶XVHGLQWKH0ultiple and Simple +D\HV¶Dnd 
Preacher (2013) Bootstrapping Indirect Mediations for the Conspiracy Conditions (Pro-
conspiracy versus Anti-conspiracy; versus Control) and either Intended Climate Change or 
Political Behaviours. 
 
Climate change behaviours.  A multiple mediation analysis of the effect of pro-
conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy condition on intended climate change behaviours (D1) 
(when controlling for pro-conspiracy versus control, D2) indicated that climate 
powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment (controlling for all three other mediators) 
significantly mediated this effect.  Second, the effect for D2 (controlling for D1) concurred, 
which demonstrated that climate powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment were 
significant mediators of the effect of exposure to conspiracy theories on climate change 
behaviour (pro- versus anti-conspiracy conditions and pro-conspiracy versus control).  
Intended political behaviours.  A simple mediation of the effect of pro-conspiracy 
versus anti-conspiracy condition on intended political behaviours ± testing the specific 
indirect effect for both D1 (controlling for D2) and D2 (controlling for D1) ± indicated that 
political powerlessness significantly mediated this effect. 
                                     Conspiracy Condition 
Indicator Coding Pro-conspiracy Anti-conspiracy Control 
D1 0 1 0 
D2 0 0 1 
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Table 3 
Multiple Mediation of the Indirect Effects of Conspiracy Condition (using Indicator Coding, see Table 2) on Intended Climate Change 
Behaviors (DV) through Feelings of Climate Powerlessness (a), Uncertainty (b) and Disillusionment (c) (MVs) (N = 191; 10,000 bootstrap 
samples). 
 
Note.  Boldface type highlights a significant effect as determined by the Monte Carlo 90% confidence interval (CI) which does not contain a 
zero.  
*p <  .10.  **p < .05.   ***p < .01. 
                      Normal test theory    
 




































Monte Carlo 90% 
Confidence Intervals 
  Lower       Upper 
D1 a1a -0.47 (.21)**  c1 0.47 (.20)** c¶ 0.19 (.18) 0.19 (.09) 0.0438 0.3432 
 a1b -0.42 (.20)**      0.06 (.08) 0.0409 0.3051 
 a1c   -0.45 (.17)***      0.04 (.07) 0.0641 0.3068 
D2 a2a -0.33 (.20)*  c2 0.50 (.19)** c¶ 0.24 (.17) 0.13 (.08) 0.0012 0.2706 
 a2b -0.32 (.19)*      0.04 (.08) 0.0069 0.2605 
 a2c -0.40 (.16)**      0.03 (.07) 0.0478 0.2780 
 µ0V¶     ba  -0.39 (.07)*** 
   
      
bb 
bc 
 -0.14 (.08)* 
 -0.08 (.09)    
















Figure 2. Multiple mediation test of the relationship between conspiracy condition (using 
indicated coding, see Table 2) and intended climate change behaviors. 
Note. Dashed straight lines highlight non-significant path relationships and solid straight 
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Table 4 
Simple Mediation of the Indirect Effects of Conspiracy Condition (using Indicator Coding, see Table 2) on Political Behaviours (DV) through 
Feelings of Political Powerlessness (MV) (N= 191; 5,000 bootstrap samples).  
 
 
Note.  Boldface type highlights a significant effect as determined by the Monte Carlo 95% confidence interval (CI) which does not contain a zero. 
**p < .05.  ***p < .01. 
  
                    Normal test theory     
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Point Estimate  
(s.e.) 
Monte Carlo 95% 
Confidence Intervals 
 
 Lower          Upper 
D1 a1 -0.81 (.14)***  c1 0.54 (.18)** c¶ 0.24 (.19) 0.30 (.09) 0.1382 0.4916 
D2 a2 -0.89 (.13)***  c2 0.52 (.17)** c¶ 0.19 (.19) 0.32 (.10) 0.1561 0.5369 
 µMV¶     b -0.37 (.09)*** 
   
















Figure 3.  Simple mediation test of the relationship between conspiracy condition (using 
indicated coding, see Table 2) and intended political behaviors. 
Note. Dashed straight lines highlight non-significant path relationships and solid straight lines 
highlight significant path relationships. 
Discussion 
 In Study 2, participants were exposed to either a pro-conspiracy or anti-conspiracy 
DFFRXQWRIHYHQWVSOXVDFRQWUROFRQGLWLRQ:HPHDVXUHGSDUWLFLSDQW¶VLQWHQWLRQVWRUHGXFH
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The effect of exposure to conspiracy theories on intended climate change behaviours was 
mediated by climate powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment.  Supporting the 
possibility that conspiracy theories in general may be associated with political cynicism, the 
effect of exposure to conspiracy theories on intended political behaviours was mediated by 
feelings of political powerlessness.  That is, climate change conspiracy theories, that do not 
explicitly accuse the government, can lead to political disengagement through feelings of 
political powerlessness.  
General discussion 
Psychologists are learning more about the individual traits associated with beliefs in 
conspiracy theories (e.g., Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Goertzel, 
1994; Swami, et al., 2010) and the extent to which conspiracy theories influence peoSOH¶V
attitudes about significant social and political events (Butler et al., 1995; Douglas & Sutton, 
2008).  However, there is a need to understand what these beliefs entail.  The current research 
sought to examine some of the potential consequences associated with exposure to conspiracy 
theories.  Study 1 demonstrated that exposure to governmental conspiracy theories led to 
heightened feelings of political powerlessness, which reduced intentions to engage in politics.  
In Study 2, we showed that exposure to climate change conspiracy theories increased feelings 
of climate powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment, which in turn lowered intentions 
to reduce ones carbon footprint.  Study 2 also demonstrated that exposure to climate change 
conspiracy theories, like governmental conspiracy theories in Study 1, led to feelings of 
political powerlessness, which reduced intentions to engage in politics.  Overall, these studies 
demonstrate that exposure to conspiracy theories may have potentially detrimental effects.  
We know from previous research that engagement with politics and climate change is 
undesirably low in Western societies (e.g., Fiorina, 2002; Leiserowitz, 2003; Niemi & 
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Weisberg, 2001; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Putnam, 1995, 2000).  Conspiracy theories 
may be an important source of ongoing disengagement, and may even serve to increase 
disengagement.   
The results of Study 2 suggest a further intriguing possibility.  Specifically, we 
demonstrated that climate change conspiracy theories not only influenced intentions to 
HQJDJHLQHIIRUWVWRUHGXFHRQH¶VFDUERQIRRWSULQWEXWDOVRUHGXFHGLQWHQWLRQVWRHQJDJHLQ
politics.  That is, climate change conspiracy theories influenced intentions to engage in 
behaviour in a domain unrelated to the specific conspiracy theories themselves.  Perhaps 
WKHUHIRUHH[SRVXUHWRFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVLQJHQHUDOLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDµFRQVSLUDWRULDO
PLQGVHW¶UHODWHGWRSROLWLFDOEHOLHIVDQGLQWHQWLRQV3RWHQWLDOO\other types of conspiracy 
theories may be related to feelings of political cynicism and powerlessness.  Future research 
may endeavour to test this possibility, examining for example whether other types of 
conspiracy theories such as those related to AIDS and specific conspiracy theories about 
social groups (e.g., anti-Jewish conspiracy theories) influence political beliefs and political 
engagement rather than simply beliefs and behaviours associated with the specific conspiracy 
theories themselves.  As Wood et al. (2012) have recently demonstrated, people are inclined 
to believe even contradictory conspiracy theories as long as they are supported by the notion 
RIDQRYHUDUFKLQJµFRYHU-XS¶/LNHZLVHSROLWLFDOF\QLFLVPPD\IRUPDIXQGDPHQWDOEDVLVRI
conspiracy theorizing.   
The current findings revealed mixed results with respect to mediation.  Specifically, 
climate powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment explained the effect of exposure to 
conspiracy theories on climate change intentions.  However, only political powerlessness 
mediated the relationship between exposure to governmental conspiracy theories and the 
intention to engage with politics.  These are intriguing findings, and point to the possibility 
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that variables such as uncertainty and disillusionment may indeed be manipulated by raising 
suspicion about the actions of a specific group.  On the other hand, mediators such as 
powerlessness may be associated with more general conspiracism, and political cynicism.  
Future research may endeavour to examine if different mediational patterns hold for different 
types of conspiracy theories.  It is also important to discuss potential reasons why, in the 
current research, conspiracy theories were not associated with mistrust.  Indeed, this is 
inconsistent with previous research (e.g., Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  It is possible that 
although conspiracy theories may lead to powerlessness, the same directional effect does not 
apply to mistrust.  Perhaps instead, mistrust draws people towards conspiracy theories rather 
than being a consequence of being exposed to conspiracy theories.  Unfortunately the current 
studies cannot address this possibility but future research may attempt to determine the causal 
direction of any relationship between mistrust and beliefs in conspiracy theories.   
The research had some important limitations that should also be addressed in future 
research.  First, it should be noted that although the effects observed in the current studies 
were statistically robust, the effect sizes were small (Ș2 = .05 in Study 1; Ș2 = .04 and Ș2 = .06 
in Study 2).  This means that the proportion of variance in political intentions and climate 
change intentions explained by exposure to conspiracy theories was quite modest and that 
there are potentially many other factors that contribute to such intentions.  Further, it is 
important to note that our findings were based on self-report measures of intentions to engage 
in political and climate change behaviours.  As we know, intentions do not always translate 
into actual behaviours (e.g., LaPiere, 1934; Linn, 1965; Sheeran, 2002).  Therefore, future 
work should examine how exposure to conspiracy theories influences actual political and 
climate change behaviours.  Future research should also rely less on student samples that may 
not be representative of the population, and thus limit the generalizability of the current 
findings.  In other words, with the data we have available, we are unable to conclude with 
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confidence that the findings reflect the general population in terms of level of demographic 
characteristics such as level of education and socioeconomic status.  Future research should 
also therefore address the participant gender imbalance in the current studies. 
Future research may also examine some of the potential positive consequences of 
conspiracy theories.  For example, conspiracy theories may allow people to challenge 
existing social hierarchies and encourage government transparency (e.g., Clarke, 2002; 
Swami & Coles, 2010).  More generally, previous research has tended to pathologize 
conspiracy beliefs, linking them with negative individual characteristics such as mistrust and 
anomie (e.g., Goertzel, 1994).  While not disputing these findings, there are reasons to 
believe that positively valued individual difIHUHQFHVPD\LQFUHDVHSHRSOH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWR
believe conspiracy theories.  For example, conspiracy theories posit novel, often elaborate 
and unconventional explanations for events.  Therefore, they may appeal to dispositionally 
creative (e.g., Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005), curious (e.g., Flegg & Huskins, 1973), 
sensitive (e.g., Guarino, Roger, & Olason, 2007) or open-minded (e.g., Haiman, 1964) 
people.  By examining such variables, we hope to achieve a more balanced and nuanced 
conceptualisation of conspiracy beliefs and begin to consider what some of their positive 
consequences might be.   
Conclusion 
Research exploring the consequences of conspiracy theories is timely because despite 
claims that they are harmful, especially in raising suspicion concerning scientific claims (e.g., 
Goertzel, 2010; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009), there is little evidence supporting this claim.  
The current studies demonstrate that some wariness about conspiracy theories may indeed be 
warranted.  Specifically, the current research provides evidence that exposure to conspiracy 
theories may potentially have important social consequences.  People who were exposed to 
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conspiracy theories about both shady and suspicious government operations and that climate 
change is a hoax reported less intention to engage in the political system ± an effect that 
occurred because conspiracy theories led to feelings of political powerlessness.  Further, 
people who were exposed to conspiracy theories about climate change reported less intention 
to reduce their carbon footprint ± an effect that occurred because conspiracy theories led to 
feelings of powerlessness and uncertainty towards climate change, and also feelings of 
disappointment in climate scientists. The current research therefore opens up a new line of 
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The studies presented in this chapter have been published in the following journal article: 
Jolley, D., & Douglas, K. M. (2014b). The effects of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories on 
vaccination intentions. PLoS ONE, 9 (2): e89177. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089177
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Chapter summary 
The current studies investigated the potential impact of anti-vaccine conspiracy 
beliefs, and exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, on vaccination intentions.  In Study 
3, British parents completed a questionnaire measuring beliefs in anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories and the likelihood that they would have a fictitious child vaccinated.  Results 
revealed a significant negative relationship between anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs and 
vaccination intentions.  This effect was mediated by the perceived dangers of vaccines, and 
feelings of powerlessness, disillusionment and mistrust in authorities.  In Study 4, 
participants were exposed to information that either supported or refuted anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories, or a control condition.  Results revealed that participants who had been 
exposed to material supporting anti-vaccine conspiracy theories showed less intention to 
vaccinate than those in the anti-conspiracy condition or controls.  This effect was mediated 
by the same variables as in Study 3.  These findings point to the potentially detrimental 
consequences of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, and highlight their potential role in 
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Introduction 
 The development of vaccines is one of the most important advances in the history of 
medicine, but in recent years, vaccination has declined in many regions of the world, 
especially in cases such as the combined Measles, Mumps and Rubella (MMR) vaccination 
(Health Protection Agency, 2008).  One contributor to this particular decline appears to have 
been the publication of Andrew :DNHILHOG¶VDUWLFOHLQThe Lancet in 1998 concerning a 
possible link between the MMR vaccination and the appearance of autism (Burgess, Burgess 
& Leask, 2006; Opel, Diekema, & Marcuse, 2011).  Although the article has since been 
retracted, the research discredited and the author is no longer permitted to practice medicine, 
lingering doubts persist and in many regions of the world, MMR vaccination rates lie well 
below the recommended 95% uptake (Health Protection Service, 2013).  In 2008, measles 
was declared to be endemic in the United Kingdom, 14 years after its spread was halted in the 
population (Health Protection Service, 2013).  Several methods have shown promising 
improvements in vaccination intentions generally, such as using expert sources to persuade 
people toward vaccination (Hopfer, 2012) and emphasizing that vaccination is normative 
(Conroy et al., 2009).  However, one potential obstacle to such interventions may be the 
popularity of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories.  The current research investigates the 
influence of such conspiracy allegations on vaccination intentions. 
 Conspiracy theories are attempts to explain events as the secret acts of powerful, 
malevolent forces (Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Goertzel, 1994; McCauley & Jacques, 1979; 
Swami, & Coles, 2010; Wood, et al., 2012).  For example, popular conspiracy theories allege 
that the 9/11 attacks were orchestrated by the US government, that Princess Diana was 
murdered by elements within the British establishment, and that the NASA moon landings 
were faked.  Belief in conspiracy theories is widespread, with polls consistently indicating 
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that more than 60% of Americans believe some form of conspiracy was responsible for 
3UHVLGHQW-RKQ).HQQHG\¶VGHDWK (Swami, 2012).  Further, polls demonstrate that more than 
20% of respondents endorse the idea that there is a link between childhood vaccines and 
autism (Public Policy Polling, 2013).  Many other anti-vaccine conspiracy theories have 
emerged in recent years (Kata, 2012; Offit, 2010).  At the heart of the anti-vaccine conspiracy 
movement lays the argument that large pharmaceutical companies and governments are 
covering up information about vaccines to meet their own sinister objectives.  According to 
the most popular theories, pharmaceutical companies stand to make such healthy profits from 
vaccines that they bribe researchers to fake their data, cover up evidence of the harmful side 
effects of vaccines, and inflate statistics on vaccine efficacy (Kata, 2012; Offit, 2010).  Anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories therefore reflect suspicion and mistrust of scientific research 
examining vaccine efficacy and safety.  Conspiracist ideation in general tends to be 
associated with a mistrust of science such as the rejection of climate science and other 
scientific propositions such as the link between smoking and lung cancer (Lewandowsky, et 
al., 2013a).  Along the same line, anti-vaccine conspiracy theories present an attempt to 
explain away overwhelming scientific evidence that vaccines are effective, safe, and 
necessary (Kata, 2010).   
 Although declining vaccination rates are undoubtedly a product of many contributing 
factors, it is important to consider the potential impact of conspiracy theories on vaccination 
intentions.  In particular, parents who are faced with the decision to have their children 
vaccinated may be more likely to seek information about vaccines via the Internet than 
through their doctor (Downs, Bruine de Bruin, & Fischhoff, 2008).  Parents who go to the 
Internet will find that some of the top ³KLWV´IRUYDFFLQH-related search terms is websites that 
propagate anti-vaccine conspiracy theories (Kata, 2012; Offit, 2010).  Although many people 
are skeptical of anti-vaccine conspiracy allegations, recent research suggests that such 
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conspiracy theories tend to feature prominently in focus group discussions about vaccination 
(Mills, Jadad, Ross, & Wilson, 2005).  
 Further, recent findings suggest that people tend to be persuaded by conspiracy 
theories they are exposed to without being aware of it (Douglas, & Sutton, 2008).  Also, 
exposure to conspiracy theories has been found to have detrimental effects in other domains, 
such as reducing pro-environmental intentions and willingness to engage in politics (Butler, 
et al., 1995; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, see Chapter 2).  In the health domain, one prominent 
conspiracy theory proposes that birth control and HIV/AIDS are forms of genocide against 
the African American community.  Endorsement of these conspiracy theories amongst 
African Americans has been found to be associated with negative attitudes towards 
contraceptive behaviors, which may potentially expose people to the risk of unwanted 
pregnancies and sexually transmitted illnesses (Bird & Bogart, 2003; Bogart & Thorburn, 
2006; Hoyt, et al., 2012).  Directly relevant to the current investigation, it has recently been 
shown that endorsement of a variety of unrelated conspiracy theories is associated with 
negative attitudes toward vaccination (Lewandowsky, et al., 2013a).   
An emerging literature therefore points to the potential dangers of conspiracy theories.  
The current research explores the possibility that anti-vaccine conspiracy theories may 
present a significant obstacle to vaccine uptake.  Previously in Chapter 2, we investigated the 
role of exposure to conspiracy theories in the socio-political behavioral intention domain.  In 
order to further our understanding of the potential consequences of conspiracy theories 
therefore, Chapter 3 aims to explore the impact of belief in, and exposure to, conspiracy 
theories on intended health behaviors.  In the current research, we also examine some of the 
potential factors that may mediate such effects.  First, perceiving danger in vaccines tends to 
be associated with reluctance to vaccinate (Wilson, 2000).  For example, many people believe 
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that vaccines have dangerous side effects, and that exposure to the disease itself would often 
be preferable to the vaccination (Health Protection Service, 2013; Salmon, et al., 2009). 
Further, research suggests that perceived dangers play an important role in parental decisions 
to have their children vaccinated (Sporton & Francis, 2000).  It is therefore possible that 
beliefs in conspiracy theories, or exposure to conspiracy theories, negatively influence 
SHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVDERXWWKHGDQJHUVRIYDFFLQHV, and their subsequent decision to vaccinate.  
Feelings of powerlessness were measured as a second potential mediator, which refers to the 
perception of being incapable of influencing an outcome by taking action (Stern, 2000).  
Research has demonstrated that powerlessness is associated with beliefs in conspiracy 
theories (Abalakina-Paap, et al., 1999; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, see Chapter 2) and also that 
feelings of political powerlessness mediate the relationship between exposure to conspiracy 
theories and voting intentions (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, see Chapter 2).  It is therefore 
possible that beliefs in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, and exposure to such theories, 
increase feelings of powerlessness about the ability to change health outcomes, which 
subsequently reduce vaccination intentions.   
 Third, the current research examined the potential mediating role of disillusionment, 
or the feeling of disappointment that something is not what it was believed or hoped to be.  
Previous research has demonstrated that exposure to conspiracy theories increases political 
disillusionment (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, see Chapter 2), so it is reasonable to suppose that 
beliefs in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories or exposure to such theories may increase 
disillusionment with people responsible for the manufacture and administration of vaccines.  
This, in turn, may influence vaccination intentions.  Finally, the current studies examined the 
potential mediating role of trust in authorities.  Research has linked beliefs in conspiracy 
theories with low levels of trust (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994).  Further, 
distrust of medical information has been linked to reluctance to vaccinate (Kata, 2010).  
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Therefore, it is proposed here that beliefs in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories or exposure to 
such theories may decrease trust with medical officialdom and may, in turn, influence 
vaccination intentions.   
 In summary, the present research aims to explore the effect of anti-vaccine conspiracy 
beliefs on vaccination intentions.  Two studies are presented, which test the predictions that 
belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories would be associated with decreased vaccination 
intentions (Study 3), and that exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories would decrease 
vaccination intentions relative to an anti-conspiracy condition and control (Study 4).  Both 
studies examined four potential mediators of the predicted effects.   
Study 3 
 The first study employed a correlational design where participants were asked to rate 
the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with statements related to a range of anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories.  Participants, who were all parents, were then presented with a scenario 
depicting a fictitious child.  Here, they were asked to imagine that they were faced with the 
decision to have this child vaccinated against a specific (made-up) disease.  They were given 
some information about the disease and the vaccination and were asked to indicate their 
intention to have the child vaccinated.   
Method 
Participants and design 
Eighty-nine British parents (80 women and nine men, Mage = 38.06, SD = 9.25) 
participated in the study.  The parents had an average of 1.35 (SD = .59) children, with the 
mean age of their youngest child being 3.38 (SD = 1.33).  Participants were invited to take 
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part in our study between September and December 2012 via poster advertisements across 
WKH8QLYHUVLW\RI.HQW¶V&DQWHUEXU\FDPSXV, and emails sent to both students within the 
6FKRRORI3V\FKRORJ\DQGSDUHQWVZKRZHUHVLJQHGXSWRWKH3V\FKRORJ\¶V&KLOG
Development research group.  We also utilised Facebook and Twitter to advertise the study.  
In all cases, participants were invited to complete an online questionnaire.  They did so 
voluntarily and without incentive. 
Anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs were measured as the predictor variable and 
vaccination intentions as the criterion variable.  Perceived dangers of vaccines, feelings of 
powerlessness, disillusionment, and trust in authorities were measured as potential mediators. 
Materials and procedure 
  Participants indicated their informed consent before beginning the questionnaire.  
They were then asked to complete a scale measuring beliefs in anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories.  There were eight VWDWHPHQWVHJ³9DFFLQHV are harmful, and this fact is covered 
XS´Į , see Appendix C), where participants indicated their agreement on a seven-point 
scale in each case (1= strongly disagree, 7 =  strongly agree).    
 Next, participants completed a scale measuring the perceived dangers of vaccines, 
adapted from existing materials (Betsch & Sachse, 2013).  There were eight statements (e.g., 
³9DFFLQHVOHDGWRDOOHUJLHV´Į , see Appendix D) where participants indicated their 
agreement on a seven-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 7 =  strongly agree).  A three-item 
scale measuring a SHUVRQ¶VIHHOLQJVRISRZHUOHVVQHVVVSHFLILFDOO\FRQFHUQLQJYDFFLQDWLRQ
was developed from previous research (Aitken, et al., 2011; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, see 
Chapter 2).  3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGWRUHDGWKHVWDWHPHQWVHJ³,IHHOWKDt my actions will 
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not stop the negative outcomes of immunisDWLRQV´Į , see Appendix D) and rate their 
agreement on a six-point scale (1 =  strongly disagree, 6 =  strongly agree).   
$VFDOHZDVDOVRLQFOXGHGWRPHDVXUHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶IHHOLQJVRIGLVLOOXVLRQPHQW
specifically towards those involved in vaccinations (e.g., the government, pharmaceutical 
companies).  This scale was adapted from existing materials (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, see 
Chapter 2; Niehuis & Bartell, 2006) DQGFRQVLVWHGRIIRXUVWDWHPHQWVHJ³,DPYHU\
disappointed with those who are involved in immunisations (e.g., the government, 
SKDUPDFHXWLFDOFRPSDQLHV´Į , see Appendix D) where participants indicated their 
agreement on a six-point scale (1 =  strongly disagree, 6 =  strongly agree).  Further, trust 
towards authorities was measured by adapting items from existing scales (Jolley & Douglas, 
2014a, see Chapter 2; Leiserowitz, 2003).  There were two trust sources (corporations and 
government, Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .82, see Appendix D), where participants 
indicated the extent to which they trusted the source to tell the truth about vaccination on a 
six-point scale (1 =  strongly distrust, 6 =  strongly trust).  The order of measures was 
counterbalanced.  
Finally, participants were asked to imagine a scenario in which they were the parent 
of an infant (Sophie, aged 8 months, Betsch & Sachse, 2013; Betsch, Renkewitz, & Haase, 
2013).   They were informed that their doctor had provided them with information regarding 
the (fictitious) disease dysomeria.  Dysomeria was described as a DS-virus spread by droplet 
infection, which may lead to serious consequences with symptoms such as fever and 
vomiting.  Participants were then informed about the vaccination against dysomeria, and that 
it is recommend by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for people of 
all ages (see Appendix C for full wording).  After reading the scenario, participants were 
DVNHGWRLQGLFDWHWKHLULQWHQWLRQWRKDYHWKHFKLOGYDFFLQDWHG³If you had the opportunity to 
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vaccinate your child (Sophie, aged 8 months) against dysomeria next week, what would you 
GHFLGH"´3DUWLFLSDQWVLQGLFDWHGWKHLULQWHQWLRQRQDVHYHQ-point scale (1 =  definitely not 
vaccinate, 7 =definitely vaccine).  At the conclusion of the study, participants were debriefed 
and were thanked for their participation. 
Results and discussion 
For each variable, mean values were calculated by summing the individual scores and 
then dividing by the number of items.  These mean scores were used in the statistical 
analyses.  Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables are presented in Table 5.  
However, because the potential mediators were significantly correlated with each other, their 
factor structure was first examined via an exploratory factor analysis of the individual items 
using Varimax rotation.  The same mediators were included in both Studies 3 and 4, so this 
analysis was conducted across data from both studies to increase power.  The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) measure of sample adequacy was .93, exceeding the recommended value of .6 
(Kaiser, 1970) DQG%DUWOHWW¶V Test of Sphericity (Barlett, 1954) reached statistical 
significance, X 2 (136) = 4544.44, p < .001, indicating that the items had adequate common 
variance for factor analysis.  Principal component analysis was then conducted, revealing 
four components with eigenvalues greater than 1 and extraction criterion of .30, explaining 
52.5 per cent, 8.7 per cent, 8.7 per cent and 6.4 per cent of the variance respectively.  The 
rotated solution revealed each component showing strong loadings, and all variables loading 
substantially on only one component.  The results of this analysis therefore support the use of 
four separate mediators and are presented in Appendix D. 
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Table 5 
Intercorrelations and Descriptive Statistics between Anti-Vaccine Conspiracy Beliefs and 











(0.89) - -.40*** .76*** .57*** .68*** -.46*** 
(2) Immunisation    
intention 
5.63 
(1.42)  - -.49*** .29** -.36*** .20
¥
 
(3) Dangers  2.97 (1.37)   - .58*** .60*** -.48*** 
(4) Powerlessness  3.16 (1.54)    - .59*** -.31** 
(5) Disillusionment  2.45 (1.40)     - -.41*** 
(6) Trust in authorities  3.09 (1.27)      - 
Notes. ¥ <  .10. * p< .05.  **p <. 01. ***p <. 001. 
Participant age and gender were not associated with any of the potential mediators or 
the dependent measure and were therefore not analysed further.  As predicted, regression 
analyses revealed that anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs were a significant negative predictor of 
vaccination intentions, F(1, 87) = 15.97, p < .001, R2 = .16, ȕ = -.63, t = - 3.10, p < .001.  
Examining potential mediators of this effect, four separate regression analyses were 
conducted.  As shown in Table 6, anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs were a significant predictor 
of perceived dangers of vaccines, and feelings of powerlessness, disillusionment and trust in 
authorities, F(5, 83) = 12.37, p < .001, R2 = .58; F(5, 83) = 41.70, p < .001, R2 = .32; F(5, 83) 
= 74.43, p < .001, R2 = .46; F(5, 83) = 23.00, p < .001, R2 = .20, respectively.   
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Table 6 
Four Separate Regressions Examining Anti-Conspiracy Belief as Predictor, and Four 







1 Dangers .76 10.98*** 
2 Powerlessness .57 6.46*** 
3 Disillusionment .68 8.63*** 
4 Trust in authorities -.46 -4.80*** 
Note.  ***p <. 001. 
Testing mediation 
To test the predicted pattern of mediation between anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs and 
vaFFLQDWLRQLQWHQWLRQVZHXVHG+D\HVDQG3UHDFKHU¶VERRWVWUDSSLQJPDFURGHVLJQHG
for SPSS to run a multiple mediation model.  This method is a non-parametric test and 
therefore it does not violate assumptions of normality.  The method is based on re-sampling a 
subset of the data many thousands of times, which subsequently creates a custom sampling 
distribution that is shaped like the data.  This method encompasses two processes: first, the 
³GLUHFWHIIHFW´PHDVXUHVFKDQJHVLQWKH'9ZKHQWKH,9LQFUHDVHV,QFRQWUDVWWKH³LQGLUHFW
HIIHFW´PHDVXUHVFKDQJHVLQWKH'9ZKHQWKH09LQFUHDVHVDQGWKH,9LVIL[HG7KHLQGLUHFW
effect is the test of mediation, and is our sole focus here.  Bootstrapping therefore involves 
repeatedly estimating the indirect effect in each re-sampled data set.  By repeating this 
process thousands of times, it builds an empirical approximation of the sampling distribution 
that constructs the confidence intervals (Hayes & Preacher, 2013).  In order to test the 
significance of the indirect effect, we used 5000 bootstrap re-samples to describe the 
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confidence intervals of indirect effects in a manner that makes no assumptions about the 
distribution of the indirect effects.   
As argued by Hayes (2009), an indirect effect is estimated as being significant if the 
confidence intervals do not contain a zero, as opposed to significance in the individual paths.  
This is because the mediation model is not pertinent to whether the individual paths ³D´SDWK
,9WRPHGLDWRU³E´SDWKPHGLDWRUWR'9FRQWUROOLQJIRUWKH,9³F´SDWK,9WR'9RU
³F¶´SDWK,9WR'9FRQWUROOLQJIRUWKHPHGLDWRUVare either significant or non-significant.  
Results from the current study are presented in Table 7 and Figure 4.  The multiple mediation 
analysis of the effect of anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs on vaccination intentions indicated 
that perceived dangers of vaccines and feelings of powerlessness, disillusionment and trust in 
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Table 7 
A Multiple Mediation Test of the Relationship between Anti-Vaccine Conspiracy Beliefs (IV; a) and Vaccination Intentions (DV; c) Through 
Perceived Dangers of Vaccines (a), and Feelings of Powerlessness (b), Disillusionment (c) and Trust in Authorities (d) (MVs; b) (N = 89; 5000 
Bootstrap Samples). 
 
Notes.  ***p < .01.  
Boldface type highlights a significant effect as determined by the Monte Carlo 95% confidence interval (CI), which does not contain a zero.
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Point Estimate  
(s.e.) 
Monte Carlo 95% 
Confidence Intervals 
 
 Lower          Upper 
aa 1.17 (.11)***  c -0.63 (.16)*** c¶ -0.02 (.26) -0.54 (.20) -0.9439 -0.1603 
ab 0.97 (.15)***      0.04 (.18) -0.8071 -0.1345 
ac 1.06 (.12)***      0.15 (.18) -0.8595 -0.1481 
ad -0.65 (.14)***      0.05 (.12) 0.0816 0.5780 
µ0V¶     ba -0.46 (.16)*** 
   
     bb  0.04 (.12) 
   
     bc  -0.14 (.14) 
   
     bd  0.08 (.13) 
   















Figure 4. Multiple bootstrapping mediation test of the relationship between anti-vaccine 
conspiracy beliefs and vaccination intentions. 
Note. Dashed lines highlight non-significant relationships and solid lines highlight significant 
relationships.   
Therefore, as hypothesized, anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs predicted vaccination 
intentions.  Participants who endorsed anti-vaccine conspiracy theories to a greater extent 
indicated less intention to vaccinate.  Further, anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs were associated 
with three potential mediator variables that had been examined in previous research (Jolley & 
Douglas, 2014a, see Chapter 2) and also the perceived dangers of vaccines.  When all factors 
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vaccine conspiracy beliefs and vaccination intentions.  Using an experimental design, Study 4 
was designed to replicate and extend these findings by investigating the casual relationship 
between anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and vaccination intentions, via perceived dangers of 
vaccines, and feelings of powerlessness, disillusionment and mistrust in authorities.  
Study 4 
 In Study 4, participants were exposed to material supporting anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories (versus anti-conspiracy material, or a control condition).  Participants were then 
asked to indicate their intention to have a fictitious child vaccinated as in Study 3.  It was 
predicted that exposure to material supporting anti-vaccine conspiracy theories would 
negatively influence vaccination intentions, compared to the other conditions.  The potential 
mediators examined in Study 3 were also measured.  It was predicted that all variables would 
be associated with vaccination intentions, and that each would mediate the effect of exposure 
to conspiracy theories on vaccination intentions. 
Method 
Participants and design 
Two hundred forty six participants (146 women and 100 men, Mage = 34.76, SD = 
12.90) were recruited in April 2013 YLD$PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUN07XUN3DUWLFLSDQWV
were residents of the U.S.A. and received 70 cents in exchange for their participation.  
MTurk is an online crowdsourcing tool for collecting high-quality, inexpensive experimental 
data and it is widely used in psychological research (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; 
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).  Researchers have found MTurk workers to be at least 
as representative of the U.S. population as traditional internet subject pools, with gender, 
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race, age, and education matching the population more closely than internet samples in 
general (Paolacci, et al., 2010).  
Two questions randomly placed within the TXHVWLRQQDLUHHJ³6RZHFDQEHVXUH
WKDW\RXDUHUHDGLQJWKHTXHVWLRQVFDUHIXOO\SOHDVHDQVZHU³6WURQJO\GLVDJUHH´WRWKLV
TXHVWLRQ´ZHUHLQFOXGHGWRLGHQWLI\SDUWLFLSDQWVZKRKDGUXVKHGWKHTXHVWLRQQDLUH)XUWKHU
a timer was used to identify participants who had spent less than 30 seconds reading the 
vaccine-related material and who had thus exceeded reading speed capabilities for upper 
college students (Speed Reading, 2014).  Participants who failed the screening were removed 
from analyses (26 participants from the pro-conspiracy condition, 19 from the anti-conspiracy 
condition and 13 from the control condition).  The final sample size used for data analysis 
was therefore 188 (112 women and 76 men, Mage = 36.33, SD = 13.40).  There were 60 
participants in the pro-conspiracy condition, 62 in the anti-conspiracy condition, and 66 in the 
control condition. Within the final sample, 83 (44.15%) were parents, who had an average of 
1.30 (SD: 0.54) children, with the youngest being 4.37 (SD = 1.10) years old. 
A single-factor independent variable (pro-conspiracy vs. anti-conspiracy vs. control) 
between-VXEMHFWGHVLJQZDVHPSOR\HG$PDQLSXODWLRQFKHFNPHDVXUHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
judgements that a series of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories are true.  As in Study 3, 
participants reported the perceived dangers of vaccines, and feelings of powerlessness, 
disillusionment, and trust in authorities.  Finally, participants were again asked to indicate 
their intention to have a fictional child vaccinated.   
Materials and procedure 
  As in Study 3, this was an online questionnaire in which participants were first asked 
to give their informed consent.  Next, participants were either exposed to information that 
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supported anti-vaccine conspiracy theories (pro-conspiracy condition) or information that 
refuted conspiracy theories (anti-conspiracy condition) (see Appendix E for full wording).  A 
control condition was also included, where no further information was given.  Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions.  The pro-conspiracy article began by 
arguing that people within the vaccine industry are guilty of misrepresenting data.  It then 
continued to provide specific examples such as the idea that hiding information about 
vaccines is purely motivated by profit and there is significant evidence that vaccines hurt 
more than they help.  An extract from the pro-conspiracy article was as follows: 
³«IXUWKHUWKHUHLVDVLJQLILFDQWDPRXQWRIHYLGHQFHWKDWYDFFLQHVFDQKXUWPRUHWKDQ
they help. For example, by the year 2002, tens of thousands of reactions to vaccines, 
including deaths, were reported. One must magnify these figures tenfold, because it is 
HVWLPDWHGWKDWRIGRFWRUVGRQRWUHSRUWLQFLGHQWV«´  
The anti-conspiracy article differed by arguing that there are no reasons to doubt the efficacy 
and safety of vaccines.  It then continued to provide specific examples such as the idea that 
the financial benefits of preventing illnesses far outweigh the profits made from vaccines and 
that there is little evidence to suggest that vaccines are harmful.  An extract was as follows: 
³«IXUWKHUWKHUHLVOLWWOHHYLGHQFHWRVXJJHVWWKDWYDFFLQHVDUHKDUPIXO7KHVLGH
effects are minimal and whilst millions of people have been immunised over the years, 
less than .005% KDYHHYHUKDGDQDGYHUVHUHDFWLRQWRDYDFFLQH´ 
7KHWHUPµFRQVSLUDF\WKHRU\¶ZDVQRWPHQWLRQHGLQHLWKHURIWKHDUWLFOHV  To check that the 
manipulation was successful, participants rated the likelihood that a series of anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories are true.  Those in the control condition also completed this manipulation 
FKHFN7KHUHZHUHHOHYHQVWDWHPHQWVLQWRWDOHJ³Misrepresentation of the efficacy of 
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vaccines is motivated by profit´Į , see Appendix E), where participants indicated their 
agreement on a seven-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 7 =  strongly agree).  Participants 
then indicated their perceived dangers of vaccines Į 0), and IHHOLQJVRISRZHUOHVVQHVVĮ
= .88)GLVLOOXVLRQPHQWĮ DQGWUXVW in authorities (Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .73) 
as in Study 3 (see Appendix C).  The order of measures was counterbalanced.  Participants 
next read the scenario as in Study 3 and indicated their intention to have a fictional child 
vaccinated against a made up disease (see Appendix C).  At the end of the study, participants 
were told that the information presented in the article was fictional, and was written for the 
purposes of the study.  Participants were also pointed towards websites containing factual 
information about vaccines, vaccine efficacy and vaccine safety before being thanked and 
paid for their participation. 
Results and discussion 
For each variable, mean values were calculated by summing the individual scores and 
then dividing by the number of items.  These mean scores were used in the statistical 
analyses.  1RQHRIWKHDQDO\VHVZHUHDIIHFWHGE\WKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VWDWXVDVSDUHQWVRUQRQ-
parents, nor their age or gender.  These variables were therefore not analyzed further.   
Manipulation check  
There was a significant difference in endorsement of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories 
between conditions, F(2, 185) = 13.79, p <  .001, Ș2 = .15.  Endorsement of anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories was significantly higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 4.11, SD = 
1.41) than the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 2.93, SD = 1.14, p < .001) and the control 
condition (M = 3.56, SD = 1.21, p = .014).  The manipulation was therefore successful. 
Endorsement of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories was significantly lower in the anti-
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conspiracy condition than the control condition (p = .005).  Because the anti-conspiracy 
condition reduced conspiracy beliefs below baseline, we report analyses comparing the pro-
conspiracy condition to both the anti-conspiracy and control conditions.  
Anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and vaccination intentions 
As hypothesized, results revealed a significant difference in vaccination intentions 
across conditions, F(2, 185) = 4.81, p = .009, Ș2 = .05.  Vaccination intentions were 
significantly lower in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 4.87, SD = 1.74) than the anti-
conspiracy condition (M = 5.69, SD = 1.31, p = .003) and the control condition (M = 5.47, SD 
= 1.50, p = .028).  Intentions were not significantly different between the anti-conspiracy 
condition and control (p = .407).  
Testing mediation 
To test potential mediators of this effect, separate ANOVAs were firstly conducted 
with conspiracy condition (pro-conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy versus control) as the 
independent variable, and mean scores on all potential mediators (perceived vaccine dangers, 
powerlessness, disillusionment and trust in authorities) as dependent variables.  Results 
revealed a significant difference in perceived dangers of vaccines between conditions, F(2, 
185) = 7.61, p = .001, Ș2 = .08.  Perceived dangers were higher in the pro-conspiracy 
condition (M = 4.00, SD = 1.46) than the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 2.97, SD = 1.42, p < 
.001) and the control condition (M = 2.39, SD = 1.71, p = .021).  Perceived dangers were not 
significantly different between the anti-conspiracy and control conditions (p = .110). 
Results also revealed a significant difference in powerlessness between conditions, 
F(2, 185) = 3.44, p = .034, Ș2 = .04.  Powerlessness was significantly higher in the pro-
conspiracy condition (M = 4.25, SD = 1.43) than the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 3.46, SD 
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= 1.78, p = .008). Powerlessness was not significantly different between the pro-conspiracy 
and control conditions (p = .097), and the anti-conspiracy and control conditions (p = .327).  
There was a significant difference in disillusionment between conditions, F(2, 185) = 7.46, p 
= .001, Ș2 = .08.  Disillusionment was significantly higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M 
= 3.65, SD = 1.71) than the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 2.52, SD = 1.78, p < .001).  
However, disillusionment was not significantly higher than the control (M = 3.11, SD = 1.55, 
p = .062).  Disillusionment was significantly lower in the anti-conspiracy condition relative to 
the control condition (p = .041).   
Finally, results revealed no significant difference in trust in authorities between 
conditions, F(2, 185) = 2.32, p = .101, Ș2 = .03.  However, trust was significantly lower in the 
pro-conspiracy condition (M = 2.60, SD = 1.01) than the control condition (M = 2.97, SD = 
1.04, p = .048).  Trust was not significantly lower in the pro-conspiracy condition relative to 
the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 2.66, SD = 1.07, p = .745), or anti-conspiracy and control 
(p = .101).   
Each of the candidate mediators was then examined in a test of mediation in order to 
explain the effect of the conspiracy conditions (pro-conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy, versus 
control) on vaccination intentions.  7KLVZDVFDUULHGRXWXVLQJ+D\HVDQG3UHDFKHU¶V(2013) 
bootstrapping method for indirect effects, as in Study 3.  However, the method differed 
slightly, allowing mediations between the three conspiracy conditions to be tested by the use 
of indicator coding.  This was done XVLQJ+D\HVDQG3UHDFKHU¶V SPSS mediate macro.  
The pro-conspiracy condition was coded as the representative condition and was compared to 
the anti-conspiracy condition (D1) and control (D2) separately.  The SPSS macro had one 
indicator variable (D1, pro-conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy) as the IV, and the other as a 
covariate (D2, pro-conspiracy versus control), before simultaneously swapping the variables 
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around to complete the second meditational analysis (D2, pro-conspiracy versus control as the 
IV and D1, pro-conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy as the covariate).  This allows the 
mediational models to be tested whilst controlling for the effect of the parallel analysis, 
which is completed automatically by the SPSS macro.  As in Study 3, an indirect effect is 
then estimated as being significant from the confidence intervals not containing a zero, as 
opposed to significance in the individual paths (Hayes, 2009).  Results are presented in Table 
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Table 8 
A Multiple Mediation Test of Conspiracy Condition (D1, Pro-Conspiracy versus Anti-Conspiracy, versus D2, Pro-Conspiracy versus Control) on 
Vaccination Intentions (DV) Through Perceived Dangers Of Vaccines (a), and Feelings Of Powerlessness (b), Disillusionment (c) and Trust in 























Notes.  ¥ p <  .10.  **p < .05.   ***p < .01. 
Boldface type highlights a significant effect as determined by the Monte Carlo 95% confidence interval (CI), which does not contain a zero.
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Point Estimate  
(s.e.) 
Monte Carlo 95% 
Confidence Intervals 
 
 Lower          Upper 
D1 a1a -1.13 (.29)***  c1 0.83 (.28)*** c¶ 0.24 (.25) 0.44 (.19) 0.1788 0.8192 
 a1b -0.79 (.30)**      0.02 (.06) 0.0717 0.7069 
 a1d -1.13 (.30)***      0.14 (.15) 0.1902 0.9100 
 a1e 0.06 (.19)      0.00 (.02) -0.205 0.1480 
D2 a2a -0.61 (.26)**  c2 0.60 (.27)** c¶ 0.27 (.24) 0.27 (.15) 0.0401 0.5795 
 a2b 0.37 (.19)**      0.01 (.02) -0.0484 0.5274 
 a2d -0.48 (.30)      0.01 (.09) -0.0484 0.5274 
 a2e 0.37 (.19)¥      0.01 (.04) -0.3751 -0.0045 
 µ0V¶     ba -0.45 (.11)*** 
   
      bb 0.02 (.07) 
   
      bc  -0.13 (.10) 
   
      bd  0.01 (.10) 
   






















Figure 5. Multiple mediation test between conspiracy condition (using indicated coding) 
and vaccination intentions. 
 
Note. Dashed straight lines highlight non-significant path relationships and solid straight 
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The multiple mediation analysis of the effect of pro-conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy 
condition on vaccination intentions (D1) (when controlling for pro-conspiracy versus control, 
D2) indicated that perceived vaccine dangers, and feelings of powerlessness and 
disillusionment (controlling for all mediators) were mediators of this effect.  Second, the 
effect for D2 (controlling for D1) indicated that perceived vaccine dangers and trust in 
authorities (controlling for all mediators) significantly mediated this effect.  
Therefore, as expected, participants who were exposed to material supporting anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories showed reluctance to have a child vaccinated compared to the 
other two conditions.  The perceived dangers of vaccines were a consistent mediator across 
conditions.  Further, feelings of powerlessness and disillusionment mediated the difference 
between the pro- and anti-conspiracy conditions, and mistrust in authorities mediated the 
difference between the pro-conspiracy and control conditions.  
General discussion 
The current research suggests that anti-vaccine conspiracy theories may have more 
than a trivial effect on vaccination intentions.  In two studies, it has been demonstrated that 
beliefs in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories ± such as the belief that research on vaccine 
efficacy is manipulated to make profits for pharmaceutical companies ± are associated with 
reduced vaccination intentions.  Further, the current research has demonstrated that exposure 
to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories directly affects vaccination intentions.  Both effects were 
significantly mediated by the perceived dangers of vaccines.  In Study 3, the effect was 
further mediated by feelings of powerlessness, disillusionment and mistrust in authorities.  In 
Study 4, feelings of powerlessness and disillusionment mediated the difference between the 
pro- and anti-conspiracy conditions, and mistrust in authorities mediated the difference 
between the pro-conspiracy and control conditions.  Therefore, overall, anti-vaccine 
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conspiracy theories appear to introduce undue suspicion about vaccine safety, and increase 
feelings of powerlessness and disillusionment, whilst decreasing trust in authorities, which in 
turn introduce reluctance to vaccinate.  This work demonstrates empirically, and to our 
knowledge for the first time, that anti-vaccine conspiracy theories may therefore present an 
obstacle to vaccine uptake.  
Although a variety of attempts to increase vaccination intentions have shown 
promising success in recent years (Hopfer, 2012; Conroy, et al., 2009), the current research 
suggests that future attempts to intervene on vaccine reluctance should also consider the role 
of conspiracy theorizing.  Specifically, because beliefs in conspiracy theories in general are 
associated with a mistrust of scientific claims (Lewandowsky et al., 2013a, 2013b) 
interventions that cite claims by scientists and medical professionals may also meet with 
suspicion.  Such attempts at intervention may therefore fail on people who are sympathetic to 
a variety of conspiracy claims (Kata, 2012; Offit, 2010). 
Instead, successful interventions may focus on direct counter-arguments against the 
conspiracy allegations themselves (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009).  Indeed, the finding here 
that the anti-conspiracy condition ± which directly refuted conspiracy allegations ± reduced 
conspiracy beliefs below baseline, suggests that this may be a promising avenue for 
intervention.  This could be further investigated by manipulating the source of the 
information presenting the counter-arguments against conspiracy allegations (e.g., 
governmental bodies, independent vaccine agencies, academic researchers).  However, it is 
important to note that whilst the anti-conspiracy condition reduced conspiracy beliefs below 
baseline, this was not associated with increased intentions to vaccinate.  This may be 
consistent with the argument that misinformation tends to be resistant to correction 
(Lewandowsky, et al., 2012).  That is, once the very idea of a conspiracy has been mentioned 
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and has taken root, even strong counter-arguments may be unable to lead to behavioral 
action.  Future research may therefore also consider the impact of the order in which 
misinformation and counter-arguments are presented.  Further, future research may 
investigate the role of prior warnings and the continued influence of misinformation on 
behavioural intentions (Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010).  Nevertheless, it is argued here 
that future interventions to increase vaccine uptake should address the impact of anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories.  
The current research had some important limitations that should also be addressed in 
future research.  First, it is important to note that although the effects observed throughout 
this research were statistically robust, the effects sizes were small (e.g., Ș2 = .05 for the effect 
of vaccine information on vaccination intentions in Study 4).  This means that the proportion 
of variance in vaccine intentions explained by exposure to conspiracy theories was quite 
modest and there are potentially many other factors that contribute to vaccine intentions. 
Nonetheless, small reductions in uptake, especially in cases such as the MMR vaccine, can 
have large effects since the recommended uptake to ensure herd immunity is 95% (Health 
Protection Agency, 2008).  
 It should also be noted that endorsement of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories tended to 
be around or below the midpoint, except in the condition where participants were exposed to 
anti-vaccine conspiracy information (M = 4.11 on a 7-point scale in Study 4). Therefore, the 
participants were not strong endorsers of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, meaning that 
different patterns of findings may emerge for those who do strongly endorse conspiracy 
theories.  Similarly, different strategies for successful intervention may apply for people who 
hold strong anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs than those who do not hold strong beliefs 
(Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009).  Future research could consider these possibilities. 
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Further, the pattern of mediation is less clear in Study 4 than in Study 3 and future 
research may endeavour to uncover additional mediators or isolate one key mediator of the 
conspiracy-vaccination intention link.  However, the current research has identified a number 
of factors that are influenced by exposure to conspiracy theories, which, in turn, influence 
vaccination intentions.  Finally, the findings were based on self-report intentions to have a 
fictional child vaccinated against a made up disease.  As is well known, intentions do not 
always translate into behaviors (LaPiere, 1934; Linn, 1965; Sheeran, 2002).  Future research 
may therefore examine associations between anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs and actual 
vaccination behavior.  Future research could also examine larger samples and potentially 
identify the impact of conspiracy theories in geographical areas that have dangerously low 
vaccination uptake.   
 Future research may also focus on the individual difference characteristics that pre-
dispose individuals to anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs.  Psychologists are learning more about 
the traits and characteristics associated with beliefs in conspiracy theories more generally, 
such as mistrust, anomie, political cynicism and Machiavellianism (Abalakina-Paap et al., 
1999; Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Goertzel, 1994; Swami, et al., 2010), and it will be useful to 
know if the same, or different factors predict anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs.  Further, 
another avenue for intervening on vaccination reluctance may be to focus on individuals who 
possess the personal characteristics that make them receptive to conspiracy claims.  Theorists 
note the possibility of directing anti-conspiracy information at potential consumers of 
FRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVLQRUGHUWR³LQRFXODWH´WKHPDJDLQVWDFFHSWLQJVXFKWKHRULHVDQGD
method like this may also be effective in encouraging people to reject anti-vaccine conspiracy 
claims and promoting vaccine uptake (e.g., Sunstein, & Vermeule, 2009).  
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the current research suggests that anti-vaccine conspiracy theories may 
have significant and detrimental consequences.  Specifically, they appear to reduce 
vaccination intentions by inducing undue concern about the dangers of vaccines, and 
increasing powerlessness, disillusionment, and mistrust.  This research is timely in the face of 
declining vaccination rates, and recent outbreaks of vaccinated-against diseases such as 
measles.  Indeed, at the time of writing this article, 1,325 people in Wales had contracted 
measles, and medical officials were becoming increasingly concerned about vaccination 
uptake in general across the United Kingdom (BBC News, 2013).  The current research also 
speaks to a broader concern about conspiracy theorizing and science denial (Goertzel, 1994; 
Lewandowsky et al., 2013b; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009).  Ongoing investigations are 
needed to further identify the social consequences of conspiracism, and to identify potential 







Chapter 4 -  












The studies presented in this chapter have been submitted for publication in the following 
paper: 
Jolley, D., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (submitted). Blaming a few bad apples saves the 
 barrel: The system-justifying function of conspiracy theories. 
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Chapter summary 
Four studies demonstrate that conspiracy theories may bolster, rather than 
undermine, support for the social status quo.  In Study 5 (N = 98) beliefs in prominent 
conspiracy theories were positively associated with system-justifying beliefs.  In Study 6 (N = 
120), threatening (vs. affirming) the status quo in British society caused participants to 
endorse conspiracy theories.  In Study 7 (N = 159), exposure to conspiracy theories 
increased satisfaction with the British social system after this had been experimentally 
threatened.  In Study 8 (N = 109), this effect was mediated by the tendency for participants 
exposed (vs. not exposed) to conspiracy theories to attribute societal problems relatively 
more strongly to individuals rather than systemic causes.  By blaming tragedies, disasters 
and social problems on the actions of a malign few, conspiracy theories can divert attention 
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Introduction 
 Conspiracy theories blame significant events on the secret actions of powerful, 
malevolent and unjust actors (Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Wood, et al., 2012).  
They range from wildly implausible (e.g., the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was triggered by 
U.S. government scientists), through unlikely (e.g., the U.S. government orchestrated, or was 
complicit in, the 9/11 attacks), to demonstrably true (e.g., the Watergate, Iran-Contra, and 
Tuskegee syphilis scandals).  Although their plausibility varies, one thing that they seem to 
have in common is that they are subversive.  They point accusing fingers at authority, and 
offer alternatives to official explanations (Gray, 2010; Sapountzis & Condor, 2013).  Their 
proponents often UHSUHVHQWVNHSWLFVDVJXOOLEOHFRQIRUPLVWVRU³VKHHSOH´1DWUDVV  
6FKRODUVKDYHDOVRZULWWHQDERXWFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHV¶FDSDFLW\WRFRQIURQWVRFLDOKLHUDUFKLHV
and to offer alternative, subjectively empowering understandings of social reality (e.g., Gray, 
2010; Sapountzis & Condor, 2013).       
Several findings provide support for this view.  Endorsement of conspiracy theories is 
robustly associated with anomie and political distrust (e.g., Abalakina-Paap, et al., 1999; 
Goertzel, 1994).  Exposure to conspiracy theories undermines confidence in governmental 
positions on topics such as climate science, and compliance with officially encouraged 
actions such as voting and vaccinating children (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b, see 
Chapters 2 and 3).  Also, as might be expected of a subversive position, belief in conspiracy 
theories appears to be especially strong among members of disaffected minority groups 
(Crocker, et al., 1999).  Entertaining conspiracy beliefs, then, would seem to be at odds with a 
well-documented motivation ± system justification.     
System justification theory proposes that people are motivated to hold positive views 
about existing social, economic and political arrangements (Jost & Andrews, 2011; Jost & 
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Banaji, 1994; Jost, et al., 2004; Kay, et al., 2005; Kay, et al., 2009).  This motivation arises 
because system justification symbolically satisfies relational, epistemic, and existential needs.  
Threats to the fairness, integrity and legitimacy of social systems threaten these needs, 
causing people to defend, bolster or rationalize the status quo, even at the expense of their 
own interests (Jost et al., 2004).  For example, people use stereotypes to justify status 
differences between groups (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Jost, 2001; Jost & Hunyady, 2002), and 
employ other ideological devices such as rationalization and outgroup favouritism to preserve 
the legitimacy of the social system (Jost & Hunyady, 2002).   
Why do people subscribe to conspiracy beliefs when they appear to be so critical of 
authorities and institutions?  One possible answer is that like system justification, conspiracy 
beliefs satisfy important psychological needs, allowing people to make sense of events (van 
Prooijen, 2012), avoid feelings of uncertainty (van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; Whitson, et 
al., in press), and address feelings of powerlessness (Abalakina-Paap, et al., 1999; Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008).  Conspiracy theorizing may represent a substitute route to these needs when 
system justification is untenable.   
We propose an alternative possibility, which is that conspiracy theories may actually 
bolster support for WKHVWDWXVTXR$VQRWHGE\*RHUW]HO³DFRQVSLUDF\WKHRU\JLYHV
believers someone tangible to blame for their perceived predicament, instead of blaming it on 
impersonal or abstUDFWVRFLDOIRUFHV´S. 494).  In doing so, a conspiracy theory deflects 
EODPHIRUVRFLHW\¶VSUREOHPVIURPWKHLQKHUHQWIHDWXUHVRIVRFLDOV\VWHPVWRWKHDOOHJHG
malfeasance of small groups of people.  Thus, conspiracy theories postulate that illegitimate 
and unjust factors infOXHQFHSHRSOH¶VOLYHVEXWnominate factors that are not inherent to social 
systems.    
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In this way, the motivated defence of social systems via conspiracy theories is 
analogous to the preservation of many cherished social beliefs.  Subtyping preserves group 
stereotypes by categorizing people who defy them as members of special subgroups (Kunda 
& Oleson, 1995).  Similarly, in order to defend beliefs that the world is just, people demonize 
wrongdoers, ascribing to them evil dispositions that make them unrepresentative of normal 
people (Ellard, Miller, Baumle, & Olson, 2002; Fouts, Callan, Piasentin, & Lawson, 2006).  
Likewise, people derogate deviant ingroup members more harshly than deviant outgroup 
members, in order, ironically, to preserve the belief that typical ingroup members are superior 
to typical outgroup members (Marques & Paez, 1994).  In all these cases, people attribute 
disconfirmatory phenomeQDWRSDUWLFXODUFDXVDOIDFWRUVVXFKDVLQGLYLGXDOV¶SHUVRQDOLW\WUDLWV
In so doing, people avoid revising beliefs about more general entities such as social groups. 
In sum, there are grounds to predict that conspiracy theories may either undermine or 
bolster support for the status quo.  However, no research has directly examined these 
predictions.  We report four studies testing the novel proposal that conspiracy theories bolster 
(vs. undermine) support for the status quo.  Study 5 tested the hypothesis that belief in 
conspiracy theories would be positively (vs. negatively) associated with a measure of system 
justification.  Study 6 examined whether conspiracy theorizing would increase (vs. not 
LQFUHDVHLQUHVSRQVHWR³V\VWHPWKUHDW´LQIRUPDWLRQStudy 7 tested the hypothesis that 
exposure to conspiracy theories would buffer (vs. aggravate) the negative effects of system 
threat on a measure of system justification.  Study 8 examined the mediating role of the 
attribution of societal problems to individual perpetrators rather than social systems.   
Study 5 
This study examined the relationship between conspiracy belief and satisfaction with 
the status quo.  Evidence of such a relationship would provide grounds for experimental 
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studies examining the effects of system threat and conspiracy theories on satisfaction with the 
status quo.  If conspiracy theories tend to subvert the status quo, we can expect a negative 
correlation between these beliefs.  If conspiracy theories help to uphold the status quo, this 
correlation should be positive.   
Study 5 also measured values (Schwartz, 1992), reasoning that security, conformity 
and tradition (conservation values) are relevant to the idea of upholding positive perceptions 
of social systems.  Values can be divided into two bipolar dimensions (Schwartz, 1992).  The 
first contrasts conservation values with openness to change values (self-direction, 
stimulation, hedonism).  The second contrasts self-enhancement values (achievement, power, 
hedonism - note that hedonism is typically included in both openness and self-enhancement 
values), with self-transcendence values (benevolence and universalism).  We also measured 
need for cognitive closure (NFCC; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), reasoning that this could be 
associated with belief in conspiracy theories that address uncertainty (van Prooijen & 
Jostmann, 2013).  NFCC comprises five subscales of preference for order and structure, 
preference for predictability, discomfort with ambiguity, closed-mindedness, and 
decisiveness.  We therefore test whether variations in values ad NFCC may predict system-
justifying beliefs.   
Method 
Participants and design 
Ninety-eight undergraduate students at a British University (25 men and 73 women, 
Mage = 20.38, SD = 4.38) participated in an online questionnaire.  In this study and all other 
studies reported in this Chapter, the questionnaire management software Qualtrics was used.  
Participants received course credit in exchange for their participation.  7KHXQLYHUVLW\¶V
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Psychology Ethics Committee approved this pilot study and all others reported in this report, 
and participants provided their written, informed consent.  Belief in both real-world 
conspiracy theories and general notions of conspiracy were measured as the predictor 
variables, alongside values and NFCC, and satisfaction with the status quo was measured as 
the criterion variable.   
Materials and procedure 
Conspiracy beliefs were measured using a scale assessing belief in real-world 
FRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHV'RXJODV	6XWWRQ7KHUHZHUHVWDWHPHQWVHJ³One or more 
URJXHµFHOOV¶LQWKH%ULWLVK6HFUHW6HUYLFHFRQVWUXFWHGDQGFDUULHGRXW a plot to kill Princess 
Diana´ extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likelyĮ , see Appendix F).  Further, a 
scale was used to measure belief in general notions of conspiracy (Brotherton, et al., 2013).  
7KHUHZHUHVWDWHPHQWVHJ³7KHJRYHUQPent is involved in the murder of innocent 
citizens and/or well-NQRZQSXEOLFILJXUHVDQGNHHSVWKLVDVHFUHW´ definitely not true, 5 = 
definitely trueĮ , see Appendix F).   
Values were measured using the Schwartz value survey (Schwartz, 1992, 2005).  Out 
of the 57 original items, 45 items were shown to have demonstrated nearly equivalent 
meaning across 65 nations (Schwartz, 1992, 1995; see Appendix G).  These 45 items are used 
WRLQGH[WKHWHQYDOXHVRISRZHUHJ³VRFLDOSRZHU´Į DFKievement (e.g., 
³VXFFHVVIXO´Į KHGRQLVPHJ³SOHDVXUH´Į VWLPXODWLRQHJ³GDULQJ´Į 
.68); self-GLUHFWLRQHJ³FUHDWLYLW\´Į XQLYHUVDOLVPHJ³EURDGPLQGHG´Į 
EHQHYROHQFHHJ³KHOSIXO´Į WUDGLWLRQHJ³KXPEOH´Į FRQIRUPLW\HJ
³SROLWHQHVV´Į DQGVHFXULW\HJ³IDPLO\´Į 7KHVHLQGLFHVZHUHFRPSXWHGE\
averaging the importance ratings of the terms that represent each general value.  Participants 
rated each specific term as a guiding principle in their own life on a 9-point scale from -1 
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(opposed to my principles) to 0 (not important) to 7 (of supreme importance).  The 
asymmetry of the scale reflects the discriminations people naturally make when thinking 
about value importance, reflecting the desirable nature of values (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001).  
However, participants rarely use the ratings of -1 ± hence the vast majority of responses range 
from zero to seven.  Some people tend to rate all values as quite important whereas others 
tend to rate all values as moderately important (this is referred to as scale use tendency; 
6FKZDUW],QRUGHUWRFRUUHFWIRUWKLVELDVZHIROORZHG6FKZDUW]¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQ
to ipsatize the value scores by centering them on the personal means of value importance 
ratings.  
NFCC was measured using the revised Webster and Kruglanski (1994) questionnaire 
(see Appendix G).  This scale included 41 items, where participants responded on a six-point 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  A higher score on this scale indicated a 
greater need for cognitive closure.  In addition to summing all 41 items to produce a total 
1)&&VFRUHĮ ILYHVXEVHFWLRQVFRUHVZHUHDOVRFDOFXODWHGE\VXPPLQJWKHVXEVFDOH
items of preference IRURUGHUDQGVWUXFWXUHHJ³I think having clear rules and order at work 
is essential for success´ Į SUHIHUHQFHIRUSUHGLFWDELOLW\HJ³:KHQGLQLQJRXW,OLNH




Finally, satisfaction with the status quo was PHDVXUHGXVLQJ.D\DQG-RVW¶V
general system justification scale.  3DUWLFLSDQWVUHVSRQGHGWRHLJKWLWHPVHJ³,QJHQHUDO,
ILQGVRFLHW\WREHIDLU´ strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agreeĮ , see Appendix G), 
with higher scores indicating greater support for the status quo.  The order of the scales was 
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randomized.  At the conclusion of the study, the participants were debriefed in writing and 
were thanked for their participation. 
Results and discussion 
There were no significant effects involving participantV¶ gender or age, so these 
factors are not mentioned further.  Intercorrelations and descriptive statistics are presented in 
Appendix H.   Using oblique rotation (promax), we conducted an exploratory factor analysis 
of the individual items of belief in real-world conspiracy theories and general notions of 
conspiracy.  The scales were also used in Study 6, so the analysis was conducted across data 
from this study and Study 6 in order to increase power.  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sample adequacy was .94, exceeding the recommended minimum of .60 (Kaiser, 
DQG%DUWOHWW¶V7HVWRI6SKHULFLW\%DUOHWWUHDFKHGVWDWLVWLFDOVLJQLILFDQFHX 2 
(496) = 3869.50, p < .001, indicating that the items had adequate common variance for factor 
analysis.  Principal component analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues greater than 
one and extraction criterion of .30, explaining 43.38 per cent and 6.83 per cent of the variance 
respectively.  Each component showed strong loadings on the rotated solution, and each item 
loaded substantially on the predicted scale, with the exception of two items from the real-
world conspiracy scale which cross-loaded on the general notions of conspiracy (conspiracies 
about JFK and aliens).  We note that reported results are not affected when these two items 
are omitted from the real-world conspiracy scale (see Appendix F for items and factor 
loadings).   As predicted, belief in real-world conspiracy theories and general notions of 
conspiracy were positively correlated with satisfaction with the status quo, r(98) = .23, p = 
.024, r(98) = .32, p < .001, respectively.  That is, participants who endorsed conspiracy 
theories perceived society to be fairer, more legitimate and more secure.   
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We also conducted a multiple regression with belief in real-world conspiracy theories 
as the target variable and the NFCC subscales, conservation/openness values, and system 
justification beliefs as predictors.  The model was significant, F(12, 85) = 3.52, p < .001, Adj. 
R2 = .33, and closed-mindedness (ȕ = .272, t = 2.05, p = .043), self-direction (ȕ = -.24, t = -
2.28, p = .025), and system justification beliefs (ȕ = .28, t = 2.71, p = .008) were significant 
predictors.  We conducted the same regression, but with belief in general notions of 
conspiracy as the target variable.  The model was significant, F(12, 85) = 3.54, p < .001, Adj. 
R2 = .33, and closed-mindedness (ȕ = .31, t = 2.30, p = .024), hedonism (ȕ = -.18, t = -1.77, p 
= .080), self-direction (ȕ = -.27, t = -2.52, p = .014), and system justification beliefs (ȕ = .37, 
t = 3.53, p = .001) were significant predictors.   
We then conducted a multiple regression with belief in real-world conspiracy theories 
as the target variable and the NFCC subscales, self-enhancement/self-transcendence values, 
and system justification beliefs as predictors.  The model was significant, F(11, 86) = 2.84, p 
< .001, Adj. R2 = .27, and discomfort with ambiguity (ȕ = -.24, t = -1.97, p = .052), closed-
mindedness (ȕ = .30, t = -2.21, p = .030), and system justification beliefs (ȕ = .31, t = 2.67, p 
= .009) were significant predictors.  We conducted the same regression with belief in general 
notions of conspiracy as the target variable.  The model was significant, F(11, 86) = 3.44, p < 
.001, Adj. R2 = .31, and predictability (ȕ = -.05, t = -1.76, p = 082), closed-mindedness (ȕ = 
.33, t = 2.50, p = .015), universalism (ȕ = .21, t = 1.77, p = .081), and system justification 
beliefs (ȕ = .39, t = 3.51, p = .001) were significant predictors.  Only system-justification and 
the NFCC subscale of closed-mindedness were therefore consistent predictors of conspiracy 
beliefs.  Therefore, as predicted, this study provides preliminary evidence that conspiracy 
theories may serve a system-justifying function.  Next, we experimentally examined whether 
belief in conspiracy theories responds to system threat. 
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Study 6 
Previous work has demonstrated that system threat leads to increased efforts to defend 
the status quo.  For example, Kay et al. (2005) asked participants to read one of two 
paragraphs designed to induce either low or high system threat.  In the low system threat 
condition, participants read that people in the United States felt secure DERXWWKHQDWLRQ¶V
condition, and that it was socially, economically and politically stable.  In the high threat 
FRQGLWLRQSDUWLFLSDQWVUHDGWKDWSHRSOHLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVIHOWGLVDSSRLQWHGZLWKWKHQDWLRQ¶V
condition, and that it was failing socially, economically and politically.  Compared to 
participants in the low threat condition, participants under high system threat derogated 
victims of misfortune and idealized the recipients of good fortune.  This manipulation has 
also been shown to motivate social cognition that restores the psychological legitimacy of the 
status quo, including attraction to women who embody sexist ideals (Lau, Kay, & Spencer, 
2008), and approval of gender inequality in the attainment of management positions (Kay et 
al., 2009).   
In the current study therefore, we employed a system threat manipulation (Kay & 
Jost, 2003) previously shown to immediately decrease general satisfaction with the status quo 
(Kay et al., 2005).   If conspiracy theories similarly enable people to affirm the status quo, 
then conspiracy belief should increase under system threat.  The opposite prediction holds if, 
instead, conspiracy theories undermine support for the status quo, in which case they should 
be rejected as additional system threats.  Moreover, we also examined whether variations in 
conspiracy belief as direct responses to threat vary according to values and NFCC.   
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Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred twenty participants (52 men, 68 women, Mage = 34.54, SD = 10.08) were 
recruited via CrowG)ORZHUDFURZGVRXUFLQJVLWHVLPLODUWR$PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUN
Participants were residents of the United Kingdom, and received a small monetary payment 
in exchange for their participation.  The study was a between-groups design with two levels 
(system threat: threat vs. affirming).  Both the NFCC subscales and values scale were 
completed before the system threat manipulation, which then formed our moderator 
variables. 
Materials and procedure 
After giving consent, participants were first presented with either the NFCC subscales 
of predictability and closed-mindedness that were shown to be associated with system-
justifying beliefs in Study 5, or the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ), which measures 10 
values in total.  The two scales were counterbalanced.  The NFCC subscales of closed-
PLQGHGQHVVĮ= .60DQGSUHGLFWDELOLW\Į= .62) were identical to the ones used in Study 5 
(see Appendix G).  However, instead of using the Schwartz values questionnaire, we elicited 
a shorter measure concerning the PVQ.  The PVQ scale is adoSWHGIURP6FKZDUW]¶VZRUNRQ
the basic human values, as used in Study 5 (Schwartz, 2003).  It contains 21 statements about 
a person, where participants were asked to rate how similar this person is to them on a six-
point scale (1 = very much like me, 6 = Not like me at all).   
7KH394VFDOHLVVSOLWLQWRWKHWHQGLIIHUHQWYDOXHVFRQVLVWLQJRISRZHU³,WLV
LPSRUWDQWWRWKHPWREHULFK7KH\ZDQWWRKDYHDORWRIPRQH\DQGH[SHQVLYHWKLQJV´³It is 
important to them to be in charge and tell others what to do. They want people to do what 
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WKH\VD\´, Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .53DFKLHYHPHQW³,W¶VLPSRUWDQWWRWKHPWRVKRZ
WKHLUDELOLWLHV7KH\ZDQWSHRSOHWRDGPLUHZKDWWKH\GR´³Being very successful is 
important to them. They like tRLPSUHVVRWKHUSHRSOH´, Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .62), 
KHGRQLVP³+DYLQJDJRRGWLPHLVLPSRUWDQWWRWKHP7KH\OLNHWR³VSRLO´WKHPVHOYHV´
³They seek every chance they can to have fun. It is important to them to do things that give 
WKHPSOHDVXUH´, Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .62), VWLPXODWLRQ³7KH\OLNHVXUSULVHVDQGLV
always looking for new things to do.  They think it is important to do lots of different things 
LQOLIH´³They look for adventures and like to take risks. They want to have an excLWLQJOLIH´, 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .54), and self-GLUHFWLRQ³7KLQNLQJXSQHZLGHDVDQGEHLQJ
FUHDWLYHLVLPSRUWDQWWRWKHP7KH\OLNHWRGRWKLQJVLQWKHLURZQRULJLQDOZD\´³It is 
important to them to make their own decisions about what they do.  They like to be free to 
SODQDQGWRFKRRVHWKHLUDFWLYLWLHVIRUWKHPVHOYHV´, Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .50). 
It also consists of XQLYHUVDOLVP³,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRWKHPWROLVWHQWRSHRSOHZKRDUH
different from them.  Even when they disagree with them, they still want to understand 
WKHP´³They strongly believe that people should care for nature. Looking after the 
HQYLURQPHQWLVLPSRUWDQWWRWKHP´³7KH\WKLQNLWLVLPSRUWDQWWKDWHYHU\SHUVRQLQWKHZRUOG
be treated equally. They want justice for ever\ERG\HYHQIRUSHRSOHWKH\GRHVQ¶WNQRZ´, 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .67EHQHYROHQFH³,W¶VYHU\LPSRUWDQWWRWKHPWRKHOSWKH
people around them.  They want to care for their well-EHLQJ´³It is important to them to be 
loyal to their friends. They waQWWRGHYRWHWKHPVHOYHVWRSHRSOHFORVHWRWKHP´, Spearman-
Brown Coefficient = .77WUDGLWLRQ³,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRWKHPWREHKXPEOHDQGPRGHVW7KH\
WU\QRWWRGUDZDWWHQWLRQWKHPVHOYHV´³Religious belief is important to them.  They try hard 
to do what WKHLUUHOLJLRQUHTXLUHV´, Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .50FRQIRUPLW\³7KH\
EHOLHYHWKDWSHRSOHVKRXOGGRZKDWWKH\¶UHWROG7KH\WKLQNSHRSOHVKRXOGIROORZUXOHVDWDOO
times, even when no-RQHLVZDWFKLQJ´³It is important to them always to behave properly. 
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7KH\ZDQWWRDYRLGGRLQJDQ\WKLQJSHRSOHZRXOGVD\LVZURQJ´, Spearman-Brown 
Coefficient = .66DQGVHFXULW\³,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRWKHPWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWLQVXUHWKHLU
safety against all treats.  They want the government to be strong so it can defHQGLWVFLWL]HQV´
³It is very important to them that their country be safe from threats from within and without. 
7KH\DUHFRQFHUQHGWKDWVRFLDORUGHUEHSURWHFWHG´, Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .66). 
Next, adapting a procedure developed by Kay et al. (2005), participants were asked to 
read and memorize details of a journalistic paragraph that described the social, economic, and 
political circumstances in the United Kingdom as either problematic (system threat) or not 
(system affirming).  Participants assigned to the system threat condition read the following: 
7KHVHGD\VPDQ\SHRSOHIHHOGLVDSSRLQWHGZLWKWKHQDWLRQ¶VFRQGLWLRQ0DQ\FLWL]HQV
feel that the country has reached a low point in terms of social, economic, and 
political factors. People do not feel as safe and secure as they used to, and there is a 
VHQVHRIXQFHUWDLQW\UHJDUGLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶VIXWXUH,WVHHPVWKDWPDQ\FRXQWULHVLQ
the world, such as the United States and Western European, nations, are enjoying 
better social, economic, and political conditions than the UK. More and more British 
citizens express a willingness to leave the UK and immigrate [sic] to other nations. 
Participants in the system affirming condition read the following 
These days, despite the difficulties the nation is facing, many people feel satisfied with 
WKHQDWLRQ¶VFRQGLWLRQ0DQ\FLWL]HQVIHHOWKDWWKH8.KDVUHDFKHGDVWDEOHSRLQWLQ
terms of social, economic, and political factors. People feel safer and securer than 
they used to, and there is a sense of confidence and RSWLPLVPUHJDUGLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶V
future. It seems that compared with many countries in the world the social, economic, 
and political conditions in the UK are relatively good. Fewer and fewer British 
citizens express a willingness to leave the UK and immigrate [sic] to other nations. 
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Participants were then asked to complete the same conspiracy theory belief items as used in 
Study 5, in which they rated their agreement with real-world conspiracy theoriHVĮ 
DQGJHQHUDOQRWLRQVRIFRQVSLUDF\Į , see Appendix F).  At the conclusion of the study, 
the participants were debriefed in writing and were thanked for their participation.  
Results and discussion 
There were no significant effects involving participantV¶ gender or age, so these 
factors are not mentioned further.  Intercorrelations and descriptive statistics are presented in 
Appendix I.  One-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) showed that as predicted, exposure to 
system threat influenced belief in both real-world conspiracy theories and general notions of 
conspiracy, F(1,118) = 4.36, p = .039, Ș2 = .04; F(1,118) = 5.32, p = .023, Ș2 = .05, 
respectively.  Specifically, endorsement of real-world conspiracy theories and general notions 
of conspiracy were significantly higher in the system threat condition (M = 3.79, SD = 1.34; 
M = 3.25, SD = 0.98, respectively) than the system affirming condition (M = 3.31, SD = 1.16; 
M = 2.85, SD = 0.96, respectively).  Moderation analysis was also conducted to examine 
whether variations in conspiracy belief as a direct response to threat vary according to values 
and NFCC.  No significant effects were found.  These were therefore not included in Studies 
7 and 81.   
Overall, this finding further supports the idea that conspiracy theories may perform a 
system-justifying function.  However, it does not show that adopting conspiracy theories 
helps people defend the system from threat.  Instead, system threat may have driven 
participants toward conspiracy theories as an alternative route to the satisfaction of 
                                                          
1
 We also replicated the effect of system threat on conspiracy beliefs in a separate study (N = 
79, 11 men and 68 women, Mage = 19.63) without measuring values and NFCC.  System 
threat increased belief in real-world conspiracies and general notions of conspiracy, F(1,77) = 
4.82, p = .031, Ș2 = .06; F(1,77) = 11.44, p = .001, Ș2 = .15, respectively. 
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psychological needs such as control (cf. Whitson et al., in press).  To resolve this ambiguity, 
it was necessary to experimentally examine the effects of conspiracy theorizing on 
satisfaction with the status quo. 
Study 7 
This study manipulated system threat, and also exposed (vs. did not expose) 
participants to conspiracy theories.  If conspiracy theories help people defend the system 
from threat, the adverse effects of system threat on satisfaction with the status quo should be 
attenuated when conspiracy theories are also presented (i.e., under system threat, higher 
satisfaction from participants exposed, vs. not exposed, to conspiracy theories).  If instead, 
conspiracy theories offer an alternative route to psychological needs under system threat, then 
the adverse effects of system threat on satisfaction with the status quo should be amplified by 
exposure to them (i.e., under system threat, lower satisfaction from participants exposed, vs. 
not, to conspiracy theories).    
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred ninety undergraduate students from a British University (24 men and 
166 women, Mage = 19.99, SD = 5.32) received course credit in exchange for their 
participation.  Given the significant length of the conspiracy theory manipulation (which was 
580 words long and took M = 182.98 [SD = 167.33] seconds to read), and the system threat or 
affirming paragraphs (which were each 97 words long and took M = 52.67 [SD = 114.71] and 
M = 51.80 [SD = 76.51] seconds to read, respectively), a timer was used to identify 
participants who had not read both the manipulations fully, by spending less than 60 seconds 
reading the conspiracy manipulation material and less than 10 seconds reading either the 
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system threat or affirming paragraph and who had thus exceeded reading speed capabilities 
for upper college students (Speed Reading, 2014).  The 29 participants (16% of total sample) 
who failed the screening were removed from the analyses.  The final sample size used for 
data analysis was 159 (21 men and 139 women, Mage = 20.00, SD = 5.30). 
The study consisted of a 2 (system threat: threat/affirming) x 2 (exposure to 
conspiracy theories: conspiracy/control) between-subjects design.  The dependent measure 
ZDVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ satisfaction with the status quo (Kay & Jost, 2003).   
Materials and procedure 
Participants were first presented with the system threat (vs. affirming) manipulation, 
as in Study 6.  We then manipulated exposure to conspiracy theories by adapting a 
manipulation used by Douglas and Sutton (2008).  Experimental participants were asked to 
read and memorize a piece of text concerning a conspiracy involving the death of Princess 
Diana.  Control participants proceeded directly to the dependent measures.  The conspiracy 
WH[WLQFOXGHGDVHULHVRIHLJKWEXOOHWSRLQWVRXWOLQLQJDUJXPHQWVWKDW3ULQFHVV'LDQD¶VGHDWK
was not an accident (see Appendix J for full wording).  The term conspiracy theory was not 
mentioned.  For example: 
³&RQFHUQKDVEHHQUDLVHGDERXWWKHUDSLGGLVSRVDORIWKHERGLHVRI'LDQDDQG'RGL
Diana had no post mortem prior to burial in Althorp. Victims of sudden death require 
DSRVWPRUWHPE\ODZLQWKH8.´ 
³Immediately after the crash news was broadcast, witnesses appeared on US TV 
saying that they heard an explosion or bang before they heard the car crash. Was this 
DJXQVKRWRUDERPE"´ 
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Finally, satisfaction with the status quo was PHDVXUHGXVLQJ.D\DQG-RVW¶VJHQHUDO
V\VWHPMXVWLILFDWLRQVFDOHĮ , see Appendix G).  At the conclusion of the study, the 
participants were debriefed in writing and were thanked for their participation. 
Results and discussion 
There were no significant effects involving participantV¶ gender or age, so these 
factors are not mentioned further.  There was also no significant main effect of system threat, 
F(1, 156) = 0.08, p = .782, partial Ș2 = .000, but there was a marginally significant main 
effect of exposure to conspiracy theories, F(1, 156) = 2.808, p = .096, partial Ș2 = .018.  As 
expected however, a two-way ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between system 
threat and exposure to conspiracy theories, F(1, 156) = 7.70, p = .006, partial Ș2 = .054 (see 
Figure 6).  Planned comparisons revealed a significant simple main effect of exposure to 
conspiracy theories when participants had been exposed to system threat, F(1,77) = 8.90, p = 
.004, partial Ș2 = .13, such that those in the system threat condition who were exposed to 
conspiracy theories reported higher satisfaction with the status quo (M = 4.95, SD = 0.60, n =  
39), than those in the control condition (M = 4.48, SD = 0.80, n =  40).  There was, however, 
no simple main effect of exposure to conspiracy theories in the system affirming condition, 
F(1, 79) = 0.68, p = .410, partial Ș2 = .006.   
Further analyses revealed a significant simple main effect of system threat in the 
conspiracy condition, F(1,75) = 4.06, p = .047, partial Ș2 = .066, such that those in the 
conspiracy condition who were exposed to system threat reported higher satisfaction with the 
status quo (M = 4.95, SD = 0.60, n =  39), than those in the system affirming condition (M = 
4.68, SD = 0.56, n =  38).  Moreover, analyses revealed a marginally significant simple main 
effect of system threat in the no conspiracy condition, F(1,81) = 3.90, p = .052, partial Ș2 = 
.048, such that participants exposed to system threat reported lower satisfaction with the 
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status quo (M = 4.48, SD = 0.80, n =  40), than those in the system affirming condition (M = 
4.81, SD = 0.71, n =  43).   
 
Figure 6.  Mean system-justifying beliefs as determined by exposure to conspiracy theories 
and system threat manipulation.  Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Participants under conditions of system threat reported the status quo as more 
legitimate after exposure to conspiracy theories.  In the context of threat to the social order, 
conspiracy theories may therefore allow people to preserve their sense that the social system 
is legitimate.  The final study tested our proposed mechanism ± that conspiracy theories allow 
people to maintain positive views about social systems because they attribute negative events 
in society to a small number of conspirators rather than broader social systems.     
Study 8 
We expected to observe an indirect causal path in which participants exposed to 
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actions of individuals and small groups than to inherent flaws in society, and in turn, to 
express increased satisfaction with the status quo.  
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred sixty six participants (76 men and 88 women, 1 transgender/other, and 1 
undisclosed, Mage = 36.07, SD = 12.04) were recruited via Crowd Flower as in Study 1.  
Participants were residents of the United Kingdom, and received a small monetary payment 
in exchange for their participation.  As in Study 7, given the significant length of the 
conspiracy theory manipulation (which was 580 words long and took M = 132.47 [SD = 
553.00] seconds to read), combined with the system threat manipulation (which was 97 
words long and took M = 32.71 [SD = 22.90] seconds to read), a timer was used to identify 
participants who had not read the manipulations fully, by spending less than 60 seconds 
reading the conspiracy manipulation material and less than 10 seconds reading the system 
threat manipulation and who had thus exceeded reading speed capabilities for upper college 
students (Speed Reading, 2014).  The 57 participants (34% of total sample) who failed the 
screening were removed from analyses.  The final sample size entered in data analysis was 
109 (51 men, 57 women and 1 transgendered/other, Mage = 37.66, SD = 12.32).  There were 
51 participants in the pro-conspiracy condition and 58 in the control.  
The study consisted of a two-group (exposure to conspiracy theories: 
conspiracy/control) between-subjects design where all participants were exposed to system 
threat.  The dependent measure was again SDUWLFLSDQWV¶satisfaction with the status quo (Kay 
& Jost, 2003).  The proposed mediator variable was the extent to which participants attributed 
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societal problems to individuals and small groups or to problems inherent in society as a 
whole.   
Materials and procedure 
All participants were first presented with the system threat information as in the 
previous studies.  Participants were then exposed to a text highlighting various conspiracy 
theories about the death of Princess Diana (vs. control), as in Study 7 (see Appendix J).  
Next, to measure the proposed mediator, participants were presented with nine problems that 
are facing society today (pollution, poverty, unemployment, inequality, crime, discrimination, 
overpopulation, conflict and war).  They were then asked to indicate the extent to which they 
thought these problems were caused by individuals or society ³3OHDVHLQGLFDWHWKHH[WHQWWR
which you think these problems are due to the actions of individuals and small groups in 
society or due to fundamental flaws inherent in UK society, such as flawed laws, values, 
norms, institutions, or its political and economic system´1 = individuals and small groups, 9 
= flaws in UK societyĮ , see Appendix K).  Finally, satisfaction with the status quo was 
DJDLQPHDVXUHGXVLQJ.D\DQG-RVW¶VVFDOHĮ , see Appendix G).  At the 
conclusion of the study, the participants were debriefed in writing and were thanked for their 
participation. 
Results and discussion 
There were no significant effects involving participantV¶ gender or age, so these 
factors are not mentioned further.  Two separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted with 
exposure to conspiracy theories (conspiracy vs. control) as the independent variable, and 
satisfaction with the status quo and attributions for social problems as the two dependent 
variables.  As predicted, exposure to conspiracy theories influenced both satisfaction with the 
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status quo DQGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DWWULEXWLRQVIRUVRFLDOSUREOHPVF(1, 107) = 13.55, p <. 001, Ș2 = 
.13; F(1, 107) = 5.18, p = .025, Ș2 = .06, respectively.  Specifically, participants who were 
exposed to conspiracy theories reported higher satisfaction with the status quo (M = 4.87, SD 
= 1.16), than those in the control condition (M = 4.01, SD = 1.27).  Further, participants who 
were exposed to conspiracy theories attributed societal problems less strongly to systemic 
flaws in British society (M = 5.77, SD = 0.87), than those in the control condition (M = 6.24, 
SD = 1.21).  Put differently, their attributions shifted toward blaming individual actions for 
these problems.  
Testing mediation 
To test the predicted pattern of mediation between exposure to conspiracy theories 
and satisfaction with the status quo via attributions for social problems, we used Preacher and 
+D\HV¶ERRWVWUDSSHGSURFHGXUH to run a simple mediation model (5000 re-samples).  
An indirect effect is estimated as being significant if the 95% confidence intervals (CIs) do 
not contain a zero.  Results for this mediational model (see Figure 7) demonstrated a 
significant indirect effect of exposure to conspiracy theories and system justification beliefs 
through attributions for significant social problems (Point Estimate = -0.30 (SE = .13), LLCI 












Figure 7. Mediation model of the relationship between exposure to conspiracy theories and 
satisfaction with the status quo through attributions for social problems. 
Notes. **p<.05. ***p<.001. 
Under system threat, exposure to conspiracy theories increased satisfaction with the 
VWDWXVTXRUHODWLYHWRDFRQWUROFRQGLWLRQ7KLVHIIHFWZDVPHGLDWHGE\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶
attributions for social problems.  Those who were exposed (vs. not exposed) to conspiracy 
theories more strongly attributed problems to individuals or small groups.  Conspiracy 
theories may therefore enable people to justify social systems by suggesting that social 
problems are the fault of a small number of people rather than inherent flaws in their society.   
General discussion 
Intuition, popular belief, proponents, and several scholars suggest that conspiracy 
theories have the power to subvert social systems (e.g., Gray, 2010; Sapountzis & Condor, 
2013).  Although some research shows that conspiracy belief undermines trust in and 
compliance with authority (e.g., Abalakina-Paap, et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Jolley & 
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Douglas, 2014a, see Chapter 2), its effect on overall perceptions of the legitimacy of social 
systems had not been researched previously.  The present results suggest that far from 
undermining system justification, conspiracy theories may actually bolster the social status 
quo.  Conspiracy belief was found to increase when the legitimacy of social systems was 
threatened (Study 6).  Exposure to conspiracy theories was shown to buffer satisfaction with 
the status quo from threat (Study 7), and was shown to do so via an indirect causal path in 
which it caused SHRSOHWRLQFUHDVLQJO\DWWULEXWHVRFLHW\¶VSUREOHPVWRPDOHYROHQWLQGLYLGXDOV
rather than systemic causes (Study 8).   
Conspiracy theories therefore appear to function as a means to defend the current 
social system.  In this respect they join the ranks of other system-justifying processes such as 
complementary stereotyping of the poor, sexist ideology, and just world belief (Calogero & 
Jost, 2011; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Jost, 2001; Jost & Hunyady, 2005).  Conspiracy 
theories, to be sure, cast doubt on the motives and legitimacy of people in authority positions. 
They draw attention to some of the most tragic and worrisome events of modern life.  
However they do so in a way that appears to divert people from questioning inherent 
limitations of their society.   
It is important to acknowledge some limitations of the current research.  We note 
that although the effects reported here are statistically robust, they are relatively small.  
Further, participants were British, and were presented with a single, uniquely British, 
example of alleged conspiracy (Studies 7 and 8).  Also, the participants contained relatively 
few genuine adherents of conspiracy theories.  This leaves open the (plausible) prospect that 
fervent commitment to conspiracy theories, as opposed to exposure or openness to them, 
radicalizes political opinion and motivates social change (Uscinski & Parent, 2014).  Strong 
commitment to conspiracy theories may lead people to believe that corruption and malice are 
endemic across different branches of the social system, and so make it incoherent to 
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SV\FKRORJLFDOO\TXDUDQWLQHWKHPE\EODPLQJLQGLYLGXDOVIRUVRFLHW\¶VSUREOHPV:H
therefore cannot be confident about the extent to which the present results will generalize to 
other populations and other conspiracy theories. 
In a similar vein, a further limitation concerns the falsifiability of our findings.  For 
example, a conspiracy theory can be defined as explaining the causes of a significant event as 
the actions of a small group of secret, powerful forces (e.g., McCauley & Jacques, 1979).  
Moreover, we propose that conspiracy theories perform a system-justifying function because 
similarly people explain negative events in society as being caused by a small group of 
people.  However, this definition opens up the question of how small these groups of people 
may be as for the proposed process to work; these groups need to be relatively small and 
unrepresentative of wider society.  Yet, people, in particular minority groups may hold the 
belief that corruption within the police for example is widespread and not just limited to 
certain secret, powerful individuals who are in charge due to their experiences of being 
victims of police harassment (cf. Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).    
Further, people who endorse the idea that Jewish people are involved in important 
international events may not limit this to being only orchestrated by powerful individuals, but 
instead believe corruption is widespread amongst all Jewish people.  Research by Golec de 
Zavala and Cichocka (2012) for example; provide support for this idea, where they found that 
belief about Jewish domination was associated with anti-Semitic attitudes concerning Jewish 
people in general.  Thus, this suggests that all Jewish people and not just those who are 
thought to be secret and powerful may be implicated in these conspiracy theories.  Therefore, 
similarly with people who have fervent commitment to conspiracy theories in general, such a 
belief that many individuals are involved in corruption may deem the system-justifying 
function of conspiracy theories for these particular people not sustainable. Future research 
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should therefore test the system-justifying function with varying conspiracy theories, such as 
those associated with anti-Semitic attitudes. 
Although boundary conditions are not yet known, the present results clearly show 
that sometimes conspiracy theories strengthen rather than weaken support for extant social 
systems.  This entails that conspiracy theories are not necessarily subversive, and poses a new 
research challenge ± to determine when and how conspiracy theories do, and do not, buttress 
the status quo.  For example, while conspiracy theories may bolster support for the social 
system very generally, they encourage subversive opinions at a more specific level (e.g., 
distrust of political leaders and scientific orthodoxy).  Such views may have the effect of 
motivating social change even if people do not express general objections to the status quo.  
However, Jolley and Douglas (2014a, see Chapter 2) have shown that exposure to conspiracy 
theories weakens political engagement.  This suggests an additional mechanism by which 
conspiracy theories may reduce, rather than increase, the likelihood of social and political 
change.   
Conclusion 
The present results, and the present analysis of the function of conspiracy theories, 
resonate with an important distinction made by political scientists, but paid little attention by 
psychologists.  Specifically, trust in governments can be distinguished sharply from support 
for systems of government (Citrin, 1974; Easton, 1975; Levi & Stoker, 2000).  Thus, 
³LQGLYLGXDOVFDQH[SUHVVDVHQVHRISUide in their political system while at the same time 
H[KLELWLQJYHU\ORZWUXVWLQJRYHUQPHQW´0XOOHU-XNDP	6HOLJVRQS,QGHHG
Muller et al. found that illegitimate forms of political dissent were predicted not by distrust in 
government but by rejection of the political system.  Measures of trust in government have 
been shown to have a robust, negative relation to conspiracy belief (e.g., Abalakina-Paap et 
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al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994).  However, instead of assessing fundamental rejection or even 
GLVWUXVWRIWKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHPVXFKVFDOHVPD\RQO\SLFNXS³HYDOXDWLRQVRIWKHJHQHUDO
performance of various incumbents, who are vaguely called to mind by the collective term 
µSROLWLFLDQV¶RUµWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶´(DVWRQS7KHSUHVHQWUesults suggest that by 
pointing fingers at individuals ± even groups of individuals charged with operating the 
system ± conspiracy theories may exonerate the system, just as blaming a driver for a car 
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The current studies aimed to test whether using anti-conspiracy arguments (e.g., that 
vaccines are safe instead of harmful), and giving people a pre-warning that details the 
persistent influence of retracted misinformation (e.g., that people continue to refer to 
information even after it has been retracted), may be effective in addressing the potentially 
detrimental consequences of conspiracy theories.  In Study 9, the order participants were 
exposed to information (pro-conspiracy vs. anti-conspiracy) was varied to examine if 
presenting anti-conspiracy information up front, or after pro-conspiracy information, 
reduces the impact on vaccination intentions.  Results demonstrated however, that pro-
conspiracy information, regardless of when it was presented, still reduced intentions to 
vaccinate a fictional child ± an effect mediated by belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories 
and the perception that vaccines are dangerous.  To strengthen the anti-conspiracy 
argument, in Study 10 participants were first exposed to either a general or specific warning 
WKDWGHWDLOHGSHRSOH¶VWHQGHQF\WRUHO\RQLQIRUPDWLRQHYHQZKHQLWKDVEHHQUHWUDFWHG(or a 
control), before being asked to read pro-conspiracy, followed by anti-conspiracy, arguments.  
There were no significant differences between conditions.  This suggests that the potentially 
harmful effects of conspiracy theories may be resistant to correction.  Ongoing investigations 
are therefore needed to design interventions that aim to address the potentially detrimental 
impact of conspiracy theories.   
  





Conspiracy theories are often portrayed as being foolish and illogical (e.g., Melley, 
2002; Shermer, 1997; Willman, 2002) and belief in conspiracy theories is often presumed to 
be reserved for a small minority of paranoid individuals on the outer fringes of society 
(Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009).  If this is the case, conspiracy theories may be unlikely to have 
any influence on society as a whole.  However, as polls consistently show, conspiracy 
theories are not just limited to a small portion of the population but instead millions of people 
subscribe to these alternative viewpoints (e.g., Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009; Swami & Coles, 
2010).  In order to understand more about their potential consequences, researchers have 
IRXQGWKDWH[SRVXUHWRFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVFDQUHGXFHSHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQVWRHQJDJHLQWKH
political system, reduce their carbon footprint and reduce their intention to vaccinate a 
fictional child against a made up disease (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b, see Chapters 2 
and 3).  Whilst research has therefore shown that exposure to conspiracy theories can have 
potentially detrimental consequences, little is known about how to address these 
consequences and reduce the impact of conspiracy theories.  This is the aim of the research 
outlined in the current chapter.  
Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) were the first to recommend a number of different 
potential avenues to address the effects of conspiracy theories.  Their initial recommendation 
was that governments might ban conspiracy theorising, or impose some kind of tax, financial 
or otherwise, on those who disseminate conspiracy theories.  Whilst this would be a hands-on 
approach to pro-actively deal with conspiracy theories, it is likely that such a government 
response would be met with great resistance due to its unethical nature - this type of approach 
ZRXOGXQGHUPLQHSHRSOH¶VIUHHVSHHFKSunstein and Vermeule (2009) also suggested that 
governments could engage in cognitive infiltration of the groups that produce conspiracy 




theories.  A tactic for doing this PD\EHIRU³JRYHUQPHQWDJHQWVDQGWKHLUDOOLHV[to] enter 
chat rooms, online social networks, or even real-space groups and attempt to undermine 
percolating conspiracy theories by raising doubts about their factual premises, causal logic, or 
LPSOLFDWLRQVIRUDFWLRQSROLWLFDORURWKHUZLVH´6XQVWHLQ	9HUPHXOHS7KHDLP
of this approach is that by planting doubts about conspiracy theories directly within 
conspiracy circles, cognitive diversity will be introduced that would aim to break up the 
³FULSSOHGHSLVWHPRORJ\RIFRQVSLUDF\-PLQGHGJURXSV´6XQVWHLQ	9HUPHXOHS
Put differently, planting doubts about conspiracy theories will introduce new ideas to these 
conspiracy-minded groups.  
$IXUWKHUUHFRPPHQGDWLRQE\6XQVWHLQDQG9HUPHXOH¶VLVVLPLODUWRFRJQLWLYH
infiltration, but instead of infiltrating conspiracy-minded groups, governments might engage 
in issuing public anti-conspiracy arguments to specific conspiracy theories.  Governments 
could either do this on their own or alternatively elicit credible private parties formally or 
informally to issue anti-conspiracy arguments on their behalf.  The aim of this approach 
would be to direct anti-conspiracy information at potential consumers of conspiracy theories 
LQRUGHUWRµLQRFXODWH¶ them against accepting such theories (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009).   
The authors suggest that governments should issue a response to more, rather than fewer, 
conspiracy theories.  By responding to many conspiratorial explanations for past events and 
current controversies, people cannot interpret silence as government acceptance or 
involvement in the conspiracy, or their inability to offer refuting arguments.   
Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) note, however, that conspiracy theories may be 
extremely resisWDQWWRFRUUHFWLRQDQG³contrary evidence can usually be shown to be a 
SURGXFWRIWKHFRQVSLUDF\LWVHOI´ (p.210).  In other words, providing an alternative account 
may lead conspiracy theory believers to believe that the conspirators are deliberately taking 




the focus away from the conspiracy theory in order to cover their tracks (Sunstein & 
Vermeule, 2009).  This type of assertion is troubling, as one of Sunstein and Vermeule¶V
(2009) recommendations for intervention is directly based on the use of anti-conspiracy 
arguments.  It is suggested therefore, that such an approach may be met with suspicion.  
Nonetheless, out of the selection of recommendations provided by Sunstein and Vermeule 
(2009), examining the use of anti-conspiracy arguments as a tool for attenuating the impact of 
conspiracy theories is a promising starting point. 
In order to empirically explore the success of using anti-conspiracy arguments as an 
avenue to counteract the potential effects of conspiracy theories, Banas and Miller (2013) 
first asked participants to watch a 40-minute chapter from the 9/11 Truth conspiracy theory 
film, Loose Change: Final Cut.  Participants were then exposed to either a factual anti-
conspiracy argument against the 9/11 conspiracy theory where the message focused on the 
factual errors in the movie (e.g., providing no evidence of explosives), or a logical based anti-
conspiracy argument that attempted to show that the 9/11 conspiracy theory was not logically 
sound (e.g., that the theory lacks parsimony).  A control condition was also utilised where no 
anti-conspiracy material was provided.   Afterwards, participants indicated their belief in 
theory that the United States government participated in a conspiracy to perpetrate the attack 
on 9/11.  Results demonstrated that both treatment conditions reduced belief in the 9/11 
conspiracy theory relative to the control message.  However, the fact-based message was 
shown to be more effective than the logic-based argument in reducing belief in the 9/11 
FRQVSLUDF\WKHRU\7KHDXWKRUV¶QRWHWKLVFRXOGEHEHFDXVH³DSSO\LQJORJLFWRDSUREOHP
might be more challenging than understanding WKDWWKHIDFWVEHLQJSUHVHQWHGDUHLQFRUUHFW´
(Banas & Miller, 2013, p. 199). These results highlight the potentially promising avenue of 
using a fact-based anti-argument to address the impact of conspiracy theories. 




Jolley and Douglas (2014b, see Chapter 3) investigated the impact of conspiracy 
theories on both beliefs and behavioural intentions.  Participants were exposed to either pro-
conspiracy information, which argued in favour of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, or anti-
conspiracy information, which argued a fact-based anti-conspiracy argument against anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories.  A control condition was also included where no further 
information was given.  Results revealed that exposure to anti-conspiracy information 
reduced belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories relative to a control condition.  Like in 
%DQDVDQG0LOOHU¶VUHVHDUFKWKHVHILQGLQJVWKHUHIRUHVKRZWKDWFRQVSLUDF\EHOLHIV
may be reduced when anti-conspiracy arguments are utilised.  However, the results also 
indicated that exposure to anti-conspiracy information did not improve intentions to vaccinate 
a fictional child in comparison to the control condition.   
Therefore, whilst both Banas and Miller (2013) and Jolley and Douglas (2014b, see 
Chapter 3) demonstrate the promise of using anti-conspiracy arguments in reducing belief in 
conspiracy theories, the use of anti-conspiracy arguments may not necessarily improve 
behavioural intentions.  Jolley and Douglas (2014b, see Chapter 3) therefore provide the first 
empirical evidence of the assertion by Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) that conspiracy theories 
may potentially be resistant to correction.  Jolley and Douglas further assert, ³once the very 
idea of a conspiracy has been mentioned and taken root, even strong [anti-conspiracy] 
arguments may be unable to lead to behavioural action´ (p. 8).  Addressing the potential 
impact of conspiracy theories may therefore present a difficult and significant challenge for 
researchers.   
However, whilst suspicion of anti-conspiracy material could be a contributing factor 
in explaining why conspiracy theories may be resistant to correction (Sunstein & Vermeule, 
2009), another factor could be the content of the material itself.   For example, research has 




shown that if material presented first is relatively controversial, interesting, and familiar to 
the audience, this tends to produce a primacy effect (i.e., the first arguments presented have 
an advantage; e.g., Furnham, 1986; Rosnow, 1966; Rosnow & Robinson, 1967).  This may be 
because the audience starts with a high level of interest that decreases over time (Gass & 
Seiter, 2010).  If the material is relatively noncontroversial, uninteresting, and unfamiliar to 
the audience however, this tends to produce a recency effect (i.e., the later arguments 
presented have an advantage) because the information presented afterwards may instead gain 
the audience¶s interest (Gass & Seiter, 2010).  Conspiracy theories are controversial and 
interesting by nature.  They posit novel, often elaborate and unconventional explanations for 
events.  Moreover, aVQRWHGE\5HLG³FRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVDUHHPRWLRQDOO\ODGHQDQG
WKHLUGLVFRYHU\FDQEHJUDWLI\LQJ´SThey concern topics such as childhood 
vaccination that provoke social anxiety which conspiracy theorising may be able to address.  
Perhaps therefore, being presented with an anti-conspiracy argument in any order will be less 
persuasive than conspiracy theories.  Conspiracy theories simply may be more controversial, 
interesting, familiar and therefore influential than arguments designed to refute them. 
The success of using anti-conspiracy arguments could however be enhanced if the 
content is repeated or otherwise strengthened (Lewandowsky, et al., 2012).  For example, 
Ecker, Lewandowsky, Swire, and Chang (2011) presented participants with a series of 
statements concerning a fictional warehouse fire that had taken place.  Across a series of 
different experimental conditions, participants were given varying amounts of information 
about the event.  Some participants read statements that included the suggestion that volatile 
materials were found at the scene, with this information being presented once or repeated 
three times.  However, half of the participants who were told that volatile materials were 
found at the scene, were also told shortly afterwards that this information had since been 
retracted and that no volatile materials were actually found at the scene.  This retraction was 




presented to the participant either once or repeated three times.  A control condition was also 
employed where no statements referring to volatile materials were presented to the 
participants.  After reading statements concerning the event, participants were given an open-
ended questionnaire asking inference and fact questions about the event, such as relating to 
what could have caused the fire.  Results demonstrated that if misinformation concerning the 
event was presented repeatedly, repeating the retraction helped reduce the extent to which 
people referred to the retracted misinformation when questioned about the fire (i.e., referring 
to the volatile materials being a cause of the fire).  However, when the misinformation was 
presented only once, people continued to refer to the misinformation to the same extent if the 
retraction was presented once or three times.   
The research by Ecker, et al. (2011) therefore demonstrates that repeating the 
UHWUDFWLRQRQO\DSSHDUVWRDWWHQXDWHSHRSOH¶VFRQWLQXHGUHOLDQFHRQWKHPLVLQIRUPDWLRQLIWKH
misinformation is also repeated.  A potential reason for this may be that by repeating the 
PLVLQIRUPDWLRQLQUHWUDFWLRQVWKLVPD\³SDUDGR[LFDOO\HQKDQFHWKHLPSDFWRIPLVLQIRUPDWLRQ´ 
(Lewandowsky, et al., 2012, p. 117).  In a similar vein, researchers Eakin, Schreiber and 
Sergent-Marshall (2003) showed that when participants were given an immediate post-
misinformation warning about the effects of misinformation (i.e., that people continue to 
refer to retracted misinformation), participants were more able to resist the misinformation, 
but only when the misinformation was presented once (low accessibility, versus several times 
± high accessibility).  It therefore appears that combining refuting messages with a warning 
may be a successful avenue to intervention, but only if the misinformation is presented once. 
In general, however, warnings seem to be more effective when they are administered 
before the misinformation than afterwards (e.g., Lewandowsky, et al., 2012).  Loftus (2005) 
argued that this occurs because if the warning is given after the misinformation, the 




misinformation has already been incorporated into memory.  People have an expectation that 
the information they will be presented with will be valid.  Thus, being given a warning can 
change this expectation as the recipient now more closely monitors incoming messages 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  In other words, being given a warning may induce a temporary 
state of skepticism and prompt the recipient to become more vigilant, and they suppress the 
misinformation that has been presented (Eakin et al., 2003; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; 
Loftus, 2005).  Schul (1993) found support for this idea ± people were shown to take longer 
to process misinformation when they were given a warning, suggesting that they were taking 
more care when considering the content of the information. 
Researchers have also explored the effectiveness of utilising either a specific or a 
general warning as a tool to relieve the persistent influence of retracted misinformation.  For 
example, Ecker, et al. (2010) told participants that the victims of a fictional minibus accident 
were a group of elderly people, before revoking this information and arguing that the victims 
were not elderly people after all.  However, some participants were asked to read either a 
specific or general warning before receiving this correction.  In the specific warning 
condition, the warning provided an example of jurors still relying on evidence that has been 
deemed inadmissible.  The idea behind employing a specific warning was based on the 
assumption that using explicit examples of people continuing to rely on retracted 
misinformation will enable people to become more vigilant to the information that they are 
being presented.  In the general warning condition, participants were just told that facts are 
not always checked ± the aim of this was to induce alertness.  A control condition was also 
utilised where no warning was provided before the retraction.  Participants then answered 
several questions about the event.  It was found that a warning presented before 
misinformation that provided specific examples, rather than a general warning, was more 
effective in reducing people referring to the victims of the minibus accident being elderly 




people.  Research therefore demonstrates that using a specific pre-warning alongside refuting 
information can be an effective way to reduce reliance on misinformation. 
 The research outlined in the current chapter aims to first provide a direct test of the 
use of anti-conspiracy arguments in addressing the potentially detrimental consequences of 
conspiracy theories.  Specifically, we aimed to test whether the order of pro-conspiracy and 
anti-conspiracy information lessened the impact of conspiracy theories.  We used the context 
of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories as in Studies 3 and 4.   In previous research, we have only 
been able to speculate that the use of anti-conspiracy information would be effective in 
improving vaccination intentions (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b, see Chapter 3).  The current 
investigation therefore aims to provide a more stringent examination of this hypothesis by 
varying the order of pro-conspiracy and anti-conspiracy information and measuring how the 
RUGHURISUHVHQWDWLRQPD\LQIOXHQFHSHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQWRYDFFLQDWH&RQVLGHULQJSUHYLRXV
research however, it is also plausible to suggest that being presented with an anti-conspiracy 
argument in any order may be less persuasive than conspiracy theories due to (a) people 
being suspicious of the anti-conspiracy material, and (b) the content of the message.   
Second, the research outlined in this chapter aims to test a method of strengthening 
the anti-conspiracy material used to address the potential impact of conspiracy theories.  
Specifically, in Study 10 participants were given a warning explaining that people tend to 
rely on information even when it has been retracted, prior to being exposed to conspiracy 
information and anti-conspiracy arguments.  We predicted that giving people a warning 
might make them more vigilant to the information they are being presented and thus consider 
all evidence that is presented in front of them.  Moreover, the warning may induce a 
WHPSRUDU\VWDWHRIVNHSWLFLVPZKLFKFRXOGPD[LPL]HSHRSOH¶VDELOLW\WRGLVFULPLQDWH
between true and false information (Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  This in turn may therefore 




strengthen the anti-conspiracy material and render the conspiracy theories less persuasive on 
behavioural intentions.  The type of warning was also varied.  In doing so, we wanted to 
provide further evidence that a specific warning may be more effective than a general 
warning in eliciting attitude change (e.g., Ecker et al., 2010).  Specifically, we therefore 
provided a direct comparison between two different types of warnings (general and specific) 
in order to test which warning was the most successful in lessening the impact of conspiracy 
theories on behavioural intentions.   
Finally, the research outlined in the current chapter examines some of the factors that 
have been found to be a direct response to exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy information, 
specifically belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and SHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVWKDWYDFFLQHV
are dangerous (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b, see Chapter 3).  We aim to test whether both the 
order of information, and also being given a pre-warning, may reduce belief in conspiracy 
theories and the perception that vaccines are dangerous.  In previous research (Jolley & 
Douglas, 2014b, see Chapter 3), belief in conspiracy theories was treated as a manipulation 
check measure in order to test whether exposure to conspiracy theories elicits a conspiracy 
belief as predicted.  However, we suggest that belief in conspiracy theories could itself be 
utilised as a mediator variable to help explain the relationship between exposure to 
conspiracy theories, anti-conspiracy arguments and vaccination intentions.  In other words, 
we are not testing the success of the manipulation but the impact of combining both pro-
conspiracy and anti-conspiracy arguments has on belief in conspiracy theories, which in turn 
may influence intentions to vaccinate a fictional child.  Moreover, previous research has 
VKRZQWKDWFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVLQFUHDVHSHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQWKDWYDFFLQHVDUHGDQJHURXV 
(Jolley & Douglas, 2014b, see Chapter 3).  It is therefore plausible to suggest that exposure to 
FRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVZRXOGILUVWFDXVHDQLQFUHDVHLQRQH¶VEHOLHILQFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVZKLFK
would then in turn increase perceptions that vaccines are dangerous, leading to a lesser 




intention to vaccinate.  In this current chapter, we therefore also aim to test this proposed 
serial mediation model in explaining the impact of conspiracy theories and anti-conspiracy 
arguments on intentions to vaccinate.  
In summary, the present research tested methods designed to attenuate the impact of 
conspiracy information.  Two studies tested the prediction that pro-conspiracy information 
may have more impact on vaccination intentions than refuting information whenever it is 
presented (Study 9), but if a specific pre-warning about misinformation effects is provided 
beforehand, this may attenuate the impact (Study 10).  Both studies examined two potential 
mediators of the predicted effects. 
Study 9 
In this study, we aimed to examine if the order in which people are exposed to 
conspiracy information and anti-conspiracy arguments has an impact on intended vaccine 
uptake.  Using an experimental design, participants were asked to read either one of five 
pieces of information: (1) information in favour of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, followed 
by information refuting them (pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy), (2) information refuting anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories, followed by information in favour (anti-conspiracy/pro-
conspiracy), (3) pro-conspiracy information only, (4) anti-conspiracy information only, or (5) 
a control condition.   Participants were then asked to rate their belief in a series of anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories and the extent to which they perceived vaccines to be dangerous.  
Finally, participants were presented with a scenario depicting a fictitious child.  They were 
asked to imagine that they were faced with the decision to have this child vaccinated against a 
specific (made up) disease as in Chapter 3.  They were then given some information about the 
disease and the vaccination and were asked to indicate their intention to have the child 
vaccinated.   




We predicted that exposure to conspiracy information in any order would be more 
impactful than anti-conspiracy material.  We based this prediction on Sunstein and 
Vermeule¶VVXJJHVWLRQWhat people may be suspicious of the anti-conspiracy material, 
but also because the content of the conspiracy information may be more persuasive.  Further, 
we predicted that exposure to conspiracy theories would increase belief in anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories, which in turn would increase the perception that vaccines are dangerous.  
We tested this in a serial mediation model, and predicted that increased belief in anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories may lead to the perception that vaccines are dangerous which 
subsequently reduces intentions to vaccinate a fictional child. 
Method 
Participants and design 
Two hundred and sixty seven participants (97 women and 170 men, Mage = 31.73, SD 
= 9.93) were recruited YLD$PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUN07XUN3DUWLFLSDQWVZHre residents 
of the U.S.A. and received 75 cents in exchange for their participation.  At the end of the 
questionnaire, participants were asked if they devoted their full attention to the study and if 
there were any distractions present during the study.  Participants who rated four and above 
(out of five, with five indicating no attention and many distractions) on the attention check 
questions were removed from analyses.  The final sample size used for data analysis was 
therefore 260 (95 women and 165 men, Mage = 31.90, SD = 9.96).  There were 51 participants 
in the pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy condition, 50 in the anti-conspiracy/pro-conspiracy 
condition, 55 participants in the pro-conspiracy condition, 52 in the anti-conspiracy 
condition, and 52 in the control condition.  In the final sample, 131 (50.4%) were parents, 
who had an average of 1.16 (SD = 0.46) children, with the youngest being 3.46 (SD = 1.37) 
years old. 




A single-factor independent variable (pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy vs. anti-
conspiracy/pro-conspiracy vs. pro-conspiracy vs. anti-conspiracy vs. control) between-subject 
design was employed.  Participants reported their belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories 
and perceptions that vaccines are dangerous, and were then asked to indicate their intention to 
have a fictional child vaccinated.   
Materials and procedure 
 Participants indicated their informed consent before beginning the questionnaire.  
Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of the five experimental conditions. The 
pro-conspiracy and anti-conspiracy articles were identical in all conditions, which were taken 
from previous research (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b, see Chapter 3, see Appendix E).  The order 
of exposure to this information was the only element manipulated.  The teUPµFRQVSLUDF\
WKHRU\¶ZDVQRWPHQWLRQHGLQHLWKHURIWKHDUWLFOHV  In this current investigation, our aim was 
to examine the success of presenting anti-conspiracy arguments before, or after pro-
conspiracy arguments.  It was therefore not necessary to measure the success of the 
manipulations as in previous investigations.  Instead, we utilised the manipulation check 
measure from previous research that asks participants to indicate their anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theory beliefs as a mediator variable in our current investigation (Į 79; Jolley & 
Douglas, 2014b, see Study 4, Chapter 3, see Appendix E).  
Participants then indicated the extent to which they felt that vaccines were dangerous 
(Į  .94), followed by reading the scenario as in Studies 3 and 4 (Chapter 3) and indicating 
their intention to have a fictional child vaccinated against a made up disease (see Appendix 
C).  At the end of the study, participants were told that the information presented in the article 
was fictional, and was written for the purposes of the study.  Participants were also pointed 




towards websites containing factual information about vaccines, vaccine efficacy and vaccine 
safety before being thanked and paid for their participation. 
Results and discussion 
For each variable, summing the individual scores and then dividing by the number of 
items calculated mean values.  These mean scores were used in the statistical analyses.  
Descriptive statistics for each variable are presented in Table 9.  None of the analyses were 
affected by the SDUWLFLSDQWV¶VWDWXVDVSDUHQWVRUQRQ-parents, nor their age or gender.  These 
variables were therefore not analysed further.  
Table 9  
Descriptive Statistics between Conspiracy Conditions and Vaccination Intentions, and 
Mediator Variables.  
 
 
Notes. Pro/anti = Pro-conspiracy/Anti-conspiracy condition. Anti/Pro = Anti-conspiracy/Pro-
conspiracy condition. Pro = Pro-conspiracy condition. Anti = Anti-conspiracy condition. 
 
 
                                     Means (SD) 






Pro/Anti 4.23 (0.91) 4.04 (1.45) 4.80 (1.77) 
Anti/Pro 3.94 (1.00) 3.63 (1.56) 5.04 (1.69) 
Pro 4.47 (0.81) 4.50 (1.26) 4.42 (1.76) 
Anti 3.38 (1.02) 2.92 (1.57) 5.60 (1.49) 
Control 3.83 (1.12) 3.55 (1.62) 5.50 (1.21) 




Anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and vaccination intentions 
As hypothesised, results revealed a significant difference in vaccination intentions 
across conditions, F(4, 255) =  5.00, p = .001, Ș2 = .07.  Vaccination intentions were 
significantly lower in the pro-conspiracy condition than the anti-conspiracy condition (p < 
.001) and the control condition (p < .001).  Intentions were not significantly different between 
the anti-conspiracy condition and control (p = .718).  This replicates the previous work by 
Jolley and Douglas (2014b, see Chapter 3), where participants who were exposed to material 
supporting anti-vaccine conspiracy theories showed reluctance to have a child vaccinated 
compared to the other two conditions.  
Further, vaccinations intentions were significantly lower in the pro-conspiracy/anti-
conspiracy condition than the anti-conspiracy condition (p = .016) and the control condition 
(p = .022).  Intentions were not significantly different between the pro-conspiracy/anti-
conspiracy and anti-conspiracy/pro-conspiracy (p = .458) and the pro-conspiracy conditions 
(p = .263).   Moreover, vaccination intentions were marginally significantly lower in the anti-
conspiracy/pro-conspiracy condition than the anti-conspiracy condition (p = .081).   
However, vaccinations intentions were significantly higher than in the pro-conspiracy 
condition (p = .047).  Intentions were not significantly different between the anti-
conspiracy/pro-conspiracy and pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy (p = .458) and the control 
conditions (p = .119).  It therefore appears that pro-conspiracy information presented in any 
order reduces intentions to vaccinate a fictional child in comparison to anti-conspiracy 
information only.  Interestingly however, vaccination intentions were improved when 
exposed to pro-conspiracy information only.  This suggests that the use of anti-conspiracy 
material may be still be a promising tool for intervention 
 





To test potential mediators of these effects, separate ANOVAs were firstly conducted 
with conspiracy condition (pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy/pro-
conspiracy versus pro-conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy versus control) as the independent 
variable, and summed scores on the two potential mediators (belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories and perceived vaccine dangers of vaccines) as dependent variables.  Results revealed 
a significant difference in belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories between conditions, F(4, 
255) = 9.46, p < .001, Ș2= .13.  Belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories was significantly 
higher in the pro-conspiracy condition than the anti-conspiracy condition (p <  .001) and the 
control condition (p = .001).  Belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories was also significantly 
lower in the anti-conspiracy than the control condition (p = .017).  This similarly replicates 
the previous work conducted by Banas and Miller (2013) and Jolley and Douglas (2014b, see 
Chapter 3). 
Further, belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories was significantly higher in the pro-
conspiracy/anti-conspiracy condition than in the anti-conspiracy condition (p < .001) and the 
control condition (p = .043).  Belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories was not significantly 
different between the pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy condition and anti-conspiracy/pro-
conspiracy (p = .140) and the pro-conspiracy condition (p = .211).  Moreover, belief in anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories was significantly higher in the anti-conspiracy/pro-conspiracy 
condition than the anti-conspiracy condition (p = .004).  However, belief in anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories was significantly lower in the anti-conspiracy/pro-conspiracy condition 
than the pro-conspiracy condition (p = .006).  Belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories was 
not significant different between the anti-conspiracy/pro-conspiracy and pro-conspiracy/anti-
conspiracy condition (p = .140) and the control condition (p = .597). 




Results also revealed a significant difference in belief in perceived dangers of 
vaccines between conditions, F(4, 255) = 8.32, p < .001, Ș2= .12.  Participants in the pro-
conspiracy condition perceived vaccines to be more dangerous than the anti-conspiracy 
condition (p < .001) and the control condition (p = .001).  The perception that vaccines are 
dangerous was also significantly lower in the anti-conspiracy than the control condition (p = 
.031).  This, again, replicates the previous work by Jolley and Douglas (2014b, see Chapter 
3).   
Finally, the perception that vaccines are dangerous was significantly higher in the pro-
conspiracy/anti-conspiracy condition than the anti-conspiracy condition (p < .001) and 
marginally significantly higher than in the control condition (p = .098).  The perception that 
vaccines are dangerous was not significantly different between the pro-conspiracy/anti-
conspiracy and anti-conspiracy/pro-conspiracy condition (p = .171) and the pro-conspiracy 
condition (p = .110).  Moreover, the perception that vaccines are dangerous was significantly 
higher in the anti-conspiracy/pro-conspiracy than the anti-conspiracy condition (p = .017).  
However, the perception that vaccines are dangerous was significantly lower in the anti-
conspiracy/pro-conspiracy than the pro-conspiracy condition (p = .003).  The perception that 
vaccines are dangerous was however not significantly different between the anti-
conspiracy/pro-conspiracy and pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy condition (p = .171) and the 
control condition (p = .787).  
Each candidate mediator was then examined in a test of serial mediation in order to 
explain the effect of the conspiracy condition (pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy versus anti-
conspiracy/pro-conspiracy versus pro-conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy versus control) on 
YDFFLQDWLRQLQWHQWLRQV7KLVZDVFDUULHGRXWXVLQJ+D\HV¶3) bootstrapping method for 




indirect effects, using the macro Process, Model 6 with two serial mediators.  A conceptual 










Figure 8. A conceptual diagram of the serial mediation analysis performed in Study 9. 
 
First, the pro-conspiracy condition was coded as the representative condition and 
compared to both anti-conspiracy and control conditions (see Table 10).  Both mediation 
models were significant, with pro-conspiracy information increasing belief in anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories, which directly increased belief in perceived dangers of vaccines, and 
subsequently reduced intentions to vaccinate a fictional child (see Table 11).  This replicates 
and extends previous research (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b, see Chapter 3) by providing 
HPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHWKDWEHOLHILQFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVGLUHFWO\LQIOXHQFHSHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQV


















Table 10  
A Table of Indicator Coding (ReferrHGWRDVµ'¶XVHGLQWKH+D\HV¶(2013) Serial Mediation 
Analysis using Process (Model 6) for the Conspiracy Conditions (Pro-conspiracy versus 







                                     Conspiracy Condition 
Indicator Coding Pro-conspiracy Anti-conspiracy Control 
D1 0 1 0 
D2 0 0 1 





Multiple Serial Mediation of the Indirect Effects of Conspiracy Condition (using Indicator Coding, see Table 10) on Immunisation Intentions 
(DV) through Belief in Anti-vaccine Conspiracy Theories and Perceived Dangers of Vaccines (MVs) (N = 260; 5,000 bootstrap samples).  
Notes.  Boldface type highlights a significant effect as determined by the Monte Carlo 95% confidence interval (CI), which does not contain a 
zero.  
**p < .05.   ***p < .01.
        Normal test theory    
 


































Monte Carlo 95% 
Confidence Intervals 
Path Coeff. (s.e.) Lower       Upper 
D1 a1a -0.85 (.16)*** a2a -0.06 (.13)  c1 0.82 (.26)** c¶ 0.31 (.25) 0.45 (.16) 0.1692 0.8031 
D2 a1b -0.39 (.16)** 
 
a2b -0.03 (.10)  c2 0.73 (.27)** c¶ 0.49 (.24) 0.20 (.11) 0.0220 0.4521 












 -0.05 (.17) b2 -0.41 (.11)***        
 
    
 
  
µ09¶WRµ09¶ d 1.29 (.05)***   
 




Second, the pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy condition was coded as the representative 
group and compared to all other conditions (see Table 12).  The mediation model between 
pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy and anti-conspiracy information and the control condition was 
significant.  The same pattern was demonstrated as in the previous analysis.  There was no 
significant mediation between pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy and anti-conspiracy/pro-
conspiracy and pro-conspiracy conditions (see Table 13). 
 Third, we then performed the same analysis but with anti-conspiracy/pro-conspiracy 
condition coded as the representative group and compared to all other conditions (see Table 
14).  The mediation model between anti-conspiracy/pro-conspiracy and anti-conspiracy 
information was significant.  The same pattern was demonstrated as in the previous analyses.   
However, the mediation model between the anti-conspiracy/pro-conspiracy and pro-
conspiracy information condition was also significant, but in the opposite direction.  In this 
case, exposure to anti-conspiracy information, then pro-conspiracy information (in 
comparison to pro-conspiracy information) reduced belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, 
which reduced feelings of perceived dangers of vaccines, subsequently improving 
behavioural intentions.  There were no significant mediations between anti-conspiracy/pro-












$7DEOHRI,QGLFDWRU&RGLQJ5HIHUUHGWRDVµ'¶XVHGLQWKH+D\HV¶(2013) Serial Mediation Analysis using Process (Model 6) for the 
Conspiracy Conditions (Pro-conspiracy/Anti-conspiracy; versus Anti-conspiracy/Pro-conspiracy versus Pro-conspiracy versus Anti-conspiracy 






 Conspiracy Condition 
Indicator Coding Pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy Anti-conspiracy/pro-conspiracy Pro-conspiracy Anti-conspiracy Control 
D1 0 1 0 0 0 
D2 0 0 1 0 0 
D3 0 0 0 1 0 
D4 0 0 0 0 1 





Multiple Serial Mediation of the Indirect Effects of Conspiracy Condition (using Indicator Coding, see Table 12) on Immunisation Intentions 
(DV) through Belief in Anti-vaccine Conspiracy Theories and Perceived Dangers of Vaccines (MVs) (N = 260; 10,000 bootstrap samples). 
Notes.  Boldface type highlights a significant effect as determined by the Monte Carlo 90% confidence interval (CI), which does not contain a 
zero.  
**p < .05.   ***p < .01. 
        Normal test theory    
 


































Monte Carlo 90% 
Confidence Intervals 
Path Coeff. (s.e.) Lower       Upper 
D1 a1a -0.29 (.19) a2a -0.04 (.16)  c1 0.24 (.31) c¶ .06 (.29) 0.15 (.07) -0.0373 0.3922 
D2 a1b 0.24 (.19) a2b 0.16 (.16)  c2 -0.39 (.31) c¶ -0.18 (.29) -0.12 (.09) -0.3496 0.0421 
D3 a1c -0.85 (.19)*** a2b -0.03 (.17)  c3 0.80 (.31)** c3 0.31 (.30) 0.43 (.17) 0.1437 0.8226 
D4 a1d -0.39 (.19)** a2b 0.01 (.17)  c4 0.70 (.31)** c4 0.48 (.29) 0.20 (.12) 0.0235 0.4116 












 -0.05 (.17) b2 -0.40 (.11)***        
 
    
 
  
µ09¶WRµ09¶ d 1.28 (.05)***   
 





$7DEOHRI,QGLFDWRU&RGLQJ5HIHUUHGWRDVµ'¶XVHGLQWKH+D\HV¶(2013) Serial Mediation Analysis using Process (Model 6) for the 
Conspiracy Conditions Anti-conspiracy/Pro-conspiracy; versus Pro-conspiracy Pro-conspiracy/Anti-conspiracy versus Anti-conspiracy versus 





 Conspiracy Condition 
Indicator Coding Pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy Anti-conspiracy/pro-conspiracy Pro-conspiracy Anti-conspiracy Control 
D1 1 0 0 0 0 
D2 0 0 1 0 0 
D3 0 0 0 1 0 
D4 0 0 0 0 1 





Multiple Serial Mediation of the Indirect Effects of Conspiracy Condition (using Indicator Coding, see Table 14) on Immunisation Intentions 
(DV) through Belief in Anti-vaccine Conspiracy Theories and Perceived Dangers of Vaccines (MVs) (N = 260; 5,000 bootstrap samples).  
Notes.  Boldface type highlights a significant effect as determined by the Monte Carlo 95% confidence interval (CI), which does not contain a 
zero.  
 
*p < .10. **p < .05.   ***p < .01. 
       Normal test theory    
 


































Monte Carlo 95% 
Confidence Intervals 
Path Coeff. (s.e.) Lower       Upper 
D1 a1a 0.23 (.18) a2a 0.02 (.15)  c1 -0.29 (.31) c¶ -0.15 (.29) -0.12 (.11) -0.3008 0.0322 
D2 a1b 0.47 (.18)** a2b 0.18 (.15)  c2 -0.67 (.30)** c¶ -0.34 (.28) -0.24 (.12) -0.5175 -0.0507 
D3 a1c -0.62 (.19)*** a2b -0.01 (.16)  c3 0.51 (.31)* c3 0.17 (.29) 0.31 (.14) 0.1149 0.5735 
D4 a1d -0.16 (.19) a2b 0.03 (.15)  c4 0.41 (.31) c4 0.34 (.28) 0.08 (.11) -0.1242 0.3192 












 -0.04 (.17) b2 -0.40 (.11)***        
 
    
 
  
µ09¶WRµ09¶ d 1.28 (.05)***   
 
Attenuating potential harmful effects 159 
 
 
Therefore, as hypothesised, conspiracy theories presented in any order appeared to be 
more impactful than information arguing against conspiracy theories.  Participants who were 
exposed to conspiracy theories indicated less intention to vaccinate a fictional child in 
comparison to those who received anti-conspiracy arguments only.  This relationship was 
explained by belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and the extent to which participants 
perceived vaccines to be dangerous.  Specifically, exposure to conspiracy theories increased 
belief in anti-YDFFLQHFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVZKLFKLQWXUQLQFUHDVHGSHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQWKDW
vaccines are dangerous, resulting in a lesser intention to vaccinate a fictional child.   
However, when anti-conspiracy arguments were presented first, participants indicated a 
higher intention to vaccinate in comparison to pro-conspiracy information only.  This effect 
was significantly mediated by a lower belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories leading to 
lower feelings of perceived dangers of vaccines.   
Overall, this research provides further evidence that conspiracy theories may be 
difficult to correct.  This may be due to people being suspicious of the anti-conspiracy 
message (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009) or the content of the conspiracy theory message being 
PRUHSHUVXDVLYHHJGXHWRWKHPHVVDJHV¶controversial and interesting content, cf. Gass & 
Seiter, 2010; Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994).  However, the anti-conspiracy material (followed 
by pro-conspiracy information) did appear to improve intentions for people who were only 
exposed to pro-conspiracy information.  This suggests that the use of anti-conspiracy material 
may be still be a promising tool for intervention.  It is plausible to suggest that if the anti-
conspiracy material can instead be strengthened, using such an intervention tool could still 
have the potential to make the conspiracy information less persuasive.  Therefore, in order to 
strengthen the anti-conspiracy material, in Study 10 we employed a pre-warning before 
participants were presented with the conspiracy theory information.  In doing this, we aimed 
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to investigate a novel avenue to intervention, predicting that a pre-warning presented before 
being exposed to conspiracy information and anti-conspiracy arguments may make people 
more vigilant and consider all pieces of information presented to them.  We also wanted to 
investigate the success of employing a general or specific warning.  The general warning 
stated that facts are not always checked.  The specific warning always began with the general 
but then described instances of people relying on incorrect information such as within juries.  
Our aim was to provide further evidence supporting the conclusion that a specific warning is 
more effective in eliciting attitude change than a general warning (e.g., Ecker et al., 2010). 
Study 10 
Research suggests that being given a pre-warning may induce a temporary state of 
skepticism and prompt the recipient to become more vigilant of the information they are 
presented with (Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  Further, being given a warning that provides 
specific details of people relying on retracted misinformation has been shown to be more 
effective than a general warning designed to induce alertness (Ecker et al., 2010).  In Study 
10, we aimed to investigate if such a tool that may induce a temporary state of skepticism 
could render conspiracy information less persuasive.  In doing so, the warning may 
strengthen the anti-conspiracy message.  In this study therefore, participants were exposed to 
a general (i.e., facts are not always checked) or specific (i.e., beginning with the general 
warning but then providing examples of people relying on retracted misinformation) pre-
warning, or a control condition where no warning was given.  Participants were then asked to 
read material supporting anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, followed by anti-conspiracy 
material (pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy condition, as used in Study 9).  Finally, participants 
were asked to rate their belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, perceptions that vaccines 
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are dangerous, and to indicate their intention to have a fictitious child vaccinated, as in Study 
9.   
It was predicted that exposure to a specific pre-warning would attenuate the impact of 
conspiracy information, in comparison to a general pre-warning and control.  In other words, 
being exposed to a warning would render the conspiracy theory information less persuasive 
DQGLPSURYHSHRSOH¶s intentions to vaccinate a fictional child.  We predict this relationship 
would be explained by both a reduced belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and 
perception that vaccines are dangerous.  
Method 
Participants and design 
Two hundred and eleven participants (127 women and 84 men, Mage = 35.04, SD = 
ZHUHUHFUXLWHGYLD$PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUN07XUN3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHUHVLGHQWV
of the U.S.A. and received 75 cents in exchange for their participation.  At the end of the 
questionnaire, participants were asked if they devoted their full attention to the study and if 
there were any distractions present during the study.  Participants who rated four and above 
(out of five) to the attention check questions were removed from analyses. We also included a 
timer to identify participants who had exceeded reading speed capabilities for upper college 
students by reading either the specific warning (95 words) in less than 10 seconds or the 
general warning (38 words) in less than 5 seconds and combined pro-conspiracy and anti-
conspiracy manipulations (367 words) in less than 40 seconds (Speed Reading, 2014).  The 
final sample size used for data analysis was therefore 130 (78 women and 52 men, Mage = 
36.11, SD = 11.58).  There were 48 participants in the specific-warning condition, 39 in the 
general warning condition, and 43 in the control condition.  In the final sample, 74 (51.7%) 
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were parents who had an average of 1.14 (SD = 0.42) children, with the youngest being 4.24 
(SD = 1.12) years old.  
A 3-group design (pre-warning: specific-warning versus general-warning versus 
control) where all participants were in the same conspiracy condition (conspiracy condition: 
pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy condition), between-subject design was employed.  
Participants reported their belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, the extent to which they 
perceived vaccines to be dangerous, and were finally asked to indicate their intention to have 
a fictional child vaccinated.   
Materials and procedure 
 Participants provided their informed consent before beginning the questionnaire.  
Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions, which 
were adapted from previous research (Ecker, et al., 2010).  Participants were either given a 
specific pre-warning about misinformation, a general pre-warning, or were in a control 
condition where no warning was given.  In the specific pre-warning condition, participants 
were given information about the lasting effects of misinformation where examples of its 
operation were provided: 
³,QWKHLUGHVLUHWRVHQVDWLRQDOLse, the media sometimes does not check facts before 
publishing information that turns out to be inaccurate. Research has shown that 
people continue to rely on inaccurate information in the media once they have read it. 
One example is the fact that some people today still believe that Iraq had weapons of 
mass destruction even though none were found. Also, many people believe inaccurate 
information about the Holocaust, despite evidence that six million Jewish people lost 
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their lives and despite an official apology from Germany. It is therefore important to 
UHDGWKHIROORZLQJLQIRUPDWLRQDQGDQVZHUWKHTXHVWLRQVDWWKHHQGFDUHIXOO\´ 
In the general warning condition, the warning stated that sometimes reportHG³IDFWV´DUHQRW
double-checked before the media releases them: 
³,QWKHLUGHVLUHWRVHQVDWLRnalise, the media sometimes does not check facts 
before publishing information that turns out to be inaccurate. It is therefore important 
to read the following stRU\DQGDQVZHUWKHTXHVWLRQVDWWKHHQGFDUHIXOO\´ 
7KHWHUPµFRQVSLUDF\WKHRU\¶ZDVQRWPHQWLRQHGLQHLWKHURIWKHDUWLFOHV$OOSDUWLFLSDQWV
were then exposed to information in favour of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, followed by 
information refuting them, as in Study 9.   Participants were then asked to indicate their anti-
vaccine conspiracy belief (Į ), perception that vaccines are dangerous (Į ), and 
vaccination intentions, as in Study 9 (see Appendix E and Appendix C, respectively).  At the 
end of the study, participants were told that the information presented in the article was 
fictional, and was written for the purposes of the study.  Participants were also pointed 
towards websites containing factual information about vaccines, vaccine efficacy and vaccine 
safety before being thanked and paid for their participation. 
Results and discussion 
For each variable, summing the individual scores and then dividing by the number of 
items calculated mean values.  These mean scores were used in the statistical analyses.  None 
RIWKHDQDO\VHVZHUHDIIHFWHGE\WKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VWDWXVDVSDUHQWVRUQRQ-parents, nor their 
age or gender.  These variables were therefore not analysed further.  Results however did not 
reveal a significant difference in anti-vaccine beliefs, perception that vaccines are dangerous 
or vaccination intentions across conditions, F(2, 127) = 0.16, p = .857, Ș2 = .00; F(2, 127) = 
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0.63, p = .534, Ș2 = .00; F(2, 127) = 0.88, p = .416, Ș2 = .00, respectively (see Table 16 for 
descriptive statistics).  Therefore, even after being given a pre-warning about the effects of 
misinformation, the impact of conspiracy theories on behavioural intentions was not reduced.  
Moreover, exposure to a pre-ZDUQLQJGLGQRWUHGXFHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶EHOLHIVLQDQWL-vaccine 
conspiracy theories or the extent to which they perceived vaccines to be dangerous.  No 
further meditational analyses were therefore conducted.   
Table 16 
A Table of Descriptive Statistics of All Variables per Condition (Specific Warning, General 
Warning and Control) in Study 10.  
 
General discussion 
The studies outlined in this chapter suggest that conspiracy theories may be resistant 
to correction, even after using methods that have been previously shown to be effective in 
eliciting attitude change.  In Study 9, anti-vaccine conspiracy theories presented in any order 
were shown to have more impact on behavioural intentions than anti-conspiracy arguments.  
This relationship was explained by an increased belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and 
the perception that vaccines are dangerous.  In Study 10, even when participants were given a 
                                     Means (SD) 
Condition Anti-vaccine belief Perceived dangers Intention measure 
Specific warning 3.57 (1.40) 3.00 (1.23) 5.04 (1.45) 
General warning 3.72 (1.75) 3.11 (1.51) 5.21 (1.20) 
Control 3.73 (1.69) 3.33 (1.50) 4.81 (1.33) 
Attenuating potential harmful effects 165 
 
 
pre-warning detailLQJSHRSOH¶VFRQWLQXHGUHOLDQFHRQUHWUDFWHGPLVLQIRUPDWLRQ(specific or 
general) before anti-conspiracy material, this did not reduce the impact of exposure to 
conspiracy information.  Therefore, in the present chapter, anti-vaccine conspiracy theories 
were shown to be more influential on behavioural intention outcomes than anti-conspiracy 
arguments, even when people were warned about the ongoing effects of relying on retracted 
misinformation.  This research demonstrates that the potential detrimental impact of 
conspiracy theories may therefore be difficult to counteract.   
Our work has replicated and extended previous research examining the role of anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories on behavioural intention outcomes (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b, see 
Chapter 3).  First, we showed that exposure to pro-FRQVSLUDF\LQIRUPDWLRQUHGXFHGSHRSOHV¶
intentions to vaccinate a fictional child, relative to an anti-conspiracy condition, or a control.  
We extended this finding by testing a serial mediation model, and found that exposure to 
conspiracy theories increased belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories leading to an increase 
LQWKHSHUFHSWLRQWKDWYDFFLQHVDUHGDQJHURXVZKLFKFRQVHTXHQWO\UHGXFHGRQH¶VLQWHQWLRQWR
vaccinate a fictional child.  Of relevance to this current investigation, anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories were also shown to be more influential on behavioural intention outcomes than anti-
conspiracy arguments in any order they were presented.   
As suggested by Sunstein and Vermeule (2009), suspicion of anti-conspiracy material 
may help explain why the conspiracy theories were resistant to correction in this 
investigation.  For example, when people were presented with the anti-conspiracy-material 
they may have believed that the conspirators themselves to cover their tracks planted the 
material.  However, a further contributor may also be due to the content of the material being 
presented.  Previous research has indicated that relatively controversial and interesting 
information tends to produce a primacy effect (Gass & Seiter, 2010; Haugtvedt & Wegener, 
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1994).  For example, Lana (1964) found a significant primacy effect for a high-controversy 
issue (nuclear weapons), but not for a low-controversy issue (Picasso).  This may also be the 
case for conspiracy theories, since conspiracy theories are relatively controversial and 
interesting by nature.  Moreover, conspiracy theories offer novel explanations for tragedies 
that people are eager for explanations.  Conspiracy theories are also emotionally laden as they 
concern topics that provoke widespread social anxiety (Reid, 2010), such as concerning 
childhood vaccination.  The content of conspiracy theories may therefore be more persuasive 
than anti-conspiracy arguments designed to refute them.  
It is therefore important for future research to examine ways to strengthen anti-
conspiracy arguments in order to make them more persuasive than conspiracy theory 
accounts.  One simple way would be to make the anti-conspiracy argument equally as 
interesting and controversial as the conspiracy theory account.  For example, in the context of 
YDFFLQHVPRUHEDFNJURXQGFRXOGEHSURYLGHGVXUURXQGLQJ$QGUHZ:DNHILHOG¶VDUWLFOH
in The Lancet and how the research was discredited and that the author is no longer permitted 
to practice mHGLFLQH)RUH[DPSOHWKLVPD\LQYROYHDGLVFXVVLRQRQ:DNHILHOG¶VXQGLVFORVHG
ILQDQFLDOFRQIOLFWVRILQWHUHVWVIDLOHGUHSOLFDWLRQVRI:DNHILHOG¶VILQGLQJVDQGKLVZRUN
ultimately being identified as an elaborate fraud.  Providing more contextual details may 
make the anti-conspiracy argument account more interesting to the reader than just supplying 
the facts.  Previous research has also shown that refuting information not only needs to 
provide opposing arguments, but argue against the misinformation (Gass & Seiter, 2010).   
Researchers have found that non-refutation counter-arguments (i.e., opposing arguments 
mentioned, but not arguing against the initial argument presented) are less effective than 
refutation counter-arguments (Allen, 1991, 1993, 1998; Allen, et al., 19902¶.HHIH.  
It is therefore plausible to suggest that an anti-conspiracy argument that clearly argues 
against the conspiracy theory (as opposed to just presenting the anti-conspiracy information) 
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may be more successful in attenuating the influence of conspiracy theories.  An anti-
conspiracy argument that directly refutes conspiracy theories could therefore be tested as a 
means to combat the impact of conspiracy theories in future research. 
Along the same lines, it is interesting to note that exposure to anti-conspiracy 
arguments followed by conspiracy information improved intentions to vaccinate a fictional 
child compared to exposure to pro-conspiracy information only.  Although the intention to 
vaccinate was still below the anti-conspiracy only and control conditions, exposure to anti-
conspiracy arguments improved intentions in comparison to conspiracy information only.  
This points to the possibility that if the anti-conspiracy arguments can be strengthened as 
proposed in this chapter, the use of anti-conspiracy arguments may still have the potential to 
be used as a tool for intervention in addressing conspiracy theories.  Nonetheless, our 
findings demonstrate that a traditional anti-conspiracy argument where the anti-conspiracy 
account is only presented and not explicitly arguing against the conspiracy theory may not be 
sufficient to counteract the impact of conspiracy theories in general.    
Other limitations of the current research should be considered in future investigations.   
For example, the interventions tested here were based on anti-vaccine conspiracy theories 
only and it is therefore not possible to conclude that all conspiracy theories may be resistant 
to correction.  It is plausible to propose that anti-vaccine conspiracy theories may be more 
persuasive than other types of conspiracy theories.  Indeed, the conspiracy theory statements 
used in the present study discussed childhood vaccinations, which could be more emotionally 
laden than other conspiracy theories.  Future research could therefore examine the success of 
utilising traditional anti-conspiracy arguments with other types of conspiracy theories and 
their potential behavioural outcomes, such as climate change conspiracy theories and pro-
environmental behaviours.    
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Alongside developing anti-conspiracy arguments to be more interesting and to argue 
explicitly against conspiracy theories, future research could examine enhancing anti-
conspiracy arguments by manipulating how they are presented to the reader.  We know that 
certain sources are trusted more than others as a means to acquire information on a variety of 
topics.  For example, people are more likely to seek information about vaccines via the 
Internet than through their doctor (Downs, et al., 2008).  Varying the source of the counter-
material could highlight which sources are therefore most trustworthy, and thus will have the 
most weight in making the counter-argument credible to the reader.  In doing so, this will 
allow the intervention tool of anti-conspiracy arguments that was first suggested by Sunstein 
and Vermeule (2009), to be further explored.  Utilising anti-conspiracy arguments as a means 
for intervention appears to be the method as recommended by Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) 
that has the most promise.  Banning conspiracy theorising for example, is somewhat 
impractical and the recommendation of cognitive infiltration is similar to presenting 
conspiracy consumers with anti-conspiracy arguments.  Therefore, strengthening an anti-
conspiracy argument may be the most successful intervention recommendation to further 
explore in future research.   
Future research could therefore also look into presenting anti-conspiracy material on 
other media platforms and measure how varying the source of information can lessen the 
impact of conspiracy theories on behavioural intentions.  For example, the anti-conspiracy 
material text could be accompanied by images, or presented in a video or podcast format.  
Previous research has shown that anti-conspiracy arguments concerning the NASA moon 
landing accompanied by photographs reduced conspiracy beliefs below baseline (Swami, et 
al., 2012).   It may therefore be useful in future research to investigate the success of 
combining text and images in anti-conspiracy arguments in order to investigate how such 
tools may improve behavioural intentions after exposure to conspiracy theories.   




In conclusion, the current research suggests that conspiracy theories may be more 
powerful than anti-conspiracy arguments whenever they are presented.  Specifically, 
conspiracy information appeared to reduce vaccination intentions by increasing belief in anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories, which in turn increased concerns about the dangers of vaccines.  
This can have an alarming impact upon society, as even if people are presented with an anti-
conspiracy argument and a pre-warning, conspiracy theories may still be resistant to 
correction.  Ongoing investigations are therefore needed to develop interventions that are 











Chapter 6 - 
The social psychological consequences of conspiracy theories:  











Beliefs in conspiracy theories are blooming in the 21st century and accompany a large 
proportion of significant social and political events (Bruder et al., 2013; Swami & Coles, 
2010).  In recent years, scholars have made great strides in understanding the psychological 
factors associated with beliefs in conspiracy theories.  Researchers are also starting to 
consider the consequences that may be associated with conspiracy theorising.  Examining the 
consequences of conspiracy theories is an important area of investigation, as conspiracy 
theories can be viewed as attempts to undermine or subvert social systems.  They offer 
alternatives to official explanations DQGXQGHUPLQHSHRSOH¶VFRQILGHQFHLQSROLWLFDOV\VWHPV
and scientific findings (Gray, 2010; Sapountzis & Condor, 2013).  In support of this view, 
research has shown that conspiracy theories are associated with anomie and political distrust 
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994), and that conspiracy theorising is especially 
strong among members of minority groups (Crocker, et al., 1999).  Researchers have also 
found that conspiracy WKHRULHVXQGHUPLQLQJSHRSOH¶VFRQILGHQFHLQVFLHQWLILFILQGLQJVPD\be 
associated with lack of condom use (Bird & Bogart, 2003; Bogart & Thorburn, 2006) and 
people potentially avoiding appropriate treatment of HIV (Hoyt et al., 2012).  However, 
because the research to date has been largely correlational, examinations of cause and effect 
are not possible.  An aim of the research outlined in this thesis therefore concerned utilising 
experimental methods to examine and attempt to address the social psychological 
consequences of conspiracy theories. 
The studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3 put to test the assertion that conspiracy 
theories appearing to subvert or undermine important social systems may lead to potentially 
detrimental consequences for society.  We found that either belief in, or exposure to, 
FRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVQHJDWLYHO\LQIOXHQFHGSHRSOH¶VOLNHOLKRRGRIHQJDJLQJZLWKLPSRUWDQW
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aspects of society such as the political system, taking action against climate change and 
having their children vaccinated.  Ironically however, instead of undermining the social 
system, conspiracy theories were found to increase support for the social status quo (Chapter 
4).  By blaming the causes of significant events on a small number of people, as opposed to 
society as a whole, conspiracy theories may enable people to maintain the belief that society 
is fair.  By bolstering support for social systems however, conspiracy theories may lead 
people to justify rather than address limitations of society.  Conspiracy theories may therefore 
be similar to other system-justifying processes such as complementary stereotyping, sexist 
ideology and just world beliefs, which reduce the likelihood of social and political change 
(Calogero & Jost, 2011; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Jost, 2001; Jost & Hunyady, 2005).  In the 
final studies outlined in this thesis, we also found that once people are exposed to conspiracy 
theories, their effects might be difficult to counteract (Chapter 5).  In two experiments we 
tested interventions based on counter-arguments (e.g., that vaccines are safe instead of 
harmful) and a pre-warning that detailed SHRSOH¶V tendency to rely on retracted information.  
However, both were found to be ineffective in improving intentions to vaccinate a fictional 
child.  
The research outlined in this thesis has therefore uncovered the potential dangers of 
conspiracy theories.  They may stop people from engaging with important aspects society and 
be a way to mask some of the deeper limitations of social systems.  Moreover, once exposed 
to conspiracy theories, their effects might be difficult to counteract.  This final chapter will 
first provide a summary of each of the empirical studies.  Potential implications and 
applications of the research findings will then be discussed.  The chapter will end by 
discussing the potential limitations that affect the external validity of the conclusions, and 
how considering these limitations has inspired ideas for future research. 
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Summary of empirical studies 
In Chapters 2 and 3, we sought to investigate whether belief in, and exposure to 
conspiracy theories would stop people from potentially engaging in important aspects of 
society that are needed for society to function.  Conspiracy theories can be viewed as 
attempts to undermine or subvert social systems by pointing accusing fingers at authority and 
offering alternatives to official explanations (Gray, 2010; Sapountzis & Condor, 2013).  In 
doing so however, they may undermine SHRSOH¶VFRQILGHQFHLQSROLWLFDOV\VWHPVWKHLUWUXVWLQ
the workings of science, and their confidence and trust in medical establishments.   We 
therefore aimed to put this assertion to the test and empirically examine whether belief in, or 
exposure to conspiracy theories would reduce SHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQWRHQJDJHLQWKHSROLWLFDl 
system, take action against climate change and vaccinate a fictional child.  In Study 1, 
participants were exposed to information in favour of governmental conspiracy theories (e.g., 
that the British government were involved in the death of Princess Diana) or anti-conspiracy 
material arguing in favour of WKHPDLQVWUHDPDFFRXQWHJ3ULQFHVV'LDQD¶VGHDWKZDV
simply a tragic accident), before indicating their intention to engage in politics in the future 
(e.g., their intention to vote in the next election).  Results demonstrated that people who were 
exposed to pro-conspiracy information indicated less intention to engage in the political 
system relative to those exposed to information refuting conspiracy claims ± an effect 
mediated by increased feelings of political powerlessness.   
Using a similar experimental design, Study 2 tested the impact of climate change 
conspiracy theories on pro-environmental intentions.  Participants were exposed to 
information in favour of climate change conspiracy theories (e.g., arguing that climate change 
is a hoax) or information arguing against climate conspiracy claims.  We also included a 
control condition where participants read no information.  Participants were then asked to 
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indicate their intention to take action toward reducing their carbon footprint (e.g., using 
energy-efficiency as a selection criterion when buying a light bulb or household appliance).  
Results demonstrated that people who were exposed to climate change conspiracy 
information showed less intention to engage in pro-environmental behaviours, relative to the 
other conditions.  This effect was explained by increased feelings of powerlessness, 
disillusionment, mistrust and uncertainty.  
,Q6WXG\ZHDOVRPHDVXUHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQWHQWLRQWRHQJDJHLQWKH political system 
and their feelings of political powerlessness.  In doing so, we aimed to explore whether a 
conspiracy theory that does not explicitly accuse the government can also lead to political 
disengagement.   Results demonstrated that people who were exposed to climate change 
conspiracy theories also indicated less intention to engage with the political system (i.e., they 
indicated that they would be less likely to vote), relative to the other conditions ± an effect 
again explained by feelings of political powerlessness.  This research points to the possibility 
that conspiracy theorising may form part of a political mindset ± a set of beliefs that are 
associated with political suspicion and disbelief of official explanations.  Wood et al. (2012) 
found that people are inclined to believe even contradictory conspiracy theories as long as 
WKH\DUHVXSSRUWHGE\WKHQRWLRQRIDQRYHUDUFKLQJµFRYHUXS¶ Political cynicism may also 
form a fundamental basis of conspiracy theorising.  Along the same lines, Imhoff and Bruder 
(2014) argue that conspiracy theories can be seen as a generalised political attitude.  Our 
results therefore provide support that exposure to conspiracy theories may be associated with 
a political mindset related to political beliefs and intentions.  
In Chapter 3, we aimed to explore the consequences of belief in, and exposure to, 
anti-vaccine conspiracy theories.  Previous anecdotal evidence has indicated that anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories may have detrimental consequences for vaccination uptake.  In Study 3, 
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we presented the first empirical test that aimed to examine the potential association between 
belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and vaccination intentions.  It was found that 
participants who indicated higher beliefs in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories showed less 
intention to vaccinate a fictional child ± an effect mediated by the perception that vaccines 
are dangerous, mistrust, powerlessness and disillusionment.  The aim of Study 4 was to 
confirm the casual pathway between conspiracy theories and vaccine uptake.  We exposed 
participants to either information in favour of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, information 
critical of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, or a control condition where no information was 
presented.  Compared to the other two conditions, participants who were exposed to pro-
conspiracy information showed a reduced intention to vaccinate.  This effect was again 
mediated by the perception that vaccines are dangerous, mistrust, powerlessness and 
disillusionment.  Overall, these studies suggest that anti-vaccine conspiracy theories may 
XQGHUPLQHSHRSOH¶VFRQILGHQFHLQYDFFLQDWLRQ%HOLHILQDQGH[SRVXUHWRDQWL-vaccine 
conspiracy theories may therefore be an obstacle to vaccine uptake. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, we have shown that exposure to conspiracy theories appear to 
subvert or undermine important social systems, mainly because conspiracy theories make 
people feel that their actions will not make a difference.  If people do not vote, take action 
against climate change or vaccinate their children, then this could have detrimental 
consequences on society.  Conspiracy theories may damage the social systems that are 
needed for society to function.  Importantly therefore, conspiracy theories may be in conflict 
with the important social-psychological need of system justification.  System justification 
theory argues that people are motivated to maintain a positive view of the social system 
rather than subvert it (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & Thompson, 
2000).  Threats to the fairness of social systems cause people to defend, bolster or rationalise 
the status quo (Jost et al., 2004).  To explore this possibility further, we examined in Chapter 
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4 whether conspiracy theories may either uphold or undermine the social status quo.  One 
prediction is that people may endorse conspiracy theories because whilst they may undermine 
the social status quo, conspiracy theories could be a substitute route to meet important needs 
such as power and control (Abalakina-Paap, et al., 1999; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) when 
system justification is unattainable.  An alternative prediction is that conspiracy theories may 
actually bolster the perceived legitimacy of the social status quo.  Conspiracy theories give 
believers someone to blame instead of impersonal or abstract forces (Goertzel, 2010), which 
GHIOHFWVEODPHIRUVRFLHW\¶VSUREOHPVRQWRDVPDOOQXPEHURISHRSOH,QRWKHUZRUGV, 
conspiracy theories may bolster satisfaction with the status quo because they explain 
troubling events as the actions of a small group of conspirators rather than problems inherent 
in society as a whole.   
In performing this system justifying function, however, conspiracy may not only force 
people to disengage with important social systems but stop people from addressing the 
limitations of their society as a whole.  Conspiracy theories may therefore prevent people 
from engaging with important aspects of society that are necessary for society to function 
effectively whilst appearing to mask some of the deeper limitations of society.  This system-
justifying function may cause people to uphold unfair social systems because when system 
justification beliefs increase, feelings of moral outrage, guilt and frustration are reduced (Jost 
& Hunyady, 2005; Wakslak, Jost, & Chen, 2007).  This suggests that by reducing emotional 
distress in people, the system-justifying function shrinks the demands for social change to 
perceived injustices or inequalities that are present in society (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; 
Wakslak, et al., 2007).  Put differently, because people do not feel as outraged, guilty or 
frustrated by issues such as gender inequality, the demand for change is lessened.  The 
system-justifying function of conspiracy theories may therefore similarly reduce feelings of 
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moral outrage, guilt and frustration, which shrinks the demands for social change.  In a series 
of studies in Chapter 4, the system-justifying function of conspiracy theories was tested. 
In Study 5, we aimed to provide an initial test of the association between satisfaction 
with the status quo and conspiracy theories.  Results demonstrated that those who endorsed 
conspiracy theories to a greater extent were more satisfied with the social system.  We argue 
that this is because conspiracy theories perform a system-justifying function that allows 
people to maintain a positive view of society.  Conspiracy theories therefore appear to uphold 
the status quo rather than subvert it.  In Study 6, we manipulated the motive to justify the 
social system by having participants read a paragraph stating that British society is unsafe and 
insecure (system threat) vs. safe and secure (system affirming).  By using such a 
manipulation, we aimed to investigate the relationship between satisfaction with the status 
quo and belief in conspiracy theories (Study 5), by examining whether belief in conspiracy 
theories responds to system threat.  Results showed that people who were exposed to system 
threat indicated a higher level of belief in conspiracy theories relative to those in the system 
affirming condition.  Conspiracy theories were therefore found to increase when the 
legitimacy of the social system was threatened.  This further supports the idea that conspiracy 
theories may perform a system-justifying function for people.  
 The aim of Study 7 was to provide a direct test of the system-justifying function of 
conspiracy theories.  In this study we aimed to provide a more stringent test of the system-
justifying function of conspiracy theories because in Study 6 the results do not necessarily 
demonstrate that conspiracy theories help defend the system from threat.  Conspiracy theories 
could have just been alternative routes to the satisfaction of psychological needs such as 
control (cf. Whitson et al., in press) after being exposed to threat.  We therefore measured 
SHRSOH¶VV\VWHP-justifying beliefs as a function of both system threat and exposure to 
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conspiracy theories.  System threat was manipulated (threat vs. affirm) and participants were 
also exposed to conspiracy theories (vs. control).  In the conspiracy condition, we exposed 
participants to conspiracy theories about the death of Princess Diana.  Results demonstrated 
that under conditions of system threat, participants reported the status quo as more legitimate 
after exposure to conspiracy theories.  In other words, exposure to conspiracy theories in the 
context of threat to the social order allowed people to maintain the belief the social system in 
which they live is legitimate and fair.  Exposure to conspiracy theories therefore buffered the 
effect of the system threat manipulation and allowed people to preserve their sense that the 
social system is legitimate.  
In Study 8, we aimed to test our proposed mechanism to explain why conspiracy 
theories perform a system-justifying function for people.  We propose that this process is 
explained by blaming the causes of social problems on the actions of a small few; conspiracy 
theories may therefore divert attention from the inherent limitations of social systems.  We 
tested this mechanism by first exposing all participants to system threat then conspiracy 
theories (vs. control).  Participants were then asked to rate the extent to which they believed 
that various social problems (e.g., pollution, inequality) were due to the actions of individuals 
or fundamental flaws in society.  Participants who were threatened and exposed to conspiracy 
theories (vs. control) indicated greater satisfaction with the status quo ± an effect mediated by 
the perception that individuals are responsible for social problems.  Therefore, by describing 
social events as the actions of isolated groups, conspiracy theories may allow people to 
maintain the belief that the social system is safe and secure. 
Conspiracy theories can be viewed as attempts to undermine or subvert social systems 
as they highlight inconsistencies or ambiguities in official accounts (e.g., Clarke, 2002; 
Fenster, 1999; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007).  In providing evidence of this assertion, we found 
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that when people are exposed to conspiracy theories this reduced the likelihood of people 
engaging with the political system, taking action against climate change and vaccinating 
children.  However, whilst conspiracy theories may subvert and undermine confidence in 
important social systePVWKH\LURQLFDOO\GRQRWXQGHUPLQHSHRSOH¶VRYHUDOOVHQVHWKDWVRFLDO
systems are fair and appropriate.  Instead, conspiracy theories appear to bolster satisfaction 
with the social system because they explain troubling events as the actions of a small group 
of conspirators rather than problems inherent in society as a whole.   The research described 
in this thesis has therefore demonstrated some of the potential dangers of conspiracy theories.  
They may not only stop people from engaging with important aspects of society, but they can 
be a way of justifying rather than addressing the limitations of social systems.  With this in 
mind, it is important to consider ways to address the potential impact of conspiracy theories 
on engagement with important aspects of society that enable society to function.   
In Chapter 5, we therefore aimed to address the potential detrimental consequences of 
conspiracy theories impacting important social systems.  Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) were 
the first to recommend the use of anti-conspiracy arguments as a tool to address conspiracy 
theories.  In Chapters 2 and 3, we have previously used counter-arguments in our 
investigations; however, they were only used as a comparison tool when assessing the impact 
of the pro-conspiracy arguments.  For this purpose therefore, we did not examine the 
effectiveness of counter-arguments as an intervention tool but instead they were only used to 
compare differences between pro-conspiracy arguments and anti-conspiracy arguments on 
behavioural intentions.  In Study 9, we therefore aimed to investigate the usefulness of anti-
conspiracy arguments as a means to lessen the impact of conspiracy theories on intentions to 
engage with important social activities.   
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In Study 9, we investigated the impact of anti-conspiracy arguments as a means to 
attenuate the effects of anti-YDFFLQHFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVRQSHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQVWRYDFFLQDWHD
fictional child.  The order in which participants were presented with both pro-conspiracy 
conspiracy theories and anti-conspiracy arguments was varied.  We also exposed some 
participants to conspiracy information and anti-conspiracy arguments in the absence of each 
other.  Further, a control condition was included where no further information was given.  
Results demonstrated that whenever conspiracy information was presented, this information 
had more impact on behavioural intentions than material that argued against conspiracy 
theories.   Participants who were exposed to conspiracy theories in any order indicated a 
lesser intention to vaccinate a fictional child ± an effect explained by belief in conspiracy 
theories and the perception that vaccines are dangerous.  This study suggests that the use of 
anti-conspiracy arguments that oppose conspiracy theories may not be a successful avenue 
for intervention.  
In Study 10, we therefore aimed to strengthen the anti-conspiracy material in order to 
make the conspiracy theories less persuasive.  Specifically, we used a technique that involved 
giving people a pre-warning that detailed the persistent influence of retracted information 
before being presented with pro-conspiracy and anti-conspiracy arguments.  In this study we 
tested the prediction that giving people a warning may make them more vigilant to the 
information they are presented and thus consider all pieces of information presented to them 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  We predicted that this would lead to the participants being less 
persuaded by the conspiracy theory account.  Therefore, in Study 10, people were first given 
a specific warning that detailed the tendency for people to rely on retracted information (vs. a 
general warning or a control), before being exposed to conspiracy theories, followed by 
counter-arguments.  Results demonstrated that there were no differences between any of the 
conditions.  Being provided with a specific or general warning did not lessen the impact of 




results of Studies 9 and 10 therefore suggest that conspiracy theories may be resistant to 
correction.  Tools that are successful in eliciting attitude change in other domains did not 
attenuate the impact of conspiracy theories on behavioural intentions.  Although further 
research is required, these results suggest that established attitude change interventions might 
therefore not be a successful tool to address the impact of conspiracy theories.   
Implications of the current research 
The research outlined in this thesis has found that exposure to conspiracy theories 
may stop people from engaging with important aspects society such as voting, vaccination 
and reducing their carbon footprint.   Ironically however, whilst conspiracy theories 
undermine confidence in particular social systems, they do not undermine pHRSOH¶VRYHUDOO
sense that the social systems are fair and legitimate.  In doing so, conspiracy theories may 
consequently mask some of the deeper limitations of society.  This highlights the potential 
dangers of conspiracy theories, as they may not only undermine confidence in particular 
social systems but be a way for people to justify unfairness within societies.  Moreover, once 
exposed to conspiracy theories, their effects might be difficult to counteract.  In the final 
studies outlined in this thesis, conspiracy theories were shown to be resistant to correction.  
Taken together, the findings outlined in this thesis demonstrate that conspiracy theories 
cannot necessarily be dismissed as trivial.  In the next section, we highlight some of the 
significant implications of this research.  
Consequences of conspiracy theories 
The literature to date exploring the psychology of conspiracy theories has not 
provided empirical evidence that conspiracy theories have any direct consequences for 
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individuals or societies.  For example, whilst work conducted by Bogart and colleagues 
(Bogart & Thorburn, 2006; Bogart, Wagner, Galvan, & Banks, 2010; Bogart, Galvan, 
Wagner, & Klein, 2011) have shown an association between belief in conspiracy theories and 
risky behaviours such as lack of condom use, the causal pathway is not clear.  For example, 
belief in conspiracy theories may lead to heighted risky behaviours, or alternatively, those 
who engage in more risky behaviours may also be more likely to endorse conspiracy theories.   
Our work, for the first time, has utilised experimental methods to explore the causal pathway 
between exposure to conspiracy theories and behavioural intentions.  We have shown that 
exposure to conspiracy theories can undermine SHRSOH¶Vconfidence in the social systems that 
are required for society to function effectively.  
Across the studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3, we have contributed to scientific 
knowledge on the effects of conspiracy theories on social, political and health-related 
intentions (Butler et al., 1995; Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Swami et al., 2013).  We have shown 
that exposure to conspiracy theories not only changes the way people think about events, but 
DOVRLQIOXHQFHVSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRXUDOLQWHQWLRQVWRHQJDJHLQSROLWLFVWRUHGXFHWheir carbon 
footprint, and to vaccinate children against disease.  The possibility that conspiracy theories 
may influence other behaviours is also likely.  For example, conspiracy theories may reduce 
support for the Royal Family by increasing negativity towards them being a part of British 
society and also worsen relations between different groups of people by increasing levels of 
prejudice and ambivalent stereotypes.  Our research highlights that conspiracy theories are 
not trivial notions and should therefore not be taken lightly.  Ultimately, conspiracy theories 
may have the potential to influence a wide range of behavioural outcomes.  Everyday 
exposure to conspiracy information may therefore have significant consequences and it is 
therefore vital that individuals have the skills and ability to differentiate between accurate 
information and information derived from conspiracy theorising. 
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However, this is not always simple.  For example, Bartlett and Miller (2011) showed 
WKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VDELOLW\WRUHFRJQLVH bias and verify sources on the Internet (as rated by their 
teachers) is fairly limited.  Therefore, if people are unable to recognise bias in Internet 
articles and thus freely accept conspiracy theories as fact, everyday exposure to conspiracy 
theories could lead to disengagement from important aspects of society that people rely on in 
their everyday lives.  Our research therefore speaks to the importance of developing 
interventions that can tackle conspiracy theories in society.  Without further consideration 
being given to conspiracy theories by psychologists, everyday exposure to conspiracy 
theories may result in people continuing to disengage from important societal issues.  
The number of people voting in elections and taking action against climate change is 
decreasing around the world (e.g., Fiorina, 2002; Leiserowitz, 2003).  Moreover, despite 
VFLHQWLVWV¶FDOOVIRUXUJHQWDFWLRQFOLPDWHFKDQJHKDVVOLSSHGWRWKHERWWRPRIWKHOLVWRI
American priorities, with a further poll in 2009 indicating that 41% of American respondents 
believe the environment is actually getting better (Paw Research Center, 2009; Silver, 2009).  
Our research therefore suggests that decreased engagement with important social systems 
could be due, in part, to how widespread conspiracy theories are in society (Swami & Coles, 
2010).   
The empirical work in this thesis has also shown that exposure to conspiracy theories 
may stop people from engaging with aspects of society that are needed for society to 
function, mainly because they feel powerless that their actions will not make a difference.  
Specifically, throughout Chapters 2 and 3 we measured feelings of powerlessness in different 
forms such as people perceiving that their vote will not influence politics (Study 1), ability to 
prevent climate change (Study 2) or alter health outcomes (Studies 3 and 4).  Throughout 
these studies, we have therefore demonstrated that exposure to conspiracy theories can 




social systems.  This extends our understanding of the association between conspiracy 
theories and powerlessness as previously only correlational associations have been 
demonstrated (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  Our data provides evidence that powerlessness 
could be a direct response of being exposed to conspiracy theories.  It is plausible to suggest 
however, that a reciprocal relationship may occur between belief in conspiracy theories and 
powerlessness.  Whilst some people may endorse conspiracy theories to reduce their feelings 
of powerlessness, our research demonstrates that exposure to conspiracy theories may also 
bring about feelings of powerlessness.   
System justification theory 
Our early findings suggest that conspiracy theories may subvert or undermine 
important social systems.  In support of this, we found conspiracy theories may stop people 
from engaging with important aspects of society, such as voting, taking action against climate 
change and vaccinating children.  However, conspiracy theories may not necessarily be 
completely subversive as we also found exposure to conspiracy theories did not decrease 
general satisfaction with social systems.  Instead, conspiracy theories appear to bolster 
satisfaction with the status quo because they explain troubling events as the actions of a small 
group of conspirators rather than problems inherent in society as a whole.  Our findings 
therefore support the theory that people are motivated to maintain a positive view of social 
systems (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & Thompson, 2000).  According to 
system justification theory, threats to the fairness or legitimacy of social system therefore 
cause people to defend, bolster or rationalise the status quo (e.g., Jost, et al., 2003).  
Proponents of the theory argue that this motivation comes from the desire to decrease any 
threat or anxiety that may arise from being part of a system that at times can be unfair (Jost & 
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Hunyady, 2002; Kay et al., 2009).  Across the studies presented in Chapter 4 therefore, we 
have contributed to scientific knowledge by demonstrating that conspiracy theories may be a 
means to defend the current status quo. 
To the list of other system-justifying processes, we can therefore add conspiracy 
theories as a means to defend the current social system.  For example, people may use 
stereotypes to justify status differences between groups of people (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; 
Jost, 2001; Napier, Mandisodza, Andersen, & Jost, 2006) and engage in outgroup favouritism 
to preserve the legitimacy of the existing social system (Jost & Hunyady, 2002).  Other 
ideologies and belief systems can also be used to satisfy this motivation such as belief in a 
just world, benevolent sexism and political conservatism (Jost & Hunyady, 2005).  Belief in 
conspiracy theories may therefore perform a similar function for people.   
Under conditions of social anxiety and uncertainty surrounding a significant event 
such as the death of Princess Diana, people are eager for explanations (Reid, 2010).  Such 
significant events can also threaten our perceptions of fairness in society.  We have shown, 
for the first time, that conspiracy theories may therefore not only address feelings of anxiety 
and uncertainty (e.g., van Prooijen, 2012), but can allow people to fulfil the motivation to 
perceive the system in which they live as fair and legitimate.  By blaming significant events 
on a malign few, conspiracy theories can allow people to affirm the perception that society 
overall is fair.  Moreover, previous experimental evidence examining system justification 
theory has mainly focused on stereotyping behaviours and relations between groups (e.g., 
Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & Kay, 2005).  In the current thesis, we found that exposure to 
system threat and conspiracy theories increased satisfaction with the status quo.  Our research 
therefore provides further empirical support to system justification theory by demonstrating 
that people may use conspiracy theories as a way to maintain a positive view of society when 
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threatened.  In summary, the present results support the theory that people are motivated to 
justify the current status quo.  By endorsing conspiracy theories when social systems are 
threatened, conspiracy theories may be another mechanism in how people can maintain an 
overall sense that social systems are fair and appropriate.      
Addressing the consequences of conspiracy theories 
Across Chapters 2, 3 and 4, we have highlighted the potential dangers of conspiracy 
theories, as they may not only make people engage less, but actually may mask some of the 
deeper limitations of society.  To date however, there has been limited empirical work that 
aimed to combat the effects of conspiracy theories.  Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) were the 
first to recommend a number of different potential avenues to address the effects of 
conspiracy theories, such as the use of anti-conspiracy arguments.  Recently Banas and Miller 
(2013) have empirically explored this suggestion by examining whether anti-conspiracy 
arguments can attenuate the impact of exposure to conspiracy theories RQFKDQJLQJSHRSOH¶V
attitudes.  To test this, the authors asked people to watch a 40-minute chapter from the 9/11 
Truth conspiracy theory film, Loose Change: Final Cut before they were exposed to anti-
conspiracy arguments.   Results revealed that people¶V belief that the United States 
government participated in a conspiracy to perpetrate the attack on 9/11 was reduced when 
exposed to anti-conspiracy arguments.  Our work however, for the first time, investigated the 
impact of anti-conspiracy arguments on both beliefs and behavioural intentions.  We found 
that whilst exposure to anti-conspiracy information reduced beliefs in conspiracy theories, 
anti-conspiracy arguments did not improve intentions to vaccinate a fictional child in 
comparison to the control condition.  Our research therefore adds to scientific knowledge by 
demonstrating that conspiracy theories may actually be difficult to counteract even when 
using the recommendation by Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) of anti-conspiracy information. 
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It is possible however to potentially strengthen the anti-conspiracy information.  In 
the final study of the thesis therefore, we examined the effectiveness of strengthening the 
anti-conspiracy information by using techniques that have been shown to elicit attitude 
change in other domains (see Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  Specifically, participants were 
given a warning explaining that people tend to rely on information even when it has been 
retracted, before they were asked to read pro-conspiracy and anti-conspiracy arguments.  The 
novel idea behind this method was that the warning may induce a temporary state of 
skepticism, which may mean the person would be more likely to consider all the information 
presented in front of them (Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  This technique however was also 
found to be ineffective in strengthening the anti-conspiracy argument, and thus lessening the 
impact of conspiracy theories on vaccination intentions.  Our research therefore highlights for 
the first time, that once the very idea of a conspiracy has taken root, even tools that have been 
shown to be successful in eliciting attitude change in other domains may be unsuccessful in 
lessening the impact of conspiracy theories on vaccination uptake.  
Across the studies presented in Chapter 5 therefore, we tested two methods to address 
the impact of conspiracy theories on behavioural intentions.  However, our research 
demonstrated that an approach that uses anti-conspiracy arguments may not be a quick fix to 
intervene upon anti-vaccine conspiracy theories.  Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) did note that 
conspiracy theories may be extremely resistant to correction.  They suggest that conspiracy 
theorists may be suspicious of the anti-conspiracy arguments because they may believe the 
conspirators are just trying to cover their tracks.  The empirical evidence providing support 
for Sunstein and 9HUPHXOH¶V(2009) assertion that conspiracy theories may be tricky to 
attenuate is perhaps therefore not too surprising.   
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 Our finding that conspiracy theories may potentially be difficult to attenuate is also 
consistent with the notion that misinformation does tend to be resistant to correction 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  Lewandowsky et al. (2012) suggested that once a piece of 
misinformation has been accepted to be true, it is highly resistant to change.  For example, in 
courtroom settings Fein, McCloskey and Tomlinson (1997) found that jurors who were asked 
to disregard a piece of inadmissible evidence were still influenced by the retracted evidence 
despite claiming they were not.  Our research therefore further supports the notion that 
misinformation tends to be resistant to correction. 
In summary, this thesis has extended scientific knowledge examining the effects of 
misinformation.  We found that even using typical attitude change interventions, the effects 
of conspiracy theories persist.  This further supports the notion that misinformation is 
resistant to correction (Lewandowsky, et al., 2012).  Our research has also provided the first 
GLUHFWWHVWRI6XQVWHLQDQG9HUPHXOH¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQIRUDGGUHVVLQJFRQVSLUDF\
theories on behavioural intentions.  This research opens up a new line of research 
investigating how to intervene on the impact of conspiracy theories.   
Applications of the current research 
Conspiracy theories have been shown to negatively influence the likelihood that 
people will engage with important social systems.  We have also found that once people have 
been exposed to conspiracy theories, their effects are difficult to attenuate.  In this section, we 
discuss how the findings from this thesis may be applied to address public disengagement 
with important pro-social behaviours.  
The key application of this thesis is to illustrate to officials and policy makers that 
conspiracy theorising could be a factor that is contributing to the decline in engagement with 
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numerous important social systems (e.g., Fiorina, 2002; Leiserowitz, 2003).  For example, 
results from an American census of people who did not vote found that the reason was based 
on their perception that their vote would not make a difference (File & Crissey, 2010).  We 
know already that feelings of powerlessness are associated with belief in conspiracy theories 
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  Our research has furthered our understanding by 
demonstrating that powerlessness is also a response to being exposed to conspiracy theories 
(Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, see Chapter 2).  It is therefore plausible that the perception held by 
people that their vote would not make a difference could be a factor, in part, caused by 
conspiracy theories.  Therefore, officials and policy makers may not only need to improve 
SHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVWKDWWKHLUYRWHPDWWHUVEXWDOVRWDFNOHFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVWKDWPDy 
directly cause people to believe that their actions will not make a difference.  Our research 
therefore calls for officials to consider the influence of conspiracy theories when aiming to 
address decreasing voter turnout. 
Along a similar vein, our research also highlights the importance of taking into 
account conspiracy theorising when trying to tackle the declining number of people engaging 
in pro-environmental behaviours.  In Study 2, we demonstrated that conspiracy theories could 
potentially stop people from engaging with efforts to reduce their carbon footprint, such as 
using energy efficiently.  Providing people who endorse climate change conspiracy theories 
with information about how to reduce their carbon footprint (e.g., providing people with an 
energy-saving checklist or information about how best to recycle; Center for Research on 
Environmental Decisions, 2009) may go unnoticed for these people.  In other words, people 
who endorse conspiracy theories may feel like these behaviours do not require their attention, 
even when presented with contrary information, because they feel uncertain that climate 
change exists and that their actions will not make a difference for something that might not be 
happening.  In support of this view, scholars have found that uncertainty and powerlessness 
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are reasons provided for climate change inaction (e.g., Aitken, et al., 2011; Corner, 2014).  
Moreover, in our research we found that feelings of uncertainty and powerlessness were a 
direct response to exposure to conspiracy theories (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, see Chapter 2).  
Officials and policy makers may therefore not only need to address feelings of uncertainty 
and powerlessness, but also conspiracy theorising which may be an important barrier to 
people engaging in pro-environmental initiatives. 
In Studies 3 and 4 we also demonstrated that belief in, and exposure to, anti-vaccine 
FRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVFDQUHGXFHSHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQVWRYDFFLQDWHDILFWLRQDOFKLOG7KLVZRUN
empirically demonstrates, for the first time, that anti-vaccine conspiracy theories may present 
an obstacle to vaccine uptake.  Similarly with voter turnout and pro-environmental initiatives, 
one of the primary applications of this work relates to informing attempts to increase 
vaccination uptake.  Anti-vaccine conspiracy theories reflect suspicion and mistrust of 
scientific research examining vaccine efficacy and safety.  Moreover, conspiracist ideation 
has been found to be associated with a mistrust of science such as the rejection of climate 
science (Lewandowsky, et al., 2013a).  Along the same lines, distrust of medical information 
has been linked to reluctance to vaccinate (Kata, 2010).  In our research, we have found that a 
feeling of mistrust is associated with belief in, and exposure to, anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b, see Chapter 3).  Therefore, a policy that involves a 
meeting with a health care professional in order to tackle decreasing vaccine uptake (e.g., 
Fine-Goulden, 2010) may not be successful for parents who hold anti-vaccine conspiracy 
beliefs due to their suspicion and mistrust of scientific research.  Policy makers and officials 
therefore must not only take into account mistrust of scientific research but also addressing 
conspiracy theories when aiming to address deceasing vaccine uptake. 
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In each of the different behavior domains therefore, the consistent application of our 
work is that conspiracy theorising should be taken into account when considering ways to 
tackle disengagement with these important societal issues.  This opens the question of how 
best to deal with conspiracy theories.  This thesis has also demonstrated however, that once 
people have been exposed to conspiracy theories, their effects are difficult to attenuate.  
Specifically, we have shown that providing people with anti-conspiracy arguments and a pre-
warning about the persistent effects of misinformation did not attenuate the impact of 
conspiracy theories.  Therefore, providing information about why someone should recycle to 
help reduce their carbon footprint or asking parents to attend a meeting with health care 
professional to discuss the benefits of vaccination may be unsuccessful for those who endorse 
conspiracy theories.  Instead, providing this information may be ignored because people who 
endorse conspiracy theories may be suspicious of the information being planted to cover the 
tracks of the conspirators and thus discredit it (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). 
Our empirical finding also supports an assertion by Kata (2010) who argued, ³JLYHn 
>WKH@ODFNRIWUXVW>FRQFHUQLQJYDFFLQHV@SURYLGLQJPRUH³HGXFDWLRQ´ZLOOEHLQHIIHFWLYH´S
1714).  Specifically, in our research, we found that feelings of mistrust were a direct response 
of exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b, see Chapter 3).  
Future research should therefore examine strengthening the anti-conspiracy message with the 
aim of attenuating feelings of mistrust caused by exposure to conspiracy theories, which may 
subsequently improve vaccination uptake.  For example, a strengthened anti-conspiracy 
message could argue against the conspiracy account and not just present the anti-conspiracy 
argument (cf. Gass & Seiter, 2010).  In practice for example, during a health care meeting, 
the health professional could address the anti-vaccine conspiracy theory and provide explicit 
refuting information for varying points of the conspiracy argument.  By engaging in an open 
dialogue, this may help reduce the suspicion that the material has merely been planted and 
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thus the effects of the conspiracy theory on feelings of mistrust, and subsequent vaccination 
intentions may be attenuated.  This approach will therefore also provide the person with more 
³HGXFDWLRQ´FRQFHUQLQJYDFFLQDWLRQZKLOVWDWWKHVDPHWLPHDGGUHVVLQJWKHLr feelings of 
mistrust. 
As noted in a report by the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions (2009), 
WKHUHLVQR³RQH-size-fits-DOO´DSSURDFKWRFRPPXQLFDWLQJLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWFOLPDWHFKDQJH 
(p. 44).  This assertion could also be applied to techniques that aim to address getting people 
involved in the political system and vaccinating their children.  As there is no approach that 
fits all, it is important that interventions are therefore developed that aim to tackle conspiracy 
theories.  If such interventions are not developed, the potential detrimental effects of 
conspiracy theories may continue to persist.  An approach such as explicitly arguing against 
conspiracy theories could therefore be a tool that policy makers and officials could use when 
aiming to tackle declining engagement in important social systems that may be due to 
SHRSOH¶VEHOLHI in conspiracy theories.  
In summary, this thesis has highlighted the potential detrimental impact of belief in, 
and exposure to, conspiracy theories.  If someone is not taking action to reduce their carbon 
footprint or vaccinating their children against harmful diseases, this may have detrimental 
consequences for us all.  It is therefore important for officials and policy makers to take into 
account conspiracy theorising, and more importantly how best to deal with these alternative 
viewpoints when aiming to address disengagement with a variety of important societal issues.   
Limitations and future directions 
Like any other programme of research, the current work has several limitations that 
may be addressed in future investigations.  A primary limitation is the use of self-reported 




a fictional child.  It is widely known that intentions do not always lead to real behaviours.  
Empirical research on attitude-EHKDYLRXULQFRQVLVWHQFLHVFDQEHWUDFHGEDFNWR/D3LHUH¶V
(1934) classic study on racial prejudice.  It was found that when a Chinese couple visited 
more than 250 restaurants, coffee shops and hotels, they received service 95% of the time 
without hesitation.  However, in response to a letter of inquiry, 92% of the establishments 
replied saying they would not accept members of the Chinese race.   Further, Sheeran (2002) 
found that between 26-57% of respondents failed to carry out their intention to use condoms, 
to undergo a cancer screening, or to exercise, despite stating this on a self-report measure.  It 
is therefore necessary to note that whilst conspiracy theories may reduce intentions to vote, 
YDFFLQDWHDQGUHGXFHRQH¶VFDUERQIRRWSULQWWKHUHLVQRJXDUDQWHHWKDWWKLVZRXOGOHDGRQWR
actual behavioural changes.  Further investigation is needed to examine the direct 
FRQVHTXHQFHVRIFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVRQSHRSOH¶VLQWentions and behaviours.  For example, 
within a controlled setting, participants could be exposed to conspiracy theories before being 
asked to sign up or donate money to an environmental group.  This would help to establish 
whether conspiracy theories do bring about changes in behaviour and not just changes in 
attitudes or intentions.  
Similarly, in Studies 3, 4, 9 and 10, participants were presented with a fictional 
disease called dysomeria whose symptoms could result in fever and vomiting, before being 
asked to indicate their intention to have a fictional child vaccinated.  However, the bulk of 
infant vaccines are developed for much more serious illnesses (e.g., HBV, DTaP, IPV), and 
as such, the consequences of vaccine refusal are much more serious.  This relatively benign 
choice for an invented disease that concerns only symptoms such as fever and vomiting as 
opposed to life threatening consequences could have affected the participants' responses.  In 
future research therefore, parents¶ beliefs in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories could be 
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measured before indicating whether their children have received vaccinations against more 
significant harmful diseases.  Whilst this would provide an indication to the impact of 
conspiracy theories on real vaccination behaviors, determining cause and effect would not be 
possible.   
In order to explore the direct impact of conspiracy theories on vaccination uptake 
parents could be exposed to conspiracy theories before their real behavioral outcomes are 
measured.  Although this approach is likely to reveal the most reliable evidence of the impact 
of conspiracy theories on vaccination behaviour, ethical considerations would obviously 
prevent such a study from being conducted.  Alternatively, a longitudinal design could be 
utilized.  Parents could indicate their belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories over a period 
of time leading up to the recommended age for a child to have a particular vaccination (e.g., 
between 12 and 13 months is the recommend age for a child to have the MMR vaccine; NHS, 
2014).  After the recommended vaccination period has passed, parents could be asked to 
indicate whether their child had been vaccinated.  Therefore, due to the scope of the 
longitudinal design, the study is more likely to suggest cause-and-effect than a cross-sectional 
study. 
Another limitation of the present research relates to the sizes of the effects observed.  
In all of the studies, whilst the effect sizes were robust, they were quite small (e.g., Ș2 = .05 
for the effect of vaccine information on vaccination intentions in Study 8; Cohen, 1977).  In 
the case of Study 8, this indicates there are undoubtedly other factors that contribute to 
parents¶ vaccination decisions other than conspiracy theories.  For example, socioeconomic 
status (SES), education or personal vaccination history may act as moderators or mediators in 
the observed relationships.  Nonetheless, our research highlights the impact that exposure to 
conspiracy theories can have on vaccination intentions.  For most vaccines, such as the MMR 
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vaccine, the desired level of herd immunity is 95%, so even small decreases in vaccination 
uptake can have a significant impact.  Therefore, whilst the effects demonstrated across the 
thesis may be fairly small statistically, conspiracy theories may still have an important role to 
play in parents¶ decisions to vaccinate or not to vaccinate their children. 
Similarly, the effects shown in the current research could be moderated by several 
other contributing IDFWRUV:KLOVWZHLQFOXGHGPHDVXUHVRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶DJHDQGJHQGHU
other potentially important factors were not considered.  For example, in Study 8 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVFRXOGKDYHEHHQDIIHFWHGE\DQXPEHURIIDFWRUVZKLFKZHUHQRW
considered in the analyses including: i) personal vaccination history, ii) history of vaccinating 
their own children, iii) time since child's last vaccination, iv) SES, v) participant education, 
and possibly other factors.  These factors may have made the impact of exposure to anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories more or less pronounced for some people.  For example, a parent 
who has had recent experience of vaccination that has had no adverse reactions may be less 
susceptible to the viewpoint that evidence concerning the success of vaccines is forged.  
Future research should therefore take in to account such factors when measuring the impact 
of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories.  
Further, whilst a variety of samples were recruited, consisting of both British students 
and community samples such as British UK parents (Study 3) and U.S. citizens (Study 8), all 
participants were recruited from Western cultures.  Therefore, the effects shown here may not 
be replicated across different cultures.  For example, belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories was seen to reduce vaccination intentions in a British (Study 3) and American (Study 
4) sample, but it is unclear whether this finding may apply in other countries.  Lechuga, 
Swain, and Weinhardt (2011) found that predictors of vaccination intentions varied cross-
culturally due to variations in social norms.  Similarly, culture could therefore moderate the 
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influence of conspiracy theories on intentions.  Conducting an international survey exploring 
the impact of conspiracy theories on vaccination behaviours would enable direct comparisons 
to be made between different cultures.  Further, the belief that HIV was manufactured in a 
laboratory is widespread among African Americans, and is associated with increased risky 
behaviours such as lack of condom use (Bird & Bogart, 2003; Bogart & Thorburn, 2006).  
Future research could examine the extent to which this conspiracy theory generalises to other 
groups, enabling researchers to further understand whether the consequences of conspiracy 
theories may be culture dependant.   
Moreover, in Studies 7 and 8 British participants were asked to read a single excerpt 
that alleged a conspiracy was involved in the death of Princess Diana.   Across these two 
studies we found that being exposed to Princess Diana conspiracy theories buffered 
satisfaction with the status quo from threat.  However, it is not possible to conclude with 
confidence that the present result will generalise to other types of conspiracy theories or 
populations.  Another limitation relates to the methodology.  Throughout this thesis, we 
exposed people to conspiracy theories then immediately measured their belief in conspiracy 
theories.  In Chapters 2, 3 and 5, we then measured behavioural intention outcomes.  In 
Chapter 4, we measured particLSDQWV¶VDWLVIDFWLRQZLWKWKHVRFLDOVWDWXVTXR,QWKHSUHVHQW
data, therefore, it is not possible to conclude whether the impact of being exposed to 
conspiracy theories would endure for a longer period of time than the experimental session.  
Future research could therefore investigate the time period that exposure to conspiracy 
theories can be seen to influence behavioural outcomes, such as re-testing participants¶ 
intentions over a period of time.     
Further, across all studies, we found that belief in conspiracy theories tended to be 
around or below the midpoint.  For example, in Study 3 the mean anti-vaccine conspiracy 
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belief was 2.00 on a 7-point scale.  This shows that the participants recruited were not strong 
endorsers of conspiracy theories, meaning that different patterns of findings may emerge for 
those who do strongly endorse conspiracy theories.  However, where participants were 
exposed to conspiracy theories the conspiracy belief did rise above the midpoint (e.g., M = 
4.81 on a 7-point governmental conspiracy theory scale in Study 1, 4.11 and 4.47 on a 7-point 
anti-vaccine belief scale in Studies 4 and 9, respectively).  Therefore, taken together the 
current research suggests that the patterns shown for those who are weak and strong 
endorsers of conspiracy theories may actually be similar.  Specifically, both people who 
indicated a weak belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories (Study 3) and those who after 
exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories indicated a stronger belief (Studies 4 and 9) 
demonstrated a lesser intention to have a fictional child vaccinated. Nonetheless, future 
research could aim to recruit a sample that contains people who are strong and weak endorser 
of conspiracy theories in order to examine whether the relationship between conspiracy 
theories and reduced intentions to vaccinate is consistent for both types of respondents.  
Future research could also further explore this possibility with other types of conspiracy 
theories and behavioural outcomes, such as those concerning climate change conspiracy 
theories. 
Similarly, in Study 5 the mean belief in real world conspiracy theories was 3.00 (on 
a 7-point scale) and 2.56 for general notions of conspiracy (on a 7-point scale).   This also 
leaves open the plausible prospect that strong endorsers of conspiracy theories may radicalise 
political opinion and motivate social change (Uscinski & Parent, 2014), as opposed to 
bolstering the satisfaction with the current status quo.  Put differently, people who believe 
that corruption is present among several different elements of the social system may make it 
increasingly difficult for them to blame only a small number of LQGLYLGXDOVIRUVRFLHW\¶V
General discussion 198 
 
 
problems.  Future research could therefore also aim to recruit a sample that is strong 
endorsers of conspiracy theories to test this possibility.  
In Chapter 5, we also investigated two tools that may be used as interventions to 
combat the effects of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories on behavioural intentions.  We found 
that both a pre-warning and anti-conspiracy arguments were unsuccessful at lessening the 
impact of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories on intended vaccine uptake.  However, this effect 
may be due to a weakness in the anti-conspiracy material utilised in the study.  Previous 
research has shown that refuting information not only needs to provide opposing arguments, 
but argue against the misinformation (Gass & Seiter, 2010).  Therefore, the anti-conspiracy 
material being used in the present study could have been stronger.  A second limitation is that 
only one type of conspiracy theory was examined.  Anti-vaccine conspiracy theories may be 
particularly emotionally charged as they are aimed at parents and concern children, thus the 
conspiracy theory account could have been more persuasive than others such as UFO 
sightings.  Future research could therefore investigate the possibility that anti-conspiracy 
arguments being ineffective in addressing conspiracy theories is something peculiar to anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories.  To do this, future research could investigate the success of using 
anti-conspiracy arguments with an array of different conspiracy types and behavioural 
intentions (e.g., governmental, environmental).   
 In addition to the methodological refinements outlined above, the current research 
opens up several new lines of research.  Specifically, future research could further investigate 
the consequences of conspiracy theories for the individual and society, the social 
psychological needs they meet, and ways to address their potentially harmful consequences.   
For example, previous research has shown that exposure to conspiracy theories can change 
SHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVZLWKRXWWKHPEHLQJDZDUH'RXJODV	6XWWRQ,QWKLVWKHVLVZH
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have shown that exposure to conspiracy theories can potentially stop people from engaging 
with the political system, climate science and vaccinating children against diseases.   Future 
research could therefore examine whether exposure to conspiracy theories may not only 
LQIOXHQFHRQH¶VDWWLWXGHVZLWKRXW them being aware, but also negatively influence their 
behavioural intentions.  This type of future investigation may involve people being exposed 
WRFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVDQGWKHQUDWLQJWKHLURZQDQGRWKHU¶VLQWHQWLRQVWRHQJDJHLQLPSRUWDQW
aspects of society such as pro-environmental behaviours.   It is plausible to predict that 
people may rate their own attitudes and behavioural intention as being less influenced than 
others (Douglas & Sutton, 2008).  Such an empirical investigation could further support the 
evidence that conspiracy theories can have a hidden impact.   
&RQVSLUDF\WKHRULHV¶LQIOXHQFHXSRQRWKHUEHKDYLRXUDOGRPDLQVFRXOGDOVREH
examined.  For example, some people believe that members of the establishment were 
involved in the death of Princess Diana (e.g., see Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Wood et al., 2012) 
or that members of the Royal family are shape-shifting reptilian humanoids (Time, 2014).  
Endorsing such an alternative view-point may lead to people feel more negative towards to 
the Royal Family and be less favourable of them continuing to be part of British society.  A 
recent poll found that only 53% of British respondents felt that if Britain did not have the 
Royal family the British nation would be worse off, with the rest indicting that the British 
nation would actually be better off (14%), that it would not make a difference (23%) or that 
they did not know (10%, Hennessy, 2013).   It is plausible that conspiracy theories may 
therefore play a role in only just over half of respondents indicating that the British nation 
would be worse off.  This is therefore an important issue to further explore.  Future research 
could therefore examine whether belief in conspiracy theories may lead to the belief for 
example, that the Royal Family are no longer needed, thus further undermining an established 
social system.    
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Conspiracy theories could also influence attitudes towards groups of people and 
relations between groups.  For example, polls have shown that individuals of the Jewish faith 
are thought to be involved in important institutions, such as in banking institutions, including 
the theory that world banking is dominated by the Rothschild Family (Foxman, 2008; Levy, 
2005).  It is plausible that conspiracy theories could therefore influence attitudes held towards 
people of the Jewish faith.  Previous research has supported this possibility.  For example, 
Golec de Zavala and Cichocka (2012) found that belief in conspiracy theories about Jewish 
domination of the world were associated with anti-Semitic attitudes.  Other researchers have 
similarly found that conspiracy theories could be a way to express prejudice against a 
particular group (e.g., Barlow, et al., 2012; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014).   As this work however 
has only employed correlational designs, future research could examine the impact of 
exposure to conspiracy theories about certain groups on explicit and implicit levels of 
prejudice.  Such an investigation would help to uncover the impact that conspiracy theories 
may KDYHRQSHRSOH¶VSUHMXGLFHV towards other groups.  
It is also plausible to suggest that conspiracy theories may play an important role in 
determining perceptions of groups.  For example, some groups are seen as warm (but less 
competent; e.g., elderly, homosexuals) and others are seen as competent (but less warm; e.g., 
business people, Asians).  Others, however, are seen as both cold and incompetent (e.g., 
uneducated, poor) or warm and competent (e.g., heterosexuals, Whites; Fiske, 2012).  
Conspiracy theories concerning group of people such as theories that suggest people of the 
Jewish faith are involved in conspiracies, may impact ambivalent stereotypes held about 
those groups of people.  Future research could therefore examine whether people who 
endorse the idea that people of the Jewish faith are involved in conspiracies view Jewish 
people as competent, but less warm and people of other religions such as Christians as both 
competent and warm.  Such an investigation may also utilise experimental methods where 
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people are exposed to anti-Semitic conspiracy theories before indicting ambivalent 
stereotypes they hold for people from different groups (e.g., Jewish people, Christians).  Such 
a study will therefore allow us to examine whether conspiracy theories can influence not only 
attitudes and behavioural intentions, but also ambivalent stereotypes held about a group. 
Holding ambivalent stereotypes about social groups may also help people legitimate 
the status quo, and thus discourage people from challenging unequal systems (Durante, et al., 
2012; Jost & Kay, 2005).  In this thesis, conspiracy theories were also found to perform a 
similar system-justifying function for people.  If conspiracy theories are therefore able to 
LQIOXHQFHSHRSOH¶Vambivalent stereotypes held of social groups as proposed, ambivalent 
stereotypes may indirectly explain the relationship between conspiracy theories and 
satisfaction with the status quo.  Put differently, belief in conspiracy theories may impact 
ambivalent stereotypes held about a particular social group (e.g., people of the Jewish faith 
are seen as competent but less warm), which then may help people maintain the view that 
society is fair and legitimate.  In certain scenarios therefore, the system-justifying function of 
ambivalent stereotypes could be caused in part, by conspiracy theories.  Future research could 
test such a possibility by exposing people to anti-Semitic conspiracy theories before 
measuring their perceptions of groups and satisfaction with the status quo.   
Future research could also further examine the system-justifying function of 
FRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVE\H[DPLQLQJSHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVRILQHTXDOLW\ZLWKLQVRFLHW\6XFKD
scale as the Economic System Justification scale (Jost & Thompson, 2000) or the Gender-
specific System Justification scale (Jost & Kay, 2005) could be used to provide other more 
specific measures of system justification.  The aim of using these measures would to further 
test the system-justifying function of conspiracy theories.  One consequence of the motive to 
justify the current social system is that this may result in upholding unfair social systems.  
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This is because the system-justifying function decreases feelings of moral outrage, guilt and 
frustration (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Wakslak, et al., 2007).  This therefore means people are 
unlikely to demand social change because they do not feel as outraged, guilty or frustrated by 
it.  As conspiracy theories have been shown to perform a system-justifying function for 
people, this may inadvertently decrease emotional distress in people and consequently allow 
people to uphold unjust systems.  By employing other more specific measures of system 
justification, this possibility can be further explored.  Specifically, if conspiracy theories 
allow people to justify, rather than undermine the current social status quo, people may 
legitimise economic and gender inequality when exposed to conspiracy theories.  By 
performing such an empirical investigation that includes other specific measures, this will 
allow us to further examine the system-justifying function of conspiracy theories.  
Conspiracy theories may also help meet other important social-psychological needs.  
For example, it has been suggested that conspiracy theories allow people to maintain a sense 
of control and meaning (Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011).  With this in mind, conspiracy 
theories may help people cope with feelings of anxiety.  We know that under conditions of 
social anxiety and uncertainty, people are eager for explanations (cf. Reid, 2010).  It is 
possible that conspiracy theories allow people to meet this need and thus reduce feelings of 
anxiety and uncertainty (e.g., van Prooijen, 2012).  Such a possibility could be examined in 
IXWXUHUHVHDUFKZKHUHDSHUVRQ¶Vdegree of anxiety is measured after being exposed to 
conspiracy theories.  If conspiracy theories enable people to deal with anxiety, then levels of 
anxiety should reduce as a response to being exposed to conspiracy theories.  By examining 
other psychological needs that may be met by conspiracy theories a greater understanding of 
the function of conspiracy theories will be gained.    
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Whilst it is important for future research to examine the function of conspiracy 
theories, scholars also need to consider in future research how to address the potentially 
detrimental consequences of conspiracy theories (e.g., Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b, see 
Chapter 2 and 3).  In the current thesis, we found that even when people were presented with 
anti-conspiracy arguments and a pre-ZDUQLQJGHWDLOLQJSHRSOH¶VWHQGHQF\WR rely on retracted 
information, conspiracy theories may still be resistant to change.  It is therefore timely to 
examine ways to attenuate the impact of conspiracy theories.   One potential way, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, is to strengthen the anti-conspiracy arguments by making the material 
as equally interesting and controversial as the conspiracy theory account.  This material could 
then be integrated in the original conspiracy account and explicitly argue against the 
conspiracy theory (cf. Allen, 1991, 1993, 1998; Allen, et al., 1990; Johnson & Seifert, 1994, 
2¶.HHIH6XFKDVWUHQJWKHQHGFRXQWHU-argument could be tested as a means to 
combat the impact of conspiracy theories in future research.   
Rubincam (2014) suggests that people who subscribe to HIV and AIDS conspiracy 
theories may be open to learning more about the official explanation of the origins of HIV 
and AIDS.  This may mean therefore, that if anti-conspiracy can be strengthened as 
suggested, the use of such a tool for intervention may be successful in eliciting behaviour 
change.  Specifically, Rubincam IRXQGWKDW$IULFDQUHVSRQGHQWV¶EHOLHILQ+,9DQG$,'6
conspiracy theories is based not only on a lack of HIV knowledge, but because they do not 
understand the scientific explanations for HIV.  The participants pointed to ongoing 
confusion and uncertainty about the origins of the virus and the existence of a cure.  
Rubincam suggests that this uncertainty and confusion does not necessarily stem from 
rejection of the science, but more pHRSOH¶VVFHSWLFLVPof biomedical assertions.  She argues 
WKDWUHVHDUFKHUVVKRXOGWKHUHIRUHILUVWVWULYHWRUHFRQQHFWSHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQDQGWKHRIILFLDO
scientific claims in order to resolve confusion and increase their trust in biomedical claims.  
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MoreovHULQ5XELQFDP¶V sample the respondents indicated some flexibility and open-
mindedness to new information about HIV.  This research suggests that if the use of counter-
arguments can be strengthened, people who endorse HIV conspiracy theories may be open to 
considering this new information.   
Further, interventions to deal with conspiracy theories could focus on teaching people 
QHZVNLOOVVXFKDVµGLJLWDOOLWHUDF\¶Miller & Ryan, 2011).  It is known that conspiracy 
theories are distributed easily across digital channels, and are regularly featured within 
popular culture, such as in TV programs, films and books (see Byford, 2011).  It is also 
known that exposure to conspiracy theories can change the way people think without them 
being aware (Douglas & Sutton, 2008), and can potentially lead to disengagement from 
important elements of the social system (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b, see Chapters 2 and 
3).   It is therefore important for psychologists to deal with conspiracy theories that are 
distributed on the Internet.  One way, as recommended by Miller and Ryan (2011), is to teach 
traditional critical thinking and online knowledge in schools.  This may involve teaching 
\RXQJSHRSOHWKDWWRS³KLWV´LQDVHDUFKHQJLQHGRQRWPHDQWKH\DUHWKHPRVWWUXVWHGVRurces.  
Further, people could be taught to evaluate all evidence in a given topic before making a 
decision, thus developing their critical thinking abilities.  It would be fruitful for future 
research to therefore empirically test the success of such recommendations.   
Alongside presenting people with anti-conspiracy arguments or teaching them new 
skills, the psychological needs that conspiracy theories satisfy could be addressed.  For 
example, research has shown that conspiracy beliefs allow people to make sense of events 
(van Prooijen, 2012), avoid feelings of uncertainty (van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; Whitson, 
et al., in press), and address feelings of powerlessness and lack of control (Abalakina-Paap, et 
al., 1999; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).   By satisfying these important psychology needs by a 




theories.  In considering this idea, the empirical work by Whitson and Galinsky (2008) is 
particularly relevant here.  The authors found that participants who were asked to remember a 
situation when they lacked control were more likely to interpret conspiracy theories in 
ambiguous stories they read.  In a follow up study however, they examined whether a person 
taking part in a self-affirmation exercise may increase feelings of control, which may 
subsequently reduce belief in conspiracy theories.  In testing this assertion, participants were 
first asked to complete the recall task that aimed to induce a lack of control.  Participants then 
completed a scale that focused on a value that they perceived to be most important (self-
affirmation) or least important (no self-affirmation).  Results demonstrated that those who 
completed the self-affirmation task perceived conspiracy theories to be less likely in the 
ambiguous stories in comparison to those who were not give an opportunity to self-affirm.   
Future research could therefore investigate whether such a technique as self-affirmation may 
help lessen the impact of conspiracy theories on behavioural intention outcomes.   
Moreover, throughout this thesis the psychological factor of powerlessness has been 
associated with disengagement from important social systems (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 
2014b, see Chapter 2 and 3).  Following a similar vein to the work conducted by Whitson and 
Galinsky (2008), making people feel more powerful could attenuate the impact of exposure to 
conspiracy theories.  For example, power could be manipulated by asking participants to 
imagine themselves as a managing director in an organisation (e.g., Guinote, Weick, & Cai, 
2012) or when either striking a powerful pose or making a powerful hand gesture (Strelan, 
Weick, & Vasiljevic, 2014).  Utilising such a manipulation makes the participant perceive 
that they are in a position of power.  By experimentally inducing a feeling of power, people 
may be less likely to subscribe to conspiracy theories.  Powerlessness can also be a direct 
response to being exposed to conspiracy theories (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b, see 
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Chapter 2 and 3).  Being made to feel powerful after exposure to conspiracy theories may 
therefore allow people to deal with feeling of powerlessness as a direct response to 
conspiracy theories.  This in turn may attenuate the impact of being exposed to conspiracy 
theories on behavioural intentions.  
In summary, it may be possible for future research to test a combination of the 
recommendations above.  Teaching people critical thinking and online literacy in the first 
instance may promote more careful evaluation of evidence on the Internet.  Next, the factors 
that make people more susceptible to endorsing conspiracy theory accounts could be 
DGGUHVVHGVXFKDVLQFUHDVLQJSHRSOH¶VIHHOLQJRIFRQWURODQGSRZHU,QWKHFDVHRIGHDOLQJ
with specific conspiracy theories, the use of strengthened anti-conspiracy knowledge could 
also be utilised.  The ultimate aim would be to allow policy makers and officials to choose 
from a bank of tools and potential interventions that they could implement to help reduce the 
potential impact of conspiracy theories on society.   
Concluding remarks 
Conspiracy theories can be seen as attempts to undermine or subvert social systems.  
They challenge authorities on important topics such as climate science and childhood 
vaccination and offer unofficial explanations.  An aim of this thesis was therefore to examine 
and attempt to address the social psychological consequences of conspiracy theories 
XQGHUPLQLQJSHRSOH¶VFRQILGHQFHLQLPSRUWDQWsocial systems.  We found that exposure to 
conspiraF\WKHRULHVUHGXFHGSHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQVWRHQJDJHin the political system, take action 
against climate change and have a fictional child vaccinated.  Ironically however, whilst 
conspiracy theories may lead to disengagement with important facets of society, they do not 
QHFHVVDULO\XQGHUPLQHSHRSOH¶VRYHUDOOVHQVHWKDWVRFLDOV\VWems are fair and appropriate.  
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Instead, conspiracy theories appear to bolster support for the social status quo because they 
DWWULEXWHVRFLHW\¶VSUREOHPVWRLQGLYLGXDOSHUSHWUDWRUVUather than social systems.    
This thesis therefore highlights the potential dangers of conspiracy theories as they 
may not only stop people from engaging with important aspects of society, but may lead them 
to justify rather than address limitations of the social system.  Conspiracy theories may 
therefore reduce, rather than increase, the likelihood of social and political change.  Further, 
the research outlined in this thesis also found that once people have been exposed to 
conspiracy theories, their effects may be resistant to correction.  Addressing the potential 
detrimental consequences of conspiracy theories is therefore an ongoing challenge that future 
research should aim to address.   
Whilst conspiracy theories were once seen to be harmless fun and of little concern 
(Bratich, 2008; Clarke, 2002), the research outlined in this thesis has highlighted the alarming 
impact that exposure to conspiracy theories may have on important societal issues.  It has also 
demonstrated that once people have been exposed to conspiracy theories, the effects may be 
difficult to attenuate.  In sum, conspiracy theories appear to prevent people from engaging 
with important aspects of society but at the same time seem to divert attention from the 
inherent limitations of society as a whole.  Ultimately therefore, this thesis demonstrates the 
role that conspiracy theorising may play in potentially damaging the social systems that allow 
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Appendix A ± Manipulation and scales used in Study 1  
Pro-conspiracy manipulation excerpt used in Study 1 
Please read the short excerpt from a recent Internet article discussing the causes of 
significant international events. 
Should we be suspicious of government operations? For example, did the United States 
government orchestrate the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers? Was the British government 
involved in the death of Diana, Princess of Wales? Questions such as these are widespread in 
the media and on the Internet, but should we pay any attention to them?  
The answer is YES. There are many good reasons to question official accounts.   
7RWDNHWKHH[DPSOHRI3ULQFHVV'LDQD¶VGHDWKLWLVQRVHFUHWWKDWWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW
ZHUHGLVFRQWHQWHGZLWK3ULQFHVV'LDQD¶VLQYROYHPHQWZLWK'RGL)D\HGDQGDOVRZLWKKHU
increasing involvement in politics. Three days before her death, Princess Diana was reported 
VD\LQJWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWZDV³KRSHOHVV´7KLVPDGHSROLWLFLDQVZKRZHUHDOUHDG\ED\LQJ
for her blood becoming ever more strident with a number of negative comments being made 
WRZDUGVKHUVXFKDV³:KDWZDVWKLVZRPDQGRLQJPHGGOLQJLQSROitics, why didn't she stick 
WRROGODGLHVDQGOLWWOHFKLOGUHQ6KHLVDµORRVHFDQQRQ¶´2QHPXVWWKHUHIRUHTXHVWLRQWKH
claim that her death was simply a tragic accident.  The recent inquest into her death also 
raises significant questions about the official account.  Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, a 
recent BBC news poll of 1,024 adults showed that an overwhelming majority of 61% 
EHOLHYHGWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWKDGVRPHLQYROYHPHQWLQ3ULQFHVV'LDQD¶VGHDWKDQGDIXUWKHU
17% were unsure. Only 22% of respondents believed that her death was an accident.  
The evidence to support alternative accounts for major world events is not restricted to the 
H[DPSOHRI3ULQFHVV'LDQD¶VGHDWK7RJLYHDQRWKHUH[DPSOHWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWKDV
been linked to the 7/7 London terrorist attacks. It is said that the government were involved to 
gain extra support for the war in Iraq.  Indeed, there are inconsistencies and basic mistakes in 
the official accounts and the current ongoing inquests are revealing information that is 
inconsistent with the official accounts.  For example, the inquests recently revealed evidence 
of significant British intelligence failings that may have contributed to the attacks.   
Over the years, many governments have been implicated in major social events.  For 












Anti-conspiracy manipulation excerpt used in Study 1 
Please read the short excerpt from a recent Internet article discussing the causes of 
significant international events. 
Should we be suspicious of government operations? For example, did the United States 
government orchestrate the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers? Was the British government 
involved in the death of Diana, Princess of Wales? Questions such as these are widespread in 
the media and on the Internet, but should we pay any attention to them?  
The answer is NO. There are very few reasons to question official accounts.  
7RWDNHWKHH[DPSOHRI3ULQFHVV'LDQD¶VGHDWKLWLVQRVHFUHWWKDW3ULQFHVV'LDQD¶VSRSXODULW\
made some members of the government uneasy.  However, there is no evidence at all to 
suggest that the British government were involved in her death.  In fact, most politicians 
embraced her popularity and her increasing involvement in politics.  For example, one 
SURPLQHQWSROLWLFLDQVDLGWKDW³ZHVKRXOGEHDSSODXGLQJZKDWVKH¶VGRLQJ6KHLVXVLQJKHU
SRSXODULW\DQGSRZHUWRGRVRPHJRRGLQWKLVZRUOG´,t has also come to light that the 
government openly welcomed intervention by the Princess in different policies.  Her death 
was simply a tragic accident.  The recent inquest into her death also puts to bed any questions 
about the official account. Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, a recent BBC news poll of 1,024 
adults showed that only 22% believed that the government had any involvement Princess 
'LDQD¶VGHDWKDQGDIXUWKHUZHUHXQVXUH$QRYHUZKHOPLQJPDMRULW\RIRI
respondents believed that her death was an accident.  
The lack of evidence to support alternative accounts for major world events is not restricted 
WRWKHH[DPSOHRI3ULQFHVV'LDQD¶VGHDWK7RJLYHDQRWKHUH[DPSOHWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW
has been linked to the 7/7 London terrorist attacks.  It is said that the government were 
involved to gain extra support for the war in Iraq.  However, there is no evidence to support 
this account and the current ongoing inquests are revealing only information that is consistent 
with the official accounts.  For example, the inquests recently ruled out any British 
intelligence involvement in the attacks.   
Over the years, many governments have been implicated in major social events.  For 












Governmental conspiracy theory scale used in Study 1 
 
Please read the statements below and rate the likelihood that each is true. 
 
Governments are often involved in the causes of significant international events.    
 
Extremely  unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
Governments often hide information from the public.    
 
Extremely  unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
Governments are often involved in international plots and schemes. 
 
Extremely  unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
Governments are often involved in conspiracies. 
 
Extremely  unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
Government agencies hold more information on citizens than is legally allowed. 
 
Extremely  unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
The British government was involved in the death of Princess Diana.    
 
Extremely  unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
The British government was involved in the 7/7 London terrorist attacks. 
 
Extremely  unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
The U.S. government was involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
 
Extremely  unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
The U.S. government faked the moon landings. 
 
Extremely  unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
The U.S. government was involved in the assassination of John F. Kennedy. 
 
Extremely  unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
Governments cover up alien landings. 
 
Extremely  unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
Governments have deliberately spread HIV amongst ethnic minorities.    
 




Mistrust scale used in Study 1 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.   
 
I have trust in the legal system. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
I have trust in parliament. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
I have trust in the police. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
I have trust in the civil service. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
Feelings of powerlessnes scale used in Study 1 
 




Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
The world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do 
about it. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
The average citizen can have an influence on government decisions. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
 
Feelings of uncertainity scale used in Study 1 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree that you can predict each statement.   
 
The government is only run for the benefit of those in power. 
 









Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
A large number of individuals in the government are crooked. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
The government only pays attention to what you think around election time. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
 
Feelings of disillusionment scale used in Study 1 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.   
 
I am very disappointed with the government. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
The government is no longer as important to me as it used to be. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
I feel tricked, cheated or deceived by the government. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
I have given up on the government. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
 
Intentions to engage in the political system used in Study 1. 
Please answer the following questions relating to your plans to engage in various activities 
within the next 12 months 
We NQRZWKDWPRVWSHRSOHGRQ¶WYRWHLQDOOJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQV8VXDOO\EHWZHHQRQH-
quarter to one-half of those eligible actually come out to vote. Could you state whether 
you intend to vote in the next general election?     






When there is an election taking place in the future do you intend to talk to people 
about it and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or 
candidates?  
 
Definitely no   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely yes 
 
Do you intend to wear a campaign button, put a sticker on your car, or place a sign in 
front of your house in the next election?    
 
Definitely no   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely yes 
 
Within the next 12 months, do you intend to contribute money to a candidate, a political 
party, or any organization that supports candidates?     
 
Definitely no   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely yes 
 
Within the next 12 months, do you intend to spend time participating in any community 
service or volunteer activities? (By volunteer activity, this means actually working in some 
way to help others for no pay) 
 
Definitely no   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely yes 
 
As you read each of the statements below, can you state if you intend to volunteer for this 
type of group or organization within the next 12 months?      
 
A political organization.     
 
Definitely no   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely yes 
 
Candidates running for office.   
 













Appendix B ± Manipulation and scales used in Study 2 
Pro-conspiracy manipulation excerpt used in Study 2 
Please read this short excerpt from a recent Internet article about climate change. 
Should we be suspicious of the official story about climate change?  Should we consider the 
proposal that climate scientists adjust their data to show evidence of global warming? 
 
3URPRWHUVRILGHDVVXFKDVWKLVUDLVHVHYHUDOTXHVWLRQV)RUH[DPSOHDUHFOLPDWHVFLHQWLVWV¶
research efforts motivated by the chase for research funds?  Are Western environmentalists 
promoting expensive solar and wind power over cheaper fossil fuels in Africa as a way to 
hold African countries back from industrialising?  Do some climate scientists actually refute 
official reports from the United Nations concluding that humans are causing climate change? 
 
Questions such as these are widespread in the media and on the Internet, but should we pay 
any attention to them?  
 
The answer is YES. There are many reasons to doubt scientific claims of the existence of 
climate change.  
 
For example, funds for research related to global warmiQJDUHLQFUHDVLQJDQG³LWLVQRZRQH
RIWKHEHVWIXQGHGDUHDVRIVFLHQFH´DFFRUGLQJWRRQHOHDGLQJVFLHQWLVW7KHVDPHVFLHQWLVWKDV
also observed that funding is rapidly withdrawn if the research findings do not concur with 
the official account.  
 
Further, the idea of global warming holds little weight.  Independent evidence shows that 
since 1940, global average temperatures fell for four decades.  This presents a significant 
flaw in the official account, because the worldwide economic boom that followed the end of 
World War II produced more carbon dioxide than ever before, and therefore should have 
meant a rise in global temperatures ² this did not happen.  
 
A large international report supporting the official account presents data from a panel of over 
2,RIWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJVFLHQWLVWV+RZHYHUWKHUHSRUWKDVEHHQODEHOOHGD³VKDP´E\D
leading professor who argues that the report includes the names of scientists who disagreed 
with what was written in the report and who have since resigned from the panel.  The 
professor goes on to say that some of the people named in the report are not even scientists. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, a recent news poll of 1,024 adults showed that an 
overwhelming majority of 61% believed that climate change is a hoax and a further 17% 
were unsure. Only 22% of respondents believed the official account of climate change.   
 
In addition, another major reason why people should doubt the official reports that argue that 









Anti-conspiracy manipulation excerpt used in Study 2 
Please read this short excerpt from a recent Internet article about climate change. 
Should we be suspicious of the official story about climate change?  Should we consider the 
proposal that climate scientists adjust their data to show evidence of global warming? 
 
3URPRWHUVRILGHDVVXFKDVWKLVUDLVHVHYHUDOTXHVWLRQV)RUH[DPSOHDUHFOLPDWHVFLHQWLVWV¶
research efforts motivated by the chase for research funds?  Are Western environmentalists 
promoting expensive solar and wind power over cheaper fossil fuels in Africa as a way to 
hold African countries back from industrialising?  Do some climate scientists actually refute 
official reports from the United Nations concluding that humans are causing climate change? 
 
Questions such as these are widespread in the media and on the Internet, but should we pay 
any attention to them?  
 
The answer is NO. There are very few reasons to doubt scientific claims of the existence of 




argued that only the best, most impartial research is funded and much knowledge is gained 
from the research.  
 
Further, evidence of global warming is robust.  Independent evidence shows that the last two 
decades of the 20th century were the hottest in 400 years and possibly for several millennia. 
Numerous findings such as this present significant support for the official account and there 
is clear evidence showing that the causes of increased temperatures are increased 
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 
 
A large international report supporting the official account presents data from a panel of over 
RIWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJVFLHQWLVWV7KHILQGLQJVLQWKHUHSRUWKDYHQRWEHHQGLVSXWHGE\
any national or international scientific organisation.  All scientists named on the report agreed 
that in the past 200-plus years, mean global temperatures have been rising, and that human 
activity is a significant contributing factor. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, a recent news poll of 1,024 adults showed that an 
overwhelming majority of 61% believed that climate change is a reality and a further 17% 
were unsure. Only 22% of respondents disbelieved the official account of climate change.   
 











Belief in climate change conspiracy theories scale used in Study 2 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. 
Climate change is a hoax. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
 
Climate change has been made up by climate researchers to chase funding. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
 
The official United Nations reports about climate are deliberately inaccurate. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
 
Scientists are creating panic about climate change because it is in their interests to do 
so. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
 
³&OLPDWHFKDQJH´LVDP\WKSURPRWHGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQWDV an excuse to raise taxes and 
FXUESHRSOH¶VIUHHGRP 
 




Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
 
The idea that the world is headed for catastrophic climate change is a fraud. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
 
 
Feelings of powerlessness scale used in Study 2 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. 
 
I feel that climate change is too big for my actions to have an impact. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
I feel that my actions will not affect the outcome of climate change. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
I feel that my contribution is just a drop in the ocean and so is insignificant. 
 





Feelings of uncertainty scale used in Study 2 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. 
 
I feel uncertain about the best options to contribute to reducing climate change. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
I feel uncertain as to whether climate change is a significant problem. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
 
Feelings of disillusionment scale used in Study 2 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. 
 
I am very disappointed with climate science researchers  
  
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
Climate science researchers are no longer as important to me as they used to be. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
I feel tricked, cheated or deceived by climate science researchers   
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
I have given up on climate science researchers. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree 
 
 
Mistrust scale used in Study 2 
 
Please rate the extent to which you trust or distrust the following groups to tell you the truth 




Strongly distrust 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly trust 
 
National government  
 
Strongly distrust 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly trust 
 
Scientists and doctors  
 





Religious organizations  
 
Strongly distrust 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly trust 
 
Family and friends  
 
Strongly distrust 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly trust 
 
Environmental organizations  
 




Strongly distrust 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly trust 
 
 
Intention to engage in carbon friendly behaviours used in Study 2 
 
Next, please rate the extent to which you intend to take part in each of the following 
behaviors in the next 12 months. 
 
Do you intend in the next 12 months to use energy-efficiency as a selection criterion 
when buying things such as light bulbs, household appliances, motor vehicles? 
 
Definitely no 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely yes 
 
Do you intend in the next 12 months to explore purchasing energy from an alternative 
source (wind, solar, geothermal, biomass)? 
 
Definitely no 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely yes 
 
Do you intend in the next 12 months to walk or cycle more than driving or using public 
transport? 
 
Definitely no 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely yes 
 
Do you intend in the next 12 months to plant a tree? 
 
Definitely no 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely yes 
 
Do you intend in the next 12 months to join, donate money to, or volunteer with an 
organization working on issues related to global warming? 
 
Definitely no 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely yes 
 
Do you intend in the next 12 months to make your views on global warming clear to 
politicians?  
 




 Appendix C:  Scales used in Study 3 (and 4, 9 and 10) 
Belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories scale used in Study 3 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. 
Immunisations allow governments to track and control people. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
Vaccines are harmful, and this fact is covered up. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
Tiny devices are placed in in vaccines to track people. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
Pharmaceutical companies, scientists and academics work together to cover up the 
dangers of vaccines. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
Vaccines are not tampered with.   
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
The government is trying to cover up the link between vaccines and autism.   
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
Tiny devices are implanted in vaccines for use in mind control experiments. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
The flu vaccine allows the government to monitor the elderly through the implantation 
of tiny tracking devices. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
Pharmaceutical companies, scientists and academics cover up the fact that child 
immunisation is harmful.   
 










Fictional vaccination scenario and intention to vaccinate used in Studies 3, 4, 9 and 10 
Please now imagine that you are the parent of an infant (Sophie, 8 months).  
Your doctor has provided you with the following information regarding the disease 
dysomeria and mentioned that there is a vaccination available.  
 
Dysomeria: The DS-virus is a contagion spread by droplet infection. Early symptoms are 
fever and vomiting. Meningitis and impairment of motor and sensory functions are also 
common. In some cases, the DS-virus leads to permanent paralysis.  
 
There is a vaccination against dysomeria. This vaccination effectively protects against 
infection and is highly recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) for people of all ages.  
 
Adverse events such as fever, rash, restlessness and dizziness have been reported following 
12% of all vaccinations (indicated by the darker rectangles in the graph below). In 88% of all 
cases, no side effects occurred (gray rectangles). 
 
If you had the opportunity to vaccinate your child (Sophie, 8 months) against dysomeria 
next week, what would you decide? 
 
   Definitely  1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Definitely  

















I feel uncertain about the potential side-effects of immunisations. 
 
.84 
   
I feel uncertain about the safety of immunisations. .83    
A large number of early vaccinations expose an LQIDQW¶V immune system to 
avoidable risks. .74    
Multiple vaccines overwhelm the inIDQW¶VLPPXQHV\VWHP .74    
The side-effects of vaccinations are unforeseeable. .71    
Vaccines lead to allergies. .67    
I feel uncertain about the motives of those involved in immunisations 
(governments, pharmaceutical companies etc.). .61    
Vaccinations cause the illnesses they are intended to protect against. .61    
I feel that immunisation concerns are too big for my actions to have an impact.  .84   
I feel that my actions will not stop the negative outcomes of immunisations.  .84   




I have given up on those who are involved in immunisations (e.g., the 
government, pharmaceutical companies, etc.).   .85  
Those who are involved in immunisations (e.g., the government, pharmaceutical 
companies, etc.) are no longer important to me as they used to be.   .83  
I feel tricked, cheated or deceived by those who are involved in immunisations 
(e.g., the government, pharmaceutical companies, etc.)   .77  
I am very disappointed with those who are involved in immunisations (e.g., the 
government, pharmaceutical companies, etc.)   .71  
Corporations    .91 
National government    .88 
 





Appendix E ± Manipulation and scales used in Study 4 (and 9 and 10)  
Pro-conspiracy manipulation excerpt used in Studies 4, 9 and 10 
Please read this short excerpt from a recent Internet article about vaccines. We will ask 
you some questions about the excerpt later in the study, so please read it carefully. 
 
Should we be suspicious of vaccines?  Should we consider the proposal that those in power, 
whether governments or pharmaceutical companies, hide crucial information about vaccines 
from the public? 
 
Several specific questions have been raised about vaccines.  For example, are people within 
the industry faking data on vaccine efficacy?  Do vaccines hurt more than they help?  Is the 
industry deceiving people purely to make a profit?  
 
Questions such as these are widespread in the media and on the Internet, but should we pay 
any attention to them?  
 
The answer is YES. There are many reasons to think twice about vaccines. 
 
For example, people within the vaccine industry are guilty of misrepresenting data on the 
efficacy of vaccines.  Evidence suggests that diseases such as smallpox and paralytic polio 
have not been eradicated by vaccines.  They have simple been renamed and these diseases 
still exist among the population.  
 
Further, there is a significant amount of evidence that vaccines can hurt more than they help. 
For example, by the year 2002, tens of thousands of reactions to vaccines, including deaths, 
were reported. One must magnify these figures tenfold, because it is estimated that 90% of 
doctors do not report incidents. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, a recent news poll of 1,024 adults showed that an 
overwhelming majority of 61% believed that vaccines were harmful and a further 17% were 
unsure. Only 22% of respondents believed the official account that vaccines are safe. 
 
Hiding information about vaccines is purely motivated by profit. The increase in government 
recommended vaccines for children has more than doubled since 1985, making 
pharmaceutical companies very wealthy. The profit margins made by pharmaceutical 
companies are extremely high. According to market research, vaccine sales will more than 
double this year, from $19 billion in 2012 to $39 billion in 2013. This is nearly five times the 
$8 billion in vaccine sales in 2004.  
 




Anti-conspiracy manipulation excerpt used in Studies 4, 9 and 10 
Please read this short excerpt from a recent Internet article about vaccines. We will ask 
you some questions about the excerpt later in the study, so please read it carefully. 
Should we be suspicious of vaccines?  Should we consider the proposal that those in power, 
whether governments or pharmaceutical companies, hide crucial information about vaccines 
from the public? 
 
Several specific questions have been raised about vaccines.  For example, are people within 
the industry faking data on vaccine efficacy?  Do vaccines hurt more than they help?  Is the 
industry deceiving people purely to make a profit?   
 
Questions such as these are widespread in the media and on the Internet, but should we pay 
any attention to them?  
 
The answer is NO. There is no reason to think twice about vaccines. 
 
For example, there is convincing and accurate evidence for the success of vaccines.  Diseases 
such as smallpox and paralytic polio have been completely eradicated by vaccines.  These 
once fatal diseases no longer exist among the population. 
 
Further, there is little evidence to suggest that vaccines are harmful.  The side effects are 
minimal and whilst millions of people have been immunized over the years, less than .005% 
have ever had an adverse reaction to a vaccine. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, a recent news poll of 1,024 adults showed that an 
overwhelming majority of 61% believed that vaccines are safe and only a further 17% were 
unsure. Only 22% of respondents believed that vaccines were harmful and unsafe. 
 
The financial benefits of preventing illnesses far outweigh the profits made from vaccines by 
pharmaceutical companies. For example, in 2001, routine childhood immunisation in the 
USA was estimated to save over $40 billion per birth-year cohort in overall social costs 
including $10 billion in direct health costs. The government recommends vaccines for 
children to improve public health and save money, not to make a profit. 
 











Belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories scale used in Studies 4, 9, and 10 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. 
 
Many diseases, said to have been eradicated by vaccines, are still around today. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
Misrepresentation of the efficacy of vaccines is motivated by profit. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
Vaccines are harmful, and this fact is covered up. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
Vaccine safety data is often fabricated. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
Immunising children is harmful and this fact is covered up. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
People are deceived about vaccine safety. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
Pharmaceutical companies cover up the dangers of vaccines. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
People are deceived about vaccine efficacy. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
Vaccines are not harmful. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
Vaccine efficacy data is often fabricated. 
 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Strongly agree 
 
People are deceived about vaccine safety. 
 















A lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the public out of self-interest. .93  
The government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or well-known public figures, and keeps this a 
secret. .84  
Certain significant events have been the result of the activity of a small group who secretly manipulate world 
events. .80  
A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions, such as going to war. .74  
The government uses people as patsies to hide its involvement in criminal activity. .74  
New and advanced technology which would harm current industry is being suppressed. .72  
The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some organisation. .72  
The power held by heads of state is second to that of small unknown groups who really control world politics. .71  
The government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, disguising its involvement. .68  
Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public. .67  
Some UFO sightings and rumours are planned or staged in order to distract the public from real alien contact. .66  
Secret organisations communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the public. .64  
Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the public. .61  
Experiments involving new drugs or technologies are routinely carried out on the public without their knowledge or 
consent. .60  




 ³&OLPDWHFKDQJH´LVDP\WKSURPRWHGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQWDVDQH[FXVHWRUDLVHWD[HVDQGFXUESHRSOH¶VIUHHGRP   .85 
7KH³VFLHQFH´EHKLQGFOLPDWHFKDQJHLVDWOHDVWGXELRXs.  .74 
Scientists are creating panic about climate change because it is in their interests to do so.  .73 
Business enemies of Dodi Fayed and his father Mohammed Al Fayed assassinated Dodi, with the death of Princess 
Diana a cover up for their operation.  .73 
A government exercise was behind the suicide at Jonestown.  .73 
The attack on the Twin Towers was not a terrorist action but a governmental conspiracy.  .73 
The idea that the world is headed for catastrophic climate change is a fraud.  .72 
One or PRUHURJXHµFHOOV¶LQWKH%ULWLVK6HFUHW6HUYLFHFRQVWUXFWHGDQGFDUULHGRXWDSORWWRNLOO3ULQFHVV'LDQD  .71 
There was an official campaign by MI6 to assassinate Princess Diana, sanctioned by elements of the establishment.  .70 
The American moon landings were faked.  .70 
Princess Diana had to be killed because the British government could not accept that the mother of the future king 
was involved with a Muslim Arab.  .68 
3ULQFHVV'LDQD¶VGHDWKZDVDQDFFLGHQW  .59 
Princess Diana faked her own death so she and Dodi could retreat into isolation.  .56 
The AIDS virus was created in a laboratory.  .56 
The European Union is trying to take control of the United Kingdom.  .48 
Governments are suppressing evidence of the existence of aliens. .62 .47 





Appendix G ± Scales used in Studies 5, 7 and 8  
Values scale used in Study 5 
Please now rate how important each value is for you as a guiding principle in YOUR life. 
  
Try to distinguish as much as possible between the values by using all the ratings.  You will, 





Before you begin reading, please read the values in each list.  Next please choose the one 
that is most important to you by making a note of it at the beginning of each of the two 
lists. Then rate its importance (usually 6 or 7).  Next, choose the value least important to you 
in each of the two lits and make a note of this at the beginning of each of the two lists 
Then rate it (usually as 0 or 1) according to its importance. Afterwards, please rate the rest of 
the values in the two lists. 
 
VALUES LIST 1 
 
The most important value in list 1: __________________   Rating: ____ 
 
The least important value in list 1: ___________________  Rating: ____ 
 
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)   
 
           -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
 
SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)      
 
              -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                 
PLEASURE (gratification of desires)       
 
              -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
  
FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought)  
 
           -1         0          1   2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            







SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society)     
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                
AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences)     
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                            
POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners)   
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
 
WEALTH (material possessions, money)     
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                               
NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation from enemies)   
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                
RETURNING FAVORS (avoiding debt)   
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
 
CREATIVITY (uniqueness, imagination)     
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                
A WORLD AT PEACE (without war and conflict)  
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 





RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of time-honored customs)  
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                
SELF-DISCIPLINE (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)    
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                
FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones)    
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                
UNITY WITH NATURE (fitting into nature)  
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                
A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, novelty and change)     
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                
WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)           
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                
AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command)     
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                
A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)    
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 






SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)     
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
 
VALUES LIST 2 
 
The most important value in list 2: __________________  Rating: ____ 
 
The least important value in list 2: ___________________  Rating  _____ 
 
 
INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)           
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
 
MODERATE (avoiding extremes of feeling & action)     
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                 
LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group)    
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                 
AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)   
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                
BROADMINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs) 
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                        
HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing)      
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 





DARING (seeking adventure, risk)           
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                        
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)           
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                        
INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events)   
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                        
HONORING PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)                  
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
 
                                                                        
CHOOSING MY OWN GOALS (selecting own purposes)    
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                       
CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)       
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                        
ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE (accepting life's circumstances) 
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                                        
HONEST (genuine, sincere)       
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 





OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations)   
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
 
HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)   
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
 
ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.)     
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
 
DEVOUT (holding to religious faith & belief)        
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                            
RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)      
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
 
CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring)      
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                            
FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)        
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                                                            
SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)         
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
 
   




CLEAN (neat, tidy)            
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
                         
SELF-INDULGENT (doing pleasant things)       
 
         -1  0   1    2      3      4        5       6          7      
          Opposed to   Not important                                                  Of supreme importance                            
          my principles                                                                                        importance 
 
NFCC scale used in Study 5 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. 
 
I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
 
Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am always eager to 
consider a different opinion. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
 
I don't like situations that are uncertain. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
 
I like to have friends who are unpredictable. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
 
I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament. 





When dining out, I like to go to places where I have been before so that I 
know what to expect. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event 
occurred in my life. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a 
group believes. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I hate to change my plans at the last minute. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect 
from it. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
When I have made a decision, I feel relieved. 




Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset. 






I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a 
solution to a problem immediately. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I would rather make a decision quickly than sleep over it. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
Even if I get a lot of time to make a decision, I still feel compelled to 
decide quickly. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I think it is fun to change my plans at the last moment. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing 
what might happen. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
My personal space is usually messy and disorganized. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is 
wrong. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I almost always feel hurried to reach a decision, even when there is no 
reason to do so. 





I believe that orderliness and organization are among the most 
important characteristics of a good student. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both 
sides could be right. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I know what to expect 
from them. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks clearly stated 
objectives and requirements. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions 
on the issue as possible. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I like to know what people are thinking all the time. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things. 





It's annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or 
her mind. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life 
more. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from 
my own. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear to 
me. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I always see many possible solutions to problems I face. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I'd rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty. 





I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own 
view. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I dislike unpredictable situations. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I dislike the routine aspects of my work (studies). 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
Satisfaction with the status quo used scale in Study 5, 7 and 8. 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. 
 
In general, I find society to be fair. 
 
 Strongly  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   Strongly  
disagree                agree  
 
In general, the United Kingdom political system operates as it should. 
 
Strongly  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   Strongly  
disagree                agree  
 
British society needs to be radically restructured. 
  
Strongly  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   Strongly  
disagree                agree  
 
The United Kingdom is the best country in the world to live in. 
 
Strongly  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   Strongly  
disagree                agree  
 
Most policies serve the greater good. 
 
Strongly  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   Strongly  








Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness. 
 
Strongly  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   Strongly  
disagree                agree  
 
Our society is getting worse every year. 
 
Strongly  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   Strongly  
disagree                agree  
 
Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve. 
 
Strongly  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   Strongly  







Appendix H: Intercorrelations and descriptive statistics for Study 5 






(SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(1) Real world conspiracy belief 
 
3.00 
(1.09) - .82* .23* -.03 -.17
¥








 -.03 .19¥ -.18¥ 
(3) System justification 5.43 (1.12)   - -.20* -.09 .01 -.31* .06 
(4) Order and structure 3.08 (0.40)    - .33** .47*** .52*** .45*** 
(5) Preference for predictability   3.13 (0.31)     - .44*** .28** .26* 
(6) Discomfort with ambiguity  3.35 (0.46)      - .32** .46*** 
(7) Closed-mindedness 3.00 (0.46)       - .58*** 
(8) Decisiveness 3.34 (0.65)        - 















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
(1) Real world 
conspiracy belief 
3.00 





(0.83)  - 
 
.32** -.01 -.08 -.11 -.12 -.28** .19
¥




(1.12)   - -.34** -.09 -.02 .-.07 .03 .31* .20* -.11 -.05 -.16 
(4) Power 3.79 (1.34)    - .08 .22* .01 -.38*** -.51*** -.08 .16 .01 .06 
(5) Achievement 5.60 (0.88)     - .08 -.09 .10 -.14 -.18
¥
 -.17 -.08 .05 
(6) Hedonism 5.36 (0.90)      - .10 -.17
¥
 -.18¥ -.04 -.09 -.09 -.15 





(8) Self-direction 5.90 (0.85)        - .11 -.15 -.27* 
-
.33*** -.05 
(9) Universalism 5.57 (0.96)         - -.15 -.40*** 
-
.41*** -.29 
(10) Benevolence 5.40 (0.88)          - .33*** .30* -.27* 
(11) Tradition 4.97 (0.95)           - .43*** -.16 
(12) Conformity 5.20 (1.06)            - -.12 
(13) Security 5.61 (0.98)             - 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 






.85 .41*** .36*** -
.01 .05 -.01 .04 .16
¥
 .23* .23* .03 .10 .12   
(2) General notion of 
conspiracy 
3.05 
(0.98)  - .36*** .36*** 
-
.01 .05 .01 -.03 .07 .15 .15 -.01 .11 .06   
(3) Predictability 3.24 (0.58)   - .71*** 
-
.08 -.08 -.09 -.03 .02 .08 .01 -.01 -.01 -.07   
(4) Closed-mindedness 3.34 (0.60)    - 
-
.06 -.08 -.09 -.08 -.04 .02 -.05 -.17
¥
 -.06 -.07   
(5) Power 3.26 (1.21)     - .66*** .52*** .37*** .26** .16 
¥
 .14 .22* .59*** .41***   
(6) Achievement 2.90 (1.12)      - .60*** .54*** .40*** .36*** .36*** .28* .43*** .66***   
(7) Hedonism 3.05 (1.16)       - .56*** .43*** .36*** .35*** .31*** .39*** .44***   
(8) Stimulation 2.89 (1.15)        - .63*** .52*** .39*** .14 .21* .31***   
(9) Self-direction 2.53 (1.12)         - .74*** .56*** .32*** .24* .49***   
(10) Universalism 2.44 (1.09)          - .71*** .40*** .28* .60***   
(11) Benevolence 2.35 (1.21)           - .57*** .34*** .63***   
(12) Tradition 2.80 (1.04)            - .60*** .62***   
(13) Conformity 3.16  (1.24)             - .51***   
(14) Security 2.63 (1.24)              -   




Appendix J ± Manipulation used in Studies 7 and 8 
Pro-conspiracy manipulation excerpt used in Studies 7 and 8. 
Please read the following excerpt, which has been taken from a British newspaper. You 
will be asked to answer some questions about this excerpt shortly. 
0DQ\EHOLHYHWKDW3ULQFHVV'LDQD¶VGHDWKZDVQRWDQDFFLGHQW$GGLWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQKDV
been discussed that castVGRXEWRQWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDW'LDQD¶VGHDWKZDVDFFLGHQWDO6RPHRI
this information is presented below.  
Concern has been raised about the rapid disposal of the bodies of Diana and Dodi. Diana had 
no post mortem prior to burial in Althorp. Victims of sudden death require a post mortem by 
law in the UK. 
 
The missing white Fiat Uno is often mentioned. With such a large-scale investigation by 
)UHQFKDXWKRULWLHVFRXOGRQO\VHFUHWDJHQWVKDYHHYDGHGWKHSROLFH¶VQHWDURXQG3DULV":H
know the car hit the Mercedes used by Diana and Dodi, thanks to traceable paint marks on 
the Mercedes. Witnesses refer to the car lurching around the road at varying speeds as both it 
and the Mercedes entered the tunnel.  
 
The misinformation surrounding Henri Paul (the Mercedes driver) is enormous. First he was 
said to be driving at up to 120mph, but recent reports by professional crash investigators 
suggest 60mph and even less on impact. Initial reports claim that Henri Paul was drunk. It is 
accepted that he had two drinks at the Ritz, but no other evidence has emerged to support this 
claim, beyond questionable results from a blood test from his corpse. The results are 
questionable because it is common for the alcohol levels to rise in bodies after death, 
regardless of consumption. The test also showed a very high level of carbon monoxide (20%) 
in his blood. Experts say that this would have incapacitated him before he set off on his fatal 
journey, and yet the hotel video evidence shows him walking around and talking normally. It 
is also thought that he may have been an alcoholic. However, as a pilot he passed a rigorous 
health check two days before the accident and his liver showed no sign of damage on the post 
mortem. Then there is the question of the multiple bank accounts Paul held, with balances 
showing income far in excess of his £20,000 salary as acting head of security at the Ritz. 
6RPHIULHQGVKDYHVXJJHVWHGWKDWKHZDVDORQJWHUPµVOHHSHU¶DJHQWIRUDVHFUHWVHUYLFH




MI6, particularly as the establishment were keen to keep tabs on Mohammed Al Fayed. It is 
interesting that he was the only person in the car to wear a seat belt. 
 
Immediately after the crash news was broadcast, witnesses appeared on US TV saying that 
they heard an explosion or bang before they heard the car crash. Was this a gunshot, or a 
bomb? 
 
Other witnesses describe an extremely bright white light, much stronger than a 
SKRWRJUDSKHU¶VIODVKEXOELOOXPLQDWLQJWKHWXQQHOEHIRUHWKHFUDVKVRXQG3RZHUIXODQWL




have access to much stronger tools, all of which are capable of blinding a victim for several 
minutes- easily enough to cause a fatal crash. 
 
Paparazzi witnesses, who were initially blamed for the crash, agree that the bikes were not 
close enough to the Mercedes in the tunnel to have actually interfered with its progress. 
 
Just 6 hours before she died, Diana let slip to Daily Mail reporter Richard Kray that she was 



























Appendix K ± Scale used in Study 8 
Attribution of causes of problems that are facing society today used in Study 8 
 
Listed below are some common problems that are facing society today.  Please indicate the 
extent to which you think these problems are due to the actions of individuals or small groups 
in society OR fundamental flaws inherent in UK society such as flawed laws, values, norms, 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7      8  9 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7      8  9 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7      8  9 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7      8  9 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7      8  9 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7      8  9 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7      8  9 
          Individuals and small groups                                               Flaws in UK society 
 
Conflict and war 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7      8  9 
          Individuals and small groups                                               Flaws in UK society 
 
